NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

THE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE

FOR

JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS

2002 – 2003

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

FOREWORD

THIS SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE provide a comprehensive overview of the Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department course on Joint Maritime Operations. Prepared for the College of Naval Command and Staff, they also provide session-by-session material to assist the student in daily seminar preparation. Administrative information is also included.

Theodore L. Gatchel
Acting Chairman,
Joint Military Operations Department

Approved:

James F. Miskel
Acting Dean of Academics

CONTENTS

COURSE STUDY GUIDES

Course Foundations

Block I. Operational Concepts / Law

Block II.
Military Organization and Planning Concepts

Block III.
Military Operations Other Than War

Block IV.
Regional Contingency Planning and Warfighting

A D D E N D A

1. Mission.

The mission of the Joint Military Operations Department is to develop in our students the ability to translate contemporary national and regional military strategies into naval, joint, and multinational operations, with particular emphasis on operational art and employment of the sea services. Furthermore, the department aspires to help our students to hone their skills in making sound operational decisions in both command and staff positions in order to prepare them for higher responsibilities in future Service, joint, and multinational assignments.

2. Course Overview.

The Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) course focuses on enhancing the capability of officers to think and to make decisions at the operational and operational-tactical levels of war. In conjunction with the other two academic departments, the Advanced Research Program, and the Electives Program, JMO provides the student with a key element in the mutually complementary war college education. Within the three core curricula, S&P offers a foundation in strategic thinking; NSDM familiarizes the student with strategic planning and the procurement of military forces; and JMO prepares students to think operationally, and to plan for and apply resources to meet the military goals and objectives derived from the nation's security strategy. This course expands student familiarity with Service capabilities, and exposes the student to a range of methods and disciplines employed in using those capabilities. Examples of these are: threat assessment; the military planning process; and analysis of Service and joint doctrines. The focus is on joint operations at the theater level and at the task force level; however, maritime operations and sea service contributions are emphasized. Reference is made throughout the trimester to the ability of the Joint Force Commander and the staff planners to be able to answer confidently five fundamental questions posed in joint doctrine:

- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce those conditions? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish the desired sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?
- What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the JFC's exit strategy?

Instilling the ability to answer these questions is the very essence of the Joint Maritime Operations course.

3. Course Objectives.

- Acquire the capacity to focus thought at the operational and operational-tactical levels of war.

- Improve the ability to assess the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) as they apply to joint and multinational military operations.
- Develop the expertise to select, allocate, and task military forces across the spectrum of conflict.
- Understand the relationships among national and multi-national military forces, non-DOD or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs).
- Strengthen the skills used in assessing regional security issues.
- Improve upon the ability to understand, analyze, and communicate complex issues clearly and effectively, both orally and in writing.

4. Course Organization

Following the Course Foundations sessions, the trimester is grouped into four "blocks." In general terms, these blocks are subdivided further into three sections which equate to approximately one week each of "concepts and doctrine," "illustration," and "application," where students will conduct staff studies, problem analyses, or operational planning exercises. Week One is used to acquaint the student with basic information, to level the playing field, or to introduce new concepts and ideas. In Week Two, the faculty will use cases, in conjunction with student presentations, to illustrate these concepts and ideas in a format which the student will then apply in a practical exercise in the final week. The course is cumulative in that each week and each block builds on the previous segment. The culmination of the trimester is a multi-crisis planning exercise, which will permit the students to apply the material covered in the JMO trimester.

The first eight sessions of the trimester constitute what is called Course Foundations. In these seminar sessions and lectures the student is introduced to the fundamental themes which are subsequently woven throughout the ensuing four blocks. Block One, "Operational Concepts/Law," will introduce operational art concepts, illustrate these concepts using the Battle of Leyte Gulf as a case study, and then provide the students an opportunity to employ operational art in an analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. Following the Operational Concepts examination, international law considerations are discussed. Block Two, "Military Organization and Planning Concepts," will consider the various Service capabilities and employment considerations. A review of the planning processes used by the CINCs and Joint Force Commanders as well as an introduction to the Commander's Estimate of the Situation are included in this block. Block Three, introducing Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), uses historical cases covering failed (and failing) states, the interagency process, Foreign Internal Defense (insurgency/counterinsurgency), terrorism, homeland security, and peace operations. Block Three concludes with a synthesis event during which the interagency process is challenged with applying resources to the solving of fundamental governmental problems in a nation on the verge of becoming a "failed state," offering the students an opportunity to apply the material covered thus far in the course. Block Four is the culmination of the course. Students prepare a Commander's Estimate of the Situation in addition to an overall campaign plan and operations orders, as appropriate. This planning exercise serves as the course synthesis event. The final portion of this block is dedicated to applying the plan developed by the seminars. The course concludes with the Final Examination, which takes into account the entire trimester's readings, classroom

seminar work, exercises, *and* the Multi-crisis Planning Exercise.

The Operations Research Paper, detailed in the Course Foundations section (CF-4), is a significant contribution to the trimester learning experience. It takes the form of a 14-17 page paper. This effort requires research, analysis, and written presentation of a subject chosen by the student early in the trimester. Students are often asked to share during daily seminar discussions the expertise which they gradually acquire during the process of developing their Research Paper.

In summary, the course is organized so that each student may benefit from the combined contributions of faculty, guest speakers, and—most importantly—the richness of the shared experiences, professional expertise, and research achievements of the corporate student body.

5. Student Guidelines.

The syllabus establishes the basis for required course work. In each session, "Focus" specifies the general context of the topic. Next, the "Objectives" section cites the session goals, including objectives required for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I certification. The "Background" section provides assistance in framing the individual session. Finally, the "Questions" and "Readings" sections serve to focus student preparation and enhance understanding of the topic.

The Joint Maritime Operations course fulfills approximately 85 percent of the Phase I, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) objectives established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The objectives identified as "PJE" in each session reflect these requirements. The remaining 15 percent of the JPME objectives are fulfilled in the National Security and Decision Making (NSDM) course.

Students joining the class as November "phased inputs" should read *Clausewitz and Sun Tzu Compared* by the late Dr. Michael Handel, formerly of our Strategy and Policy Department. This book, placed in the November students' mailboxes, will assist in discussing operational art and other topics with classmates who have already completed the Strategy and Policy course.

6. Methodology.

The seminar is the fundamental learning forum. Student expertise is a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to succeed there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, tempered with decorum. You will find that even the most "off-the-wall" idea may have some merit. Successful seminars—that is, seminars whose members leave with the greatest knowledge—are those made up of members who come to each session "loaded" with questions based on thorough preparation. Most students leave the seminar with new insights, or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of other students' ideas, all contribute to a valuable seminar experience. The "one-third" rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is the quality of the faculty. The most important third is you, the individual student. You are the active catalyst that generates the "action."

7. Readings.

All JMO Course sessions are supported by readings, the purpose of which is to assist in understanding the many aspects of the topics being presented. For the most part the readings are intended to convey to the student basic information, the mastery of which in study outside the class will facilitate the discussions to take place within the class. A thorough understanding of the following information will significantly assist the student in using the course readings to best advantage:

(a) **Categories of Readings.** Each syllabus session lists categories of readings.

(1) *Required Readings* are those which should be read prior to the session, usually in the sequence listed in order to best understand the session material. Often your moderators will offer additional guidance on the priority of the readings, based on the special needs of the individual seminar.

(2) *Supplementary Readings* are those relevant to a session topic which may be useful to a student seeking more information in order to gain insight beyond that provided by the Required Readings; this would include additional background material on case studies and exercises. On occasion, faculty moderators may assign Supplementary Readings to individual students to read and provide oral synopses to the seminar in support of topic discussion.

(b) **Reading Identifiers.** Each reading that is not a complete book or publication has a cover page which provides the four-digit reading identifier (e.g. NWC 1002) in the upper right-hand corner, and the reading title found below the Naval War College crest.

(c) **Finding Specific Readings.** Readings for any specific session may be located as follows:

(1) Required Readings are annotated as Issued at the end of the reading entry. This means they may be found in the Banker's Box of Readings provided to each student at the beginning of the JMO trimester. The Banker's Box is internally divided into specific JMO sessions by marked tabs (e.g., OPS I-2, III-3, etc.). The Issued Readings for the session are directly behind the session tab. Bulky Issued Readings such as books, publications, and large extracts are found either at the back of the Banker's Box or in a separate bag.

(2) Supplementary Readings are annotated as (Issued), (Seminar Reserve), or (Library Reserve) at the end of each Reading entry. If Issued, the reading is in the Banker's Box. If Seminar Reserve, several copies of the reading will be located on the rolling book cart in the seminar classroom. If Library Reserve, the reading (usually three to five copies) is located in the JMO Library Reserve section for JMO student use. Websites or library call numbers may be indicated for some readings. If there is no cue listed, the student will need to research the item; these readings are, however, frequently available in the Henry E. Eccles Library. The POC for a given session will be able to guide the student experiencing difficulty in tracking down a particular reading. Additional assistance is available from the reference librarians.

(3) CNC&S 2002-2003 Reading List. This extremely useful handout is located at the very front of the Banker's Box and may be the critical key to finding a reading when all else fails. It lists all NWC-numbered readings (e.g., NWC 1002) in numerical order, identifies status (Issued, Seminar Reserve, or Library Reserve), and identifies the course session to which the reading pertains. Readings are also listed by session number. The same information is also provided for books and publications. The Reading List is particularly useful for linking NWC numbered readings to their specific course sessions in situations where the readings are distributed after the Banker's Box or are otherwise separated from the Box.

(4) Readings Relevant to More Than One Session. Some NWC-numbered readings (Issued) may be listed as Required or Supplementary for more than one session. In such cases, the reading will be found with the session tab (in the Banker's Box) of the first session to which the reading has been assigned. Duplicate copies of the reading are not provided for later sessions in which the reading is listed. Therefore, if an Issued Reading is not found with a session tab in the Banker's Box, cross-reference it using the Reading List to determine if the reading has been utilized for a previous session. If that fails, check the back of the Banker's Box in case the reading is bulky. If the reading isn't there, advise your faculty moderator, who will determine if the reading was inadvertently not included in your Banker's Box or if there is a class-wide problem.

(5) Classified Readings. The few classified readings used in the JMO Course will not be issued until near the date required for a specific session. Sufficiently in advance of the session, students will be advised when and where to draw the classified readings. Normally arrangements are made for students to obtain the classified reading from PUBS (located in the basement of Conolly Hall).

IMPORTANT NOTE: Students are cautioned that *classified readings and documents must be read on the premises of the Naval War College*. Ensure such materials are properly safeguarded at all times. Do not leave the materials unattended, even in your cubicle area. Students are not provided with classified material storage containers (safes); it is therefore necessary to check out and return classified material on a daily basis. Faculty moderators will provide additional information as required during the JMO trimester.

Management of Reading Load. The amount of preparatory reading required for each session depends on a variety of factors, including topic complexity and session objectives. *Recommend you review session reading requirements at least a week ahead of time in order to accurately plan preparation time and ensure that all necessary readings are in hand.*

8. Operations Research Paper.

The Operations Research Paper presents the opportunity to study a theater-strategic or operational-level issue, conduct research and analysis, and prepare a paper that advances the literature. It is a chance for students to address a topic that they personally feel is of value. It requires independent thought and graduate-level writing, as the final product must be a 14-17 page paper suitable for publication in a professional journal. The amount and depth of research should be adequate to support the student's approach, and sufficiently justify the conclusions and recommendations. Another use of the paper may be to provide a source of innovative thinking to the Service and joint staffs involved with the many issues bearing on employment of forces.

Numerous combatant and headquarters commands actively solicit papers and monographs on topics of current interest to them. The Naval War College is frequently canvassed for papers on particular subjects, and requested to generate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. Quality papers are provided to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) via the Naval War College's Eccles Library, where qualified users can access them for use in a variety of applications.

Students are encouraged to submit their research papers for the War College Prize Competition as described in the Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM), which is included in the "Student Handbook." Amplifying information and guidance on the selection and execution of a successful Operations Research Paper project is provided in NWC 2062J. Your moderators will answer questions and otherwise assist you in this most important intellectual undertaking during the Introductory Seminar (CF-2), the Operations Research Paper-Review session (CF-4), and student tutorials in December.

9. Plagiarism and Misrepresentation.

While occurrences of plagiarism and misrepresentation are exceedingly rare, the consequences of such acts are so serious as to warrant specific mention here, and will also be reviewed in seminar by the moderator team at the beginning of the trimester. Your attention is directed to the Naval War College SORM, which discusses the academic honor code and specifically prohibits cheating, plagiarism, and misrepresentation. For the military officer accustomed to the legitimate staff practice of adopting verbatim the language of orders and directives produced by other commands, the academic prohibition of using the words of other writers without proper attribution must be reviewed and emphasized. The following definitions clarify this important issue:

Plagiarism is the duplication of an author's words without both quotation marks and accurate references or footnotes. It is also the paraphrased use of an author's ideas without accurate references or footnotes.

Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. It may include the following:

- Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the Naval War College without advance permission of the moderators.

- Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the Naval War College without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

10. Cases.

Like games, case method discussions generate good student involvement and are designed to develop student abilities to solve problems using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the JMO trimester. Some of our cases and problems stress individual effort and planning, while other cases will require a team or staff approach. Cases may consist of historical events, analyzed for operational and strategic lessons, or postulated crisis situations demonstrating the application of concepts such as presence, deterrence, international law, rules of engagement, and self-defense. Case problems

sometimes will be narrowly focused to demonstrate a specific force and its capabilities and limitations or to highlight specific concepts involving an aspect of warfare. Seminars are often split into small groups or teams to prepare solutions and responses.

11. Lectures by Senior Military Leaders.

Enrichment lectures by senior military leaders occur periodically during the course. Most of these presentations feature the Chiefs of Service or regional and functional combatant commanders. These speakers are invited to discuss views and ideas from their perspective as operational commanders, Service Chiefs, or as senior staff officers. The lectures are normally scheduled for Monday or Tuesday afternoons from 1330–1500. The busy schedules of senior officers, however, often make a departure from this schedule unavoidable. The weekly yellow schedule will specify the final date and time of each enrichment lecture. Last minute changes will be disseminated by seminar moderators. In order to gain the most benefit from these sessions, it is critical that students be prepared to ask penetrating questions of the guest lecturer.

Note: *The substance of the lectures and the ensuing question and answer period are "Not for Attribution" and must not be referenced or identified outside the War College confines, or in any written work, including the Operations Research Paper, without the express permission of the speaker. Care should be taken not to quote an earlier speaker when posing questions to a subsequent speaker.*

12. Requirements.

Students are expected to prepare fully for each seminar and to participate in classroom discussions and exercises. A tough-minded, questioning attitude and a willingness to enter into rigorous but disciplined discussion are central to the success of the course.

(a) **Workload.** Some peaks in the workload will occur. Advance planning and careful allocation of time will help mitigate these peaks. This is particularly true of the Operations Research Paper. Student experience indicates that the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of about 10-15 hours of in-class and 40-45 hours of out-of-class work.

(b) **Oral and Written Requirements.** Each section of the course has oral and written requirements that provide the opportunity for the student to demonstrate progress. In addition, these requirements serve as a means for feedback and interaction between the faculty and members of the class. Not all requirements are graded, but each provides the student some measure of how he or she is doing at that point in the course. The following is a composite listing of these course requirements, type of activity, relative weights and the key dates of graded events:

Requirement	*Type Effort*	*Weight*	*Date*
Operations Research Paper Proposal	Written/Individual meeting with moderators		9 December (Proposal due) 10–13 December (Tutorials)
Operational Concepts Exam	Written/Individual	15%	13 December
Operations Research Paper	Written/Individual	35%	3 February
Final Examination	Written/Individual	25%	7 March
Seminar Contribution	Assessment by moderators	25%	Daily

13. JMO Department Grading Criteria.

The overall guidance for grading students at the Naval War College is contained in Naval War College SORM. The most salient points in this instruction are:

- Based on the analysis of past grade achievements, a grade distribution of 35%–45% "A's" and 55% - 65% "B's" and "C's" combined can be expected. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it would be unusual to reach an overall "A" to "B/C" ratio greater than an even 50/50 distribution.

- Numerical averages will not be rounded up (i.e., 89.95 is a B+ and will not be rounded up to an A-).

- Any assigned grade may be appealed in writing within seven days after receiving the grade. Grades will be appealed first to the senior moderator and then to the Department Chairman, using forms available in Room C-203. If deemed necessary, the Chairman may assign an additional grader who will review the assignment and provide an independent grade. Note that the review *may sustain, lower, or raise the grade.*

Grade appeals may ultimately be taken to the Dean of Academics, whose decision will be final. The academic coordinator, Ms. Carol Stewart, in Room C-203, can assist in preparing an appeal.

A course average grade of B- or higher is required for successful completion of master's degree requirements. A minimum grade of C- is required for successful completion of the JMO course and receipt of JPME Phase I certification.

Three sets of general grading criteria help in the determination of the letter grades that will be assigned during the Joint Maritime Operations trimester. The inclusion of these criteria here in the syllabus offers the student a suggestion of the kinds of standards and requirements for which grading faculty look. The first set covers the Operations Research Paper; the second covers the examinations, and the third covers individual contribution grades.

Using the Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM) as basic guidance, the procedures below amplify the criteria as established within the Joint Military Operations Department.

a. Grading criteria for the Operations Research Paper:

The Operations Research Paper must have a thesis; provide sufficient background research to analyze the thesis; consider arguments and counter-arguments for the thesis and compare conflicting points of view; present logical conclusions drawn from the material presented; and provide recommendations or lessons learned based on the conclusions. In addition to the examples of substantive criteria specified below, the paper must be editorially correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, format, etc.).

A+ (98) Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Especially deserving of

distribution to appropriate authorities and submission for prize competition. Thesis is definitive, research is extensive, subject is treated completely, and the conclusions and recommendations are logical and justified.

A (95) Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original thought. Suitable for distribution and submission for prize competition. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, research is significant, arguments and counter-arguments are comprehensive, and conclusions and recommendations are supported.

A- (92) Above the average expected of graduate work. Contains original thought. Should be retained in the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Thesis is clearly defined, research is purposeful, arguments and counter-arguments are presented, conclusions and recommendations are valid.

B+ (88) A solid paper. Above the average of graduate work. Thesis is articulated, research has strong points, subject is well-presented and constructed, and conclusions and recommendations are substantiated by the material.

B (85) Average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, research is appropriate for the majority of the subject, analysis of the subject is valid with minor omissions, and conclusions and recommendations are presented with few inconsistencies.

B- (82) Below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the research does not fully support it; the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are not fully developed. The paper may not be balanced and the logic may be flawed.

C+ (78) Fails to meet the standards of graduate work. Portions of the criteria are lacking or missing, the thesis may be unclear, research may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the conclusions and recommendations may be lacking or not supported by the material.

C (75) Below the standards required of graduate work. Thesis is present, but support, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are either missing or illogically presented. Paper has significant flaws in construction and development.

C- (72) Well below standards. Thesis poorly stated with minimal evidence of research and several missing requirements. Subject is presented in an incoherent manner that does not warrant serious consideration.

F (65) Paper has no thesis, or does not support the thesis. Paper has significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, logic. An apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements for the paper.

b. Grading criteria for the exams:

A+ (98) Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total

grasp and comprehension of the topic.

A (95) Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written.

A- (92) Above the average expected of graduate work. Demonstrates a very good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent manner.

B+ (88) Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis.

B (85) Average graduate performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued.

B- (82) Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity.

C+ (78) Demonstrates some grasp of topic, but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit.

C (75) Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Misses major elements or concepts.

C- (72) Addresses the question, but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic.

F (65) Fails to address the question.

c. Grading criteria for seminar contributions:

The seminar contribution grade is determined by moderator evaluation of the quality of a student's contributions to seminar discussions, projects, and exercises.

All students are expected to contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar-mates or moderators offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and will negatively affect the contribution grade.

A+ (98) Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual seminar sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.

A (95) Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Frequently offers original and well thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

A- (92) Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes

original, well-developed insights in the majority of seminar sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

B+ (88) Above-average graduate level preparation for seminar sessions. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.

B (85) Average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.

B- (82) Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.

C+ (78) Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.

C (75) Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.

C- (72) Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.

F (65) Unacceptable preparation. Contributions are rare and reflect below-minimum acceptable understanding of session material. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work.

14. Seminar Assignments.

The principal criterion in assigning students to a seminar is a balanced distribution among Services and agencies, as well as student and moderator specialties and operational expertise. Two faculty members are assigned to each seminar. Student seminar, classroom, and faculty assignments are published separately.

15. Schedule.

Seminars usually meet in the morning. Depending on the work assigned, you may all meet for scheduled periods in seminar as a group, in smaller teams depending on tasking, or to conduct individual study and research. Please pay close attention to the start times for each event since they vary throughout the trimester. Classes normally are scheduled for 0830-1145. Moderators may adjust these times to facilitate the learning objectives for each segment of instruction. A course-planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is provided in the Addenda to this syllabus. The weekly schedule (printed on yellow paper) reflects revisions and supersedes the schedule contained in the syllabus. Late changes will be announced by memo delivered to student

mailboxes or by the moderators in class.

16. Key Personnel.

If you require additional information on the course, or if problems develop that cannot be resolved with your moderators, you may contact the Chairman via his Executive Assistant. The key departmental personnel are:

Chairman of the Department	CAPT A. J. Ruoti, Jr., USN Room C-203, 841-3556
Executive Assistant	PROF J. C. Hodell Room C-203, 841-6458
Academic Coordinator	Ms. C. A. Stewart Room C-203, 841-4120
Head, Course Foundations	CAPT W. P. Nash, USN Room C-411, 841-2598
Head, Block One Operational Concepts	CAPT C. E. Helms, USN Room C-422, 841-6471
Head, Block Two Military Organization and Planning Concepts	PROF P. C. Sweeney Room C-424, 841-6480
Head, Block Three Military Operations Other Than War	PROF J. R. Ballard Room C-411, 841-6415
Head, Block Four Multi-crisis Planning and Warfighting	CAPT R. M. Babb, USN Room C-423, 841-6467
Head, Intelligence (CI) Division	CAPT D. J. Maresh, USN Room SE-117, 841-6485
Head, International Law Division (IL)	CAPT B. J. Waltman, JAGC, USN Room C-424, 841-6473

17. Faculty Assistance.

Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, and to provide counseling as required. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so that moderators can render assistance in a timely manner. Students are urged to make use of this non-classroom time with the faculty. During Tutorials, scheduled in conjunction with Operations Research Paper, moderators may take the opportunity to discuss student progress as well as to solicit student input on the course to date. Faculty room numbers and telephone extensions are listed below in paragraph 19. The majority of the faculty are located on the fourth deck of Conolly Hall, except where noted. SP denotes Spruance Hall; SE denotes Sims Hall; M denotes Mahan Hall; and L denotes Luce Hall.

18. Student Critiques.

We strive continually to improve this course. To assist us in this goal students are provided an End-of-Course Questionnaire for completion. We have also provided "Course Session Critique Notes" to allow students to record information as they go along. Both the Critique and the note pages are provided in the Addendum. The note pages will enable you to record your insights on matters you may otherwise forget by the time you fill out the End of Course Questionnaire (e.g., which readings were particularly helpful, and which ones missed the mark.) The End-of-Course Questionnaire is required and will be submitted electronically. *The Questionnaire must be submitted and receipt acknowledged not later than 1200 on Friday, 7 March*. Your constructive comments will help ensure that the course remains relevant and vital in the years to come.

19. JMO Departmental Directory.

Position	Name	Room	Phone #
Departmental Administration			
Chairman	CAPT A. J. Ruoti Jr., USN	C-203	13556
Secretary	Ms. H. Eldridge	C-203	13414
Executive Assistant	PROF J. C. Hodell	C-203	16458
Academic Coordinator	Ms. C. A. Stewart	C-203	14120
Faculty Support Clerk	Mrs. C. A. Durkin	C-417	12596
4th Deck FAX	(401) 841-2597 (DSN 948-2597)	C-417	
Course Foundations			
Coordinator	CAPT W. P. Nash, USN	C-411	12598
Faculty	CAPT S. D. Kornatz, USN	C-420	16460
Operational Concepts (Block I)			
Division Head	CAPT C. E. Helms, USN	C-422	16471
Faculty	COL W. F. Brown, Jr., USA	SP-212	12134
Faculty	PROF D. W. Chisholm	C-412	12328
Faculty	PROF T. L. Gatchel	C-413	13467
Faculty	PROF D. M. Goodrich	C-420	16457
Faculty	PROF M. N. Vego	C-414	16483
Military Organization and Planning Concepts (Block II)			
Division Head	PROF P. C. Sweeney	C-424	16480
Faculty	COL D. T. Lennox, USMC	C-422	16230
Faculty	LTC G. P. Wilson, USA	C-415	16462
Faculty	CDR J. L. Barker, USN	C-409	16484
Faculty	Lt Col J. E. Brence, USAF	C-410	16476
Faculty	Lt Col D. T. Goldizen, USAF	C-414	16465
Faculty	CAPT M. D. Seaman, USN	C-412	16477
Faculty	CAPT D. J. Maresh, USN	SE-117	16485

Faculty	COL K. G. Merrigan, USA	C-415	14146
Faculty	CDR D. M. Galicki, USN	C-410	16474
Faculty	CDR R. J. F. Buckland, RN	C-409	13209
Military Operations Other Than War (Block III)			
Division Head	PROF J. R. Ballard	C-411	16415
Faculty	CAPT D. A. Jones, USN	C-407	16468
Faculty	CAPT M. J. Campbell, USCG	SP-214	12397
Faculty	CAPT D. F. Offer, USN	C-422	16230
Faculty	PROF J. D. Waghelstein	C-421	16469
Faculty	PROF D. F. Chandler	C-425	16478
Faculty	PROF E. A. McIntyre (CIA)	C-425	13394
Faculty	LTC M. J. McKearn, USA	C-408	16570
Regional Contingency Planning and Warfighting (Block IV)			
Division Head	CAPT R. M. Babb, USN	C-423	16467
Faculty	COL R. J. Findlay, USMC	C-415	14146
Faculty	PROF D. N. Hime	C-423	16463
Faculty	COL M. A. Englert, USA	C-407	16482
Faculty	CDR B. J. Waltman, JAGC, USN	C-424	16473
Faculty	PROF R. K. Reilly (MARAD)	C-408	16475
Faculty	PROF H. F. Lynch	C-421	16564
Faculty	CAPT W. J. Richardson	C-413	16466
Intelligence Division (CI)			
Division Head	CAPT D. J. Maresh, USN	SE-117	16485
Staff Intel Officer	CDR A. R. Wall, USN	SE-117	16486
Assistant SSO	CTA1 C. C. Seerden, USN	SE-117	16488
Intel Assistant	Mr. Mark Litman	SE-117	14709
International Law Division (CJ)			
Division Head	CAPT B. J. Waltman, JAGC, USN	C-424	16473
College of Distant Education (CDE)			
CDE/JMO JMO Division Head	PROF P. J. St Laurent	L-125	17907
Faculty	PROF R. J. Martin	L-115	16525
Faculty	PROF A. K. Ross	L-118	16528
Faculty	PROF J. D. Roberts	L-116	13277
Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC)			
Director	CAPT M. R. Critz, USN	C-217	12532
Deputy Director	PROF P. A. Romanski	M-11	17377
Faculty	Lt Col J. C. Dill, USAF	C-217	12534
Administrative Assistant	Ms. S. A. Logan	C-217	12519

20. Faculty Biographies.

CAPTAIN ANTHONY J. RUOTI, JR., USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department as chairman in August 2002, following a tour as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces Europe. Captain Ruoti graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1975. Upon winning his wings in 1976, he reported to Training Squadron THIRTY-ONE, NAS Corpus Christi, Texas serving as Aircraft and Avionics/Armament Division Officers, as well as Schedules Officer. He achieved every flight instructor designation in the TS-2A and T-44 multi-engine training aircraft. In April 1979, Captain Ruoti joined Patrol Squadron FIVE, NAS Jacksonville serving as Aircraft Division Officer, Training Officer, and Pilot NATOPS Officer. He was designated P-3 "Orion" Patrol Plane Commander, Mission Commander, and Instructor Pilot. VP-5 deployed to NAS Bermuda and NAS Sigonella, with detachments to Iceland, Crete, Spain, the Azores, Puerto Rico and Senegal, working closely with allied naval forces throughout the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Captain Ruoti reported to Commander Patrol Wing ELEVEN in May 1982 as Pilot NATOPS/Safety Officer. In 1984 He reported on board USS FORRESTAL as Communications Officer, deploying to the Mediterranean. His next tour started in March 1987 with Moffet Field, California based Patrol Squadron NINETEEN as Assistant Operations Officer and Maintenance Officer. While with "Big Red," Captain Ruoti deployed to Diego Garcia, BIOT detaching to Daharan, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Oman, Okinawa and Misawa, Japan. Between December 1988 and March 1990 he served as Executive Officer of the West Coast's P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron, Patrol Squadron THIRTY-ONE. He reported to Patrol Squadron NINE in 1990 taking command in 1991. During this tour his squadron was awarded the Battle "E", deploying to Misawa, Japan and detaching to Adak, Alaska and Panama. From 1993 until 1996, Captain Ruoti served on The Joint Staff, in the Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Directorate (J6), Architecture and Integration Division. Following this Washington tour he reported to Commander Patrol Wings Atlantic/Commander Task Force EIGHTY-FOUR as operations officer and subsequently as Chief of Staff. In September 1997, Captain Ruoti assumed command of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing FIVE, preparing and certifying Patrol and Special Project Squadrons for forward deployed operations. Captain Ruoti attended the Naval War College, receiving a master's degree in National Security and Strategic Studies in 1993.

CAPTAIN ROBIN M. BABB, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in the fall of 1999, having completed a tour as Deputy Chief, Strategic Plans Division, USCINCPAC, Honolulu, Hawaii. She is a Fleet Support Officer with a communications subspecialty. Her communications assignments include tours at NAVCOMMSTA Greece, NAVCAMSLANT Norfolk, FACSFAC San Diego, CNO OPNAV 941H, NAVCOMTELSTA London, NAVCOMTELSTA Diego Garcia. She also was a Placement Officer at BUPERS. Her degrees include a B.A. in Math from Stonehill College (1975), M.S. in Telecommunications Systems Management from Naval Postgraduate School (1987), and an M.S. in National Resources Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (1996).

PROFESSOR JOHN R. BALLARD joined the Naval War College faculty in August 2000, having taught for six years the National Defense University. He came to Newport directly from a tour as visiting Professor of Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, in Palmerston North, New Zealand. Previously his National Defense University duties were at the Joint Forces Staff College, where he served as Professor of Military History and Strategy and the Director of Curriculum. Professor Ballard's career has included broad experience in teaching operational planning, command and control, interagency coordination, and military history. His research has focused on Joint Task Forces and Peace Operations, and he is currently writing a book on Operation STABILISE, the multinational operation in East Timor. Professor Ballard's past writing efforts have included prize-winning articles in numerous military and professional publications; his first book, published in 1998, was *Upholding Democracy, the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997*. His active duty in the U. S. Marine Corps included tours at 2nd, 3rd and 4th Marine Divisions, Headquarters Marine Corps and the staff of U.S. Atlantic Command. A Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, he was recently mobilized in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 at Marine Forces Pacific. Professor Ballard's degrees include a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Naval Academy, a master of arts in history from California State University, and a doctorate from the Catholic University of America.

COMMANDER JEFFREY L. BARKER, USN, returned to the Naval War College faculty in August 1999, and is the current holder of the Matthew Fontaine Maury Military Chair of Oceanography. A 1976 graduate of the Georgia Institute of Technology, with a B.S. in Physics, he earned an M.S. in Oceanography and Meteorology from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 1987, and also earned an M.A. from the Naval War College in 1994. In his initial sea tour in USS KALAMAZOO (AOR-6) Commander Barker was designated a Surface Warfare Officer. After assignment at the U.S. Naval Academy, he was redesignated as a Meteorology and Oceanography Officer and reported to Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center in Monterey, CA as the Fleet Applications Division Officer. In addition to his initial Naval War College faculty tour, Meteorology and Oceanography assignments have included: A sea tour in USS WISCONSIN (BB-64) and; overseas tours as the Executive Officer of the Naval Oceanography Command Facility in Yokosuka, Japan, and as the Staff METOC Officer in the London headquarters of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Force Europe.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN E. BRENCE, USAF, joined the Joint Military Operations Department Faculty in September 2001, following a two year assignment at Fort Hood, Texas where he served as the Director of Operations for the 9th Air Support Operations Squadron and Commander of the 712th Air Support Operations Squadron. Lt Col Brence is a Senior Navigator with over 1300 flight hours in the T-43, T-37, T-38, and F-111A/D/F. Other assignments include a tour with the 32nd Fighter Group (FG), Soesterberg Air Base, The Netherlands as Chief of Plans, Chief of Exercises and Evaluations, and Deputy Commander of the 32nd Logistics Squadron. He was then selected to attend Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, followed by an assignment to the College of Aerospace Doctrine and Education (CADRE), where he was the Chief of Education Products for CADRE's Airpower

Research Institute. Finally, he was stationed at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and assigned to Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, as Chief of the Forces Requirements Branch. Lt Col Brence earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Military History and his commission from the USAF Academy in 1981, and was awarded a Master's of Public Administration from Troy State University in 1988.

COLONEL WILFRED F. BROWN, USA, joined the joint Military Operations faculty in June 2000 after graduating from the College of Naval Warfare class of 2000. Prior to attendance at the CNW, he served in the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division from 1996-1999 as Deputy G3, Commander of 3-101 Aviation (AH-64), and as Deputy Commander, 101st Aviation Brigade. He entered the Army in September 1970, completed flight school in January of 1972 and served as an Aviation Warrant Officer until September of 1980 when he was commissioned as a First Lieutenant of Armor. Col Brown served in a variety of command and staff positions in Korea, Germany and the United States in both armor and cavalry units. After completing the Infantry Officer's Advanced Course, he served as an exchange officer with the United States Marine Corps from 1983 through 1987, assigned to HMLA 269 deploying to the Mediterranean, Central America, and the northern flank of NATO. Col Brown completed CGSC in 1991 and subsequently served at the Army's personnel command and with the 4th Infantry Division. Col Brown holds a B.S. in History from Bradley University, a B.A. in Business Administration from Troy State University, and an M.A. from the Naval War College.

COMMANDER RICHARD J. F. BUCKLAND, ROYAL NAVY, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in July 2002 following completion of the Naval Command Course at the U.S. Naval War College. He joined the Royal Navy in 1978 and after graduating from the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, qualified as an Anti-Submarine Warfare Observer in 1979. His first operational tour was spent with 819 Naval Air Squadron, Prestwick, flying SH-3s on Anti-Submarine and Search and Rescue duties prior to joining HMS ENDURANCE Flight in 1981, this time flying in the Wasp helicopter in the attack and survey support roles. In this memorable appointment he took part in two fascinating deployments to the Antarctic and saw service during the Falklands Conflict in 1982. Returning ashore in 1983, conversion to the Airborne Early Warning(AEW) Sea King helicopter preceded a return to sea for bridge watchkeeping duties in HM Ships ARGONAUT and PENELOPE prior to joining the staff of 849 Naval Air Squadron. In 1986 he took up an exchange appointment with the United States Navy in San Diego, California, instructing on the E2C 'Hawkeye' carrier–borne Early Warning aircraft, returning to the UK in 1989 as the Senior Observer 849 'B' Flight attached to HMS ARK ROYAL's air group. Following the Initial Staff Course in 1991 he joined the staff of the Naval Air Warfare Development Group with responsibility for AEW Sea King tactics. From 1994 to 1997 he was Executive Officer first in HMS NEWCASTLE, and latterly in HMS MONMOUTH prior to joining the staff of the Flag Officer Surface Flotilla as the Staff Executive Officer with responsibility for management issues in RN warships. Promoted to commander in December 1999, he took command of the Type 23 frigate HMS LANCASTER where he enjoyed a busy and rewarding period in command, culminating in a deployment to the Arabian Gulf in support of UN sanctions and national tasking.

CAPTAIN MARK J. CAMPBELL, USCG, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in August 2001 following a ten month assignment as one of nine Senior Fellows in the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. He was commissioned through the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, CT in 1977 and was designated a Cutterman in 1978. His sea duty assignments include tours of duty embarked in USCGC EVERGREEN (WAGO 295) as Navigator and Operations Officer; USCGC POINT COUNTESS (WPB 82335) as Commanding Officer from 1979 to 1981; USCGC EVERGREEN (WMEC 295) as Executive Officer from 1984 to 1986; in USCGC NORTHLAND (WMEC 904) as Executive Officer between 1990 and 1992; and in USCGC CAMPBELL (WMEC 909) as Commanding Officer from 1995 to 1997. Ashore, he served as a Watch Supervisor at Vessel Traffic Service Houston/Galveston TX; Instructor and later Associate Professor in the Professional Studies Department at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy; attended the Naval War College (CNC&S) in 1992; served as the Senior Coast Guard Officer/Fleet Training Group Liaison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and as the Assistant Commandant of Cadets at the Coast Guard Academy prior to his assignment to the CNO's SSG in October 2000. Captain Campbell holds a B.S. degree in Ocean Engineering from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (1977) and a M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College (1993).

PROFESSOR DAVID F. CHANDLER assumed a permanent position on the faculty of the Joint Military Operations Department in August 1993, having already completed one year in the Department as a Senior SECNAV Research Fellow. He retired from the Navy in 1992 after 34 years of active duty. A native of Bradford, Massachusetts, Professor Chandler holds degrees in foreign languages from the University of Miami and in International Relations from the American University. He is a graduate of the German General Staff College. As a surface warfare officer, Professor Chandler served in amphibious, logistics, and destroyer force ships. Among his commands were USS MAHAN (DLG 11) and (DDG 42), USS LIPAN (ATF 85), Destroyer Squadrons TWENTY and SIX, the U.S. South Atlantic Force, and the Inter-American Defense College. At the conclusion of his active duty career, he served on the staffs of U.S. Southern Command and Military Sealift Command.

PROFESSOR DONALD W. CHISHOLM joined the Naval War College in 2000. Previously, he was a member of the graduate public administration faculty at the University of Illinois, Chicago (1996-2000). He has also taught political science and public policy at the University of California, Los Angeles (1989-1996), at Ohio State University (1987-1989), and the University of California, San Diego (1984-1986). Professor Chisholm earned his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. in political science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of *Coordination Without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in Multi-organizational Systems* (University of California Press, 1989) and *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793-1941* (Stanford University Press, 2001), along with a number of journal articles on problems of organizations. He is presently at work on a book on the amphibious operations of the Korean War to be published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press.

CAPTAIN MICHAEL R. CRITZ, USN, reported to the Naval War College, Joint Military

Operations faculty in September, 2001 following a three year tour as the Professor of Naval Science at the Naval ROTC Unit, University of Arizona. An HC and HSL helicopter pilot, he has served aboard numerous carriers, destroyers, and auxiliaries, most recently completing a tour as Air Officer aboard the USS INCHON (then LPH-12 , now MCS -12). He has also served as the LAMPS MK I helicopter Assistant Program Manager for Systems and Engineering at the Naval Air Systems Command, Commanding Officer of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron (Light) Thirty-Three (HSL-33), and was previously a member of the JMO faculty. He holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, an M.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School, an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the College of Naval Command and Staff and has completed the JPME Phase II course at the Armed Forces Staff College.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH C. DILL, USAF, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in the fall of 2000, following a one year tour in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as the Chief of Long Range and Contingency Plans, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. He was commissioned through ROTC following graduation from Wilkes College in 1984. He is a Command Navigator with over 12 years flying experience in the B-52 and B-1. His B-52 years were spent at Carswell AFB, TX sitting monthly Strategic Air Command nuclear alert as an Electronic Warfare Officer. In the B-1, Lt Col Dill was an Instructor Weapon Systems Officer and the Commander of the Weapons and Tactics Flight at Ellsworth AFB, SD. At Ellsworth he oversaw 28 Bomb Wing exercises, the wing's flying standards and day-to-day flying operations. He later served as the Chief of NATO Contingency Plans at United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE). He played a major role in developing USAFE's first Air Expeditionary Force War Plan. Lt Col Dill is a graduate of the Naval War College's Naval Operational Planner Course (initial cadre), the Naval War College Command and Staff Course and the Air Force Squadron Officer School. Lt Col Dill holds master's degrees from the Naval War College, Texas Christian University and Texas A and M.

COLONEL MARVIN A. ENGLERT, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 2001 following his completion of the Naval War College. He was commissioned in the Army as an Infantry Officer. His company grade assignments include platoon leader, company executive officer, company commander and assistant brigade operations officer in the 9th Infantry Division and staff officer Forces Command. His field grade assignments include battalion operations officer in the 199th Separate Infantry Brigade, staff officer on the Army Staff, executive officer for the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, base support battalion commander, and professor of military science at Providence College. He holds a bachelor of science degree from the United States Military Academy, a master of science degree in operation research and systems analysis from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a master of arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

COLONEL RICHARD FINDLAY, USMC, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in August 2002, following an eleven month assignment as a Fellow on CNO's Strategic Studies Group XXI. He received his commission in June 1978 from the

US Naval Academy and designated as a Naval Flight Officer in 1979. After completing VMA (AW)-202 he served as Maintenance Materiel Control Officer, Flight Line Officer and Avionics Officer in VMA (AW)-533 with deployments to MCAS Iwakuni and to the Mediterranean on board USS SARATOGA. From 1985 -1986 he served as an instructor at the Staff Non-Commissioned Officer Academy. In 1987 he returned to VMA (AW)-533 and served as Quality Assurance Officer, Assistant and Aviation Maintenance Officer and completed deployments to the Mediterranean on board USS J. F. KENNEDY, to Iwakuni Japan and to Desert Storm. Upon return he transitioned to the F/A-18 and during the stand-ups of VMFA(AW)-225 and VMFA(AW)-533 served as the Intelligence Officer, Administration and Operations Officer between 1993 and 1995 and deployed to Aviano Italy in support of Operations PROVIDE PROMISE and DENY FLIGHT. He served as Commanding Officer VMFA (AW)-332 between 1996 and 1998; as Section Head Aviation Officer Assignments between 1999 and 2001. He holds a B.S. degree in Oceanography from USNA (1978), and a M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He is a 1987 graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, a 1996 graduate of Air Command and Staff College and a 1999 graduate of the Naval War College.

COMMANDER DENNIS M. GALICKI, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations department in August 1999, following completion of a tour as the Future Operations/ Plans and Surface Operations Officer on the staff of Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy, and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. Commander Galicki has served over 17.5 years at sea in destroyers, the combat logistics force, and aircraft carriers. His afloat assignments have included tours in USS MULLINNIX (DD 944), USS WILLIAM C. LAWE (DD 763), USS SANTA BARBARA (AE 28), USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69), USS PLATTE (AO 186), and USS LEXINGTON (AVT 16). Commander Galicki served on the staff of Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group FIVE as Assistant Chief of Staff for Material, deploying with the KITTY HAWK Battle Group in support of humanitarian relief efforts in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and combat operations in support of Operation Desert Storm/Southern Watch in the Persian Gulf. During his most recent assignment he deployed with the GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group to the Mediterranean Sea and Arabian Gulf Ashore he has served as the Enlisted Programs Officer at Navy Recruiting District, Cleveland and as Commanding Officer of Navy Recruiting District, Michigan. He is a proven subspecialist in Naval/Mechanical Engineering and Operational Logistics.

PROFESSOR THEODORE L. GATCHEL rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in July 1998, having taught in the department twice while on active duty. He retired from the Marine Corps in 1991 as a colonel after a thirty-year career that included a wide variety of both staff and command assignments and two combat tours in Vietnam. He holds a B.S. in Geological Engineering from the University of Oklahoma and an M.S. in Management from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is also a graduate of the Naval War College, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the U.S. Army's Infantry Officers Advanced Course. He is the author of *At the Water's Edge: Defending*

Against the Modern Amphibious Assault (Naval Institute Press, 1996) and *Eagles and Alligators: An Examination of the Command Relationships That Have Existed Between Aircraft Carrier and Amphibious Forces During Amphibious Operations* (Naval War College Press, 1997), in addition to numerous magazine and journal articles and a monthly newspaper column on military affairs.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DERRILL T. GOLDIZEN, USAF, joined the Naval War College faculty in the fall of 2002 following an assignment as Director of Weather Operations, 18th Air Support Operations Group, Pope AFB, North Carolina. He completed Air Force Officer Training School as First Honor Graduate and was commissioned in 1984. His operational assignments include tours as Staff Weather Officer to the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Ft Carson, Colorado and the Combined Field Army (ROK/US), Camp Red Cloud, Republic of Korea. He has also served as an intelligence analyst at the National Air Intelligence Center and taught graduate space physics at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. In his most recent assignment, he deployed to Southwest Asia to provide airpower expertise to the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Coalition/Joint Forces Land Component Commander. His degrees include Bachelor of Arts in Natural Sciences from the University of South Florida (1984), Master of Science in Meteorology from the Pennsylvania State University (1991), and Doctor of Science in Meteorology from the Pennsylvania State University (1995).

PROFESSOR DAVID M. GOODRICH joined the faculty of the Naval War College in July 1998. He is a 1959 graduate in the first class of the United States Air Force Academy. He retired from the USAF in 1991, after 32 years of service. A native of San Antonio, Texas, he holds degrees in engineering and International Relations/Soviet Affairs, the latter from the University of California at Los Angeles. He was selected for the first Chief of Staff of the Air Force Senior Fellowship at the National War College, graduating in 1971. His service includes Commander, 24th Air Division, North American Air Defense Command; Commander, 86th Tactical Fighter Wing (USAFE); Commander, 50th Tactical Fighter Wing (USAFE), the first USAF F-16 wing in Europe; Chief, Director Defense Intelligence Agency Staff Group; USAF Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; USAF Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff USAF Programs and Resources; Deputy for Current Operations (J-3) and Plans Officer (J-5), the JCS Joint Staff; and Commandant, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

CAPTAIN CHESTER E. HELMS, USN, enlisted in the Navy in 1969 and received his commission via the Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP). He graduated with honors from North Carolina State University in 1974 with a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering and holds an M.A. from the Naval War College. Captain Helms served sea tours aboard USS OMAHA (SSN 692), USS BOSTON (SSN 703), USS PHILADELPHIA (SSN 690), and as Commanding Officer of USS GEORGE C. MARSHALL (SSBN 654). His shore tours include the staff of Admiral McKee at Naval Reactors, Department of Energy; Tactical Development Staff of Submarine Development Squadron Twelve; and Executive Assistant to the Director for Operations and Logistics and Senior Controller in

the Command Center at U.S. Strategic Command. Captain Helms reported to the Naval War College in August 1995.

PROFESSOR DOUGLAS N. HIME first joined the Naval War College faculty in 1992, following a tour as Chief, International Negotiations, U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee. Following a tour as a member of the faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, Professor Hime retired from the Air Force in September 1998 and rejoined the Naval War College faculty in October 1998. His previous assignments include several operational flying tours in B-52s and a staff assignment in Bomber Operations at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command. He has commanded avionics and field maintenance squadrons in addition to a B-52 squadron. His military schooling includes the Air War College and the NATO Defense College. He holds an undergraduate degree from Emporia State University, and a graduate degree from the University of Southern California, and a Ph.D. in humanities from Salve Regina University.

PROFESSOR JOHN C. HODELL is a 1963 graduate of Villanova University, Villanova, PA. He holds master's degrees from the Naval War College and Salve Regina University. He has begun working on his dissertation toward a doctorate in Humanities from Salve Regina University. He had tours in several Electronic Warfare Squadrons including Commanding Officer of VAQ-130, an EA-6B Squadron. He was a Naval War College faculty member in the Operations Department from November 1981 to September 1984 followed by a tour in the Research, Development and Acquisition Directorate of the OPNAV staff before returning to the War College in 1987. He retired in August 1991, as a Captain, and remained on the faculty.

CAPTAIN DAVID JONES, USN, joined the Naval War College in 2001 and holds the William F. Donovan Military Chair of Special Operations. A 1979 graduate of the University of Kentucky, with a B.A. in Economics, he received his commission through AOCS in 1980. His previous operational assignments have included: Underwater Demolition Team 22, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team Two, SEAL Team Two, Commanding Officer Naval Special Warfare Unit Ten, Joint Special Operations Command, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism-Department of State. His most recent assignment was as Branch Head, Special Warfare Branch OPNAV N751. His subspecialties include Joint Intelligence, Operational Intelligence and Special Operations.

CAPTAIN STEVEN D. KORNATZ, USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in January 2002 following assignment as Air Boss in USS ESSEX (LHD2) homeported in Sasebo, Japan. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1980 with a BS in Mathematics and was designated a Naval Aviator in 1981. An HSL pilot, his sea duty assignments entailed flying SH-2F and SH-60B aircraft with both East and West Coast squadrons. Additionally, he commanded VC-8, a composite squadron of SH-3H and A-4 aircraft based at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. Ashore, he was assigned to VX-1 at NAS Patuxent River, MD as SH-60B Operational Test Director from 1986-1989; was a contingency planning officer and Director, President's Emergency Operations Center with the White House Military Office from 1992-1994; attended the Naval War College, graduating in 1995; and was an Anti-Submarine Warfare planning officer on

CINCPACFLT staff from 1995-1997. He holds a MS degree in Systems Management from the University of Southern California and a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

COLONEL DYER T. LENNOX ,USMC, joined the JMO faculty in July 2000 after a tour as the Chief of Staff at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, CA. He was commissioned through the NROTC program at the University of Michigan in 1973. An Artillery officer, he has served in a wide variety of leadership and staff billets in CONUS, Hawaii, Okinawa and Italy. Commands include an artillery battery at Camp Lejeune, NC, the security company at Camp David, MD and Second Battalion, Twelfth Marines on Okinawa. Besides staff assignments at the artillery battalion and regimental level, he has served in the NMCC, OJCS and as the amphibious plans and operations officer on the COMSTRIKFORSOUTH staff in Naples, Italy. Here he was involved in the planning, preparation and employment of IFOR. His military schooling includes Amphibious Warfare School, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Naval War College. He holds an undergraduate degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Michigan and a MA from the Naval War College.

PROFESSOR HUGH F. LYNCH rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in February 2001, having taught in the department twice before. He served on active duty in the Navy for 26 years, commanded an attack squadron, a carrier air wing and an amphibious ship. Ashore he had two tours in Washington: the first at the Bureau of Naval Personnel and later as Director, Air Weapons Systems Analysis Staff, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. During the Vietnam War, he made three combat deployments while flying A-4 and A-7 aircraft on over 300 missions. In the course of 22 years in the cockpit, he flew from the decks of 18 carriers and piloted 18 types of aircraft, from A-1s to F-14s. He holds an M.S. degree in International Affairs from George Washington University and a B.S. in Economics from Holy Cross College. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College. Professor Lynch has written many studies on naval matters, several of which centered on the Greater Middle East, including a book-length classified study, *Iran, The United States, and The Employment of Navies.*

CAPTAIN DAVID J. MARESH, USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in July 2001, following an assignment on the USCINCPAC Staff as the Intelligence Plans and Readiness Division Chief. He graduated from USNA in 1973, with his first tour as the ASW Officer on USS OUELLET (DE 1077), on which he was designated a Surface Warfare Officer. He attended flight school and earned his Naval Aviator Wings in 1977. Duty as a pilot with VF-121 in Miramar followed, with the F-4 Phantom II. In 1980, he was selected for duty as an Intelligence Officer. He served a tour as CIC Officer on USS STERETT (CG 31) out of Long Beach prior to duty at the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center Pacific, Pearl Harbor. Duty as CINCPACFLT Special Programs Officer for two years followed. In 1984, he served as the Assistant Fleet Intelligence Officer on the COMSEVENTHFLT Staff, homeported in Yokosuka. In 1986 Captain Maresh attended the Naval War College and then reported to the Director of Naval Intelligence in 1987 as the Assistant Director for Administration. He then served as DIA's Navy HUMINT Collection Manager for a joint tour before reporting aboard

USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69) as her Intelligence Officer. In 1994, Captain Maresh assumed command of Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Detachment in Japan. He has two Master's Degrees and has twice been awarded the Defense Superior Service Medal in addition to other personal and unit awards.

PROFESSOR RICHARD J. MARTIN JR., a 1972 graduate of the University of Maine, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 1994 as an active duty Marine Lieutenant Colonel until his retirement from active duty in 1998. His Marine Corps career included assignments in various operational air command and control billets in all three Marine aircraft wings as well as various staff assignments. He also served as Executive Officer and ultimately Commanding Officer of Marine Air Support Squadron-1 in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, he was the air support detachment commander for Marine Forces Afloat aboard the USS NASSAU (LHA-4). He graduated from the USMC Command and Staff College in 1987 and the Air War College in 1994. He holds a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Salve Regina University. After his retirement in September 1998, Professor Martin joined the civilian faculty of the Joint Military Operations Department in the College of Distance Education.

PROFESSOR ELIZABETH A. MCINTYRE, CIA FACULTY REPRESENTATIVE of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), returned to the Naval War College in October 2000 from CIA HQS where she had served in a senior position in the Latin America Division of the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO). She holds the George Herbert Walker Bush Chair of National Intelligence. During her career, Dr. McIntyre has served four tours overseas, first as an operations officer and later as Chief of Station in Western Europe. She has completed several Washington assignments, serving as chief of units focusing on operations in Russia and Central Asia, and spent 1994-95 on the DCI's staff where the majority of her work related to Interagency issues. Dr. McIntyre holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Oxford (England) and a B.A. from Emmanuel College in Boston. She previously served on the JMO faculty at the Naval War College from 1995-99.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK J. MCKEARN, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 2002 following his completion of the Naval War College. Lieutenant Colonel McKearn is a native of Beloit, Wisconsin. He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1981 and was commissioned as an Infantry Second Lieutenant. Following the Infantry Officer basic course he attended flight school and has served in Aviation Branch his entire career. Highlights of LTC McKearn's career include assignments as section leader, 128th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Page, Korea; Headquarters Company Executive Officer, Assistant S-4, and Attack Platoon Leader, 7th Combat Aviation Battalion, 7th Infantry Division; Platoon Leader, Assistant S-3 and Attack Company Commander, 307th Attack Helicopter Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord, California; G-3 Plans Officer and Commander Delta Troop 2/1 Cavalry, 2nd Armored Division (Forward), Garlstedt, Germany, Assistant Brigade S-3, 1st Armored Division, Ansbach, Germany; Test Officer, TEXCOM Experimentation Center, Fort Hunter Liggett, California; Battalion S-3, 1-4 Attack Helicopter Battalion, Brigade S-3 and Brigade Executive Officer, 4th Brigade, 4th

Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, Battalion Commander, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, Garlstedt, Germany, and G-3 Operations Officer, V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Aviation Officer Advance Course, Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3), the Command And General Staff College, and the Naval War College. He holds a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies. LTC McKearn is also a graduate of the Rotary Wing Aviator Course, AH-1 (Cobra) Qualification Course, AH-64 (Apache) Qualification Course and UH-60 (Blackhawk) Qualification Course.

COLONEL KEVIN G. MERRIGAN, USA, first joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 2001 following completion of the Navy War College. He was commissioned in the Army as an Infantry Officer through the United States Military Academy. His tours of duty include service as a Platoon Leader in 1st Ranger Battalion, Assistant S3 and Company Commander in 2nd Ranger Battalion, Battalion S3 and Battalion XO of 3rd Ranger Battalion, and Senior Liaison Officer for the 75th Ranger Regiment. His overseas assignments include duty as a platoon leader in the Joint Security Area in Pan Mun Jom, Korea, and command of an Airborne Company in 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. He served as the Chief of Pacific Regional Plans and XO to the USSOCOM J5, at MacDill AFB, FL. Following the assignment at USSOCOM, COL Merrigan commanded an airborne battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, NC. He is currently deployed to Afghanistan as a member of Task Force 180 where he is serving as the Chief of the Task Force Fusion Cell responsible for integration of all information presented to the Task Force Commander. He will return to the JMO faculty during the current academic year. COL Merrigan is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and his degrees include a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts with distinction from the Naval War College.

CAPTAIN WILLIAM P. NASH, JR., USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in July 2001 following a one year assignment as a Federal Executive Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, NY. He was commissioned through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1978 and designated as a Naval Aviator in 1979. His sea duty assignments include tours of duty in Patrol Squadron Forty-Five as Aircraft Division Officer and NATOPS Pilot between 1980 and 1983; in USS ENTERPRISE as Operations Administration Officer and Tactical Action Officer between 1986 and 1988; in Patrol Squadron Forty-Five as Operations Officer between 1991 and 1992; and in Patrol Squadron Sixteen as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer between 1995 and 1997. Ashore, he served in Patrol Squadron Thirty as Instructor Pilot and Commander, Patrol Wings Atlantic Tactical Training Team Pilot between 1983 and 1986; attended the Naval War College between 1988 and 1989; served in the Office of Defense Cooperation, London UK as Navy Pro-grams Manager between 1992 and 1994; and served at United States Transportation Command, Scott AFB IL, as Strategic Planning Team Chief between 1997 and 2000. He holds a B.S.C degree in Accounting from the University of Louisville, KY (1978), a M.S. degree in Management from Salve Regina University (1990) and a M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College (1991).

CAPTAIN DEREK F. OFFER, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in June 2002 following a four-year assignment as the U.S Defense and Naval Attaché to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. He earned his commission from the United States Naval Academy in 1974 and received his wings as a Naval Flight Officer in 1976. His sea duty assignments include tours in Patrol Squadron 11 as Aircraft Division Officer, Instructor Tactical Coordinator and P-3 Mission Commander (1976-1979); Cruiser Destroyer Group 2 as Assistant Air/ASW Operations Officer and Battle Group Tactical Action Officer deployed on USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69), USS BELKNAP (CG-26), and USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62) (1983-1985); Patrol Squadron 19 as Training and Operations Officer (1986-1988); Patrol Squadron 46 as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer (1990-1992); Commander Patrol Wing 10 as Chief Staff Officer (1992-1993). Ashore he served at Naval Recruiting District Washington, D.C. as Aviation Recruiter and Officer Programs Department Head (1979-1982). He graduated with distinction from the Naval War College's College of Naval Command and Staff (1986); served as Aide and Executive Assistant to the President, Naval War College (1988-1990); attended Armed Forces Staff College (1993); served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs as Country Director for Iran, Kuwait and Oman (1994-1996); completed a Federal Executive Fellowship at Harvard University, Center for International Affairs (1996-1997); attended Joint Military Attaché Training at Bolling AFB (1997-1998) prior to duty in the Netherlands. He holds a B.S. degree in General Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, an M.A. in International Relations from Salve Regina College, and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

PROFESSOR ROBERT K. REILLY, MARAD REPRESENTATIVE, returned to the Naval War College and the JMO Department in September 1995. He was an Operations Professor and the Emory S. Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs from 1983-86 and assumed the chair again. Professor Reilly holds two B.S. degrees from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy (Marine Transportation), a B. A. degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Government and International Affairs, and a J.D. from Fordham School of Law. He has extensive experience in the commercial shipping industry and several assignments in the Military Sealift Command. He served in the Naval Control of Shipping Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-06N). After retiring from the Navy as a Commander, he practiced Admiralty Law for two civilian law offices. Most recently, he has been a member of the Board for Development of the Marine Transportation Curriculum, Massachusetts Maritime Academy; member of a Massachusetts state panel concerning Maritime Affairs and shipyard purchase and lease; and, most recently, a Principal Analyst for Sonalysts, Inc., in support of transportation issues in the CNWS Global War Game Series.

CAPTAIN WALTER J. RICHARDSON, JR., USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in August 2002 following completion of the Air War College course at Maxwell AFB. He graduated from Louisiana Tech University with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering in May 1979 and was commissioned via the AVROC Program in November 1979. He subsequently earned his wings as a Naval Aviator in May 1981. Five squadron tours ensued from August 1981 to January 1994, including VC-1, NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii where he served as Assistant Operations Officer and Material

Control Officer; VT-21, NAS Kingsville as an Instructor Pilot, A-4 Model Manager and Safety Officer; VF-24, NAS Miramar deploying with CVW-9 in USS NIMITZ as Maintenance Training Officer and Pilot Training Officer; VF-124, NAS Miramar as Instructor Pilot, Safety Officer and Tactics Phase Leader; and VF-21, NAF Atsugi, Japan, forward-deployed with CVW-5 in USS INDEPENDENCE as Operations, Safety and Maintenance Officers. In March 1994, he attended Naval War College, graduating in March 1995 with a Master of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. From April 1995 to March 1996, he served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N889) as Requirements Officer for Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN), Strike U and TACTS Ranges. He reported to NAS Meridian, MS in April 1996 where he served as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer of VT-7 and as Air Wing Standardization Officer of CTW-1. Following his Command tour, he reported to USS ENTERPRISE in August 1999, assuming duties as Air Boss in March 2000. He departed ENTERPRISE in July 2001 and reported to the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, graduating with a Masters of International Strategic Studies in June 2002. CAPT Richardson has accumulated over 4950 flight hours and over 500 carrier arrested landings.

PROFESSOR JOHN D. ROBERTS, rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in May 2002, having taught in the department for two years while on active duty. He retired from the Navy in 2001 following a 30 year career centered around maritime patrol aviation and technology development. He had five tours flying the P-3 Orion, including command of Patrol Squadron TEN and Patrol Wing FIVE. His shore assignments included duty on the Joint Staff as Chief of Detection and Monitoring for Counternarcotics, and Special Assistant to the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Professor Roberts holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the State University of New York at Oswego, a Master of Science from Salve Regina University, and a Master of Arts from the Naval War College.

PROFESSOR PAUL A. ROMANSKI, a 1968 graduate of the NROTC Program at the University of Notre Dame, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 1994 as an active duty Navy captain and held the Arleigh Burke Chair of Surface Warfare until his retirement from active duty in 1998. His Navy career included destroyer escort and Combat Logistics Force duty, junk force riverine operations in Vietnam, and shore assignments on the CNO's staff, at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and Military Sealift Command. Professor Romanski's career included tours in command of USS PYRO (AE-24), USS WICHITA (AOR 1), and the composite Task Force 63—Naval Surface Group Mediterranean—Task Force 505 (NATO). He holds Master of Arts degrees from the University of Illinois and the Naval War College, and is pursuing a Ph.D. at Salve Regina University. After his retirement in July 1998, Professor Romanski joined the civilian faculty of the Joint Military Operations Department.

PROFESSOR ANGUS K. ROSS, a 1975 graduate from Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, joined the Naval War College Faculty in September 1996, as an active duty Commander in the Royal Navy, teaching on the Joint Military Operations Faculty until his retirement in February 2000, after 25 years service. A Seaman Officer and ASW Specialist, his naval career included worldwide service in all types of RN surface vessels,

from minesweepers to aircraft carriers, staff tours with Squadron and Admiral's staffs (afloat) and a number of seagoing tours with NATO, including COMSTRKFLTLANT. Professor Ross holds a BS degree (Honors) in Marine Zoology and Oceanography from Exeter University in the UK, a Master of Arts (highest distinction) from the Naval War College (CNW 98), and is pursuing a further M.A. degree in European History at Providence College, as well as an eventual Ph.D. in History. After his retirement from active duty, Professor Ross joined the civilian faculty of the College of Distance Education where he continues to teach Joint Military Operations.

CAPTAIN MARK SEAMAN, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in September 2001 following an assignment as Chief, Naval Plans and Exercises for Joint Headquarters North, Stavanger, Norway. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in May 1979 and was designated a Naval Aviator in August 1981. His sea tours include Fighter Squadron 32 (1984–1987), deploying aboard both the USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62) and USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67); and Fighter Squadron 143 (1989–1992) deploying aboard the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69). His major shore tours include Fighter Squadron 101 (1987–1989); a joint tour with Headquarters North, Kolsas, Norway (1992–1995); and Navy Recruiting District, Portland, Oregon as Commanding Officer (1996–1998). Captain Seaman holds a B.S. in Naval Science from the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the Navy Fighter Weapons School.

PROFESSOR PAUL J. ST. LAURENT joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 1988 where he held the Frederick J. Horne Chair of Military Logistics. After retiring from the Army in 1991 he joined the JMO faculty in the College of Distance Education. While on active duty Professor St. Laurent served in the Army Corps of Engineers and in the Quartermaster Corps. He has held various command and staff positions in units in Germany, Vietnam, Turkey and Iceland. He served on the staff of the Army Quartermaster School; as Logistics Support Manager, U.S. Army Troop Support Agency; as Chief, Supply and Services Branch on the Army Staff; and as Assistant Chief of Staff J-4, Iceland Defense Force. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College. He holds a B.S. from the University of Massachusetts and Masters in European History from Providence College and in Education from Boston University.

PROFESSOR PATRICK C. SWEENEY joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 1999 as a colonel in the U.S. Army, having completed a tour in NATO as the Chief of Contingency Plans for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). He was commissioned in the Army as a Field Artillery Officer through the ROTC program at The Citadel in 1973. His tours of duty include a variety of artillery assignments in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Division G3 Ops with the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, a Fire Support Instructor at the U.S. Army Infantry School, command of a Pershing 2 Battery in Germany, Corps Plans Officer and artillery battalion executive officer in XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, NC, followed by an assignment as the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery G3 during DESERT SHIELD / STORM. He commanded an artillery battalion at the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum NY, and participated

in Hurricane Andrew relief operations as well as operations in Somalia and Haiti. His most recent assignment at AFSOUTH focused primarily as the Deputy CJ5 for the IFOR mission in Bosnia and as a NATO planner for Kosovo operations. Professor Sweeney is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advance Military Studies, and the Army War College. He holds a bachelor of science degree in Business Administration from The Citadel and master's degrees in Public Administration from Western Kentucky University and Military Arts and Science from the School of Advance Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Professor Sweeney retired from active duty in June 2002, as a colonel, and remained on the faculty.

PROFESSOR MILAN N. VEGO was an instructor at the Defense Intelligence College (1985-91) and an adjunct instructor at the War Gaming and Simulations Center, National Defense University (1989-91) before joining the Naval War College faculty in August 1991. He was a Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses (1985-87) and in the Foreign Military Studies Office (formerly Soviet Army Studies Office), Ft. Leavenworth, KS (1987-89). Professor Vego is a native of Capljina, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Professor Vego holds a B.A. in Modern History and an M.A. in U.S. History, Belgrade University, and a Ph.D. in European History from George Washington University. He also holds a Master Mariner's license since 1973. Professor Vego's book, "*Soviet Navy Today,*" was published by Arms and Armour Press (London) in 1986; "*Soviet Naval Tactics*" was published by the Naval Institute Press in 1992; and "*The Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy 1904-1914*" was published by Frank Cass Publishers (London) in September 1996. Professor Vego's most recent book, "Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas," was published by Frank Cass Publishers in 1999. He is also a frequent contributor to many professional journals and magazines.

PROFESSOR JOHN D. WAGHELSTEIN brings to the Naval War College faculty thirty years of operational experience in Low Intensity Conflict, Special Operations and Security Assistance. In addition to two tours in Vietnam, he served five tours in Latin America and commanded U.S. Army Special Forces at every level from a Detachment to Group (0-6). Other assignments include: Commander of a Mobile Training Team in the Dominican Republic, Airborne-Infantry Advisor in Bolivia, Commander of the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador and Executive Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command. He holds an M.A. in International Relations from Cornell and a Ph.D. in History from Temple University.

COMMANDER ALAN R. WALL, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in July 2002 following a three-year assignment at the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) in Pearl Harbor where he served as a Senior Watch Officer, USCINCPAC J2 Liaison Officer, and the South Asia Department Head. He earned his commission through the Navy ROTC program at Ohio State University in 1985. His sea duty assignments include tours on USS BLAKELY (FF-1072) as Gunnery Officer and Electrical Officer, where he qualified as a Surface Warfare Officer, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67) as Assistant Deck Officer, and USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72) as Strike Intelligence and Intelligence Systems Officer. Ashore he served at the Navy & Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) as an intelligence instructor, and as the Intelligence Assistant

to the Director of Surface Warfare (OPNAV N86) on the Chief of Naval Operations staff. He graduated with distinction from the Naval War College's College of Naval Command and Staff in 1999, earning an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies. He also holds a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering from Ohio State University and an M.S. in Engineering Management (Information Systems) from George Washington University.

COMMANDER BURTON J. WALTMAN, JAGC, USN, holds the Howard S. Levie Military Chair of Operational Law. Commander Waltman was called to active duty in 1983. His operational law experience includes tours as the fleet judge advocate on the staff of the U.S. SECOND Fleet / NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic embarked in USS MOUNT WHITNEY (LCC-20), the staff of Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group TWO where he deployed on the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67), and the USS IOWA (BB-61), and as the legal officer for USS HOLLAND (AS-32) and the staff of Commander, Submarine Squadron 18. Commander Waltman joined the faculty in 2001, following his tour as the Director, Defense Institute of International Legal Studies. He also holds a LL.M. in International Law from the University of San Diego School of Law (1994), a J.D. degree from Western New England College School of Law (1983), and a B.S. from Bryant College (1976).

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGETTE P. WILSON, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in July 2002 following her graduation from the Army War College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson is a native of Ghent, New York. She enlisted in the United States Army as a Computer Programmer in 1974. She is a graduate of the United States Military Academy Preparatory School and a 1981 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. LTC Wilson was commissioned a Quartermaster officer and has served in Quartermaster and Systems Automation positions throughout her military career. Highlights of LTC Wilson's career include assignments as platoon leader, executive officer and operations officer, 26th Supply and Service Company, Hanau, Germany; Battalion S-1, Special Troops Battalion, 3rd Support Command, Frankfurt, Germany; Battalion S-4, 4th Support Battalion, and A Company Commander, 3/9 Aviation Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, and Assistant 9th Division Support Command S3 Plans Officer, Fort Lewis, Washington; Chief, Computer Support Center, Headquarters CINCPAC, Hawaii; Chief, Service Support Center and Battalion Executive Officer, 4th Corps Materiel Management Center, and Battalion Support Operations Officer 553 Corps Support Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas; NATO C3 Staff Officer, Brussels, Belgium; Battalion Commander 19th Corps Materiel Management Center, Wiesbaden, Germany; and V Corps Secretary of the General Staff, Heidelberg, Germany. Her military education includes the Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advance Courses, Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3), The Support Operations Course, the Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Army War College. She has a master's degree in Strategic Studies from the Army War College and a Master of Science in Computer Science from the Naval Postgraduate School.

COURSE FOUNDATIONS

INTRODUCTION TO COURSE FOUNDATIONS

A. Focus:

The purpose of the Course Foundations (CF) sessions is to prepare students for the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) Course by introducing main themes and concepts that permeate the entire course. It is recognized that students entering the JMO course of instruction come from various Service/Agency backgrounds, possess different experience levels, and may be embarking on their first trimester at the Naval War College. Therefore, the CF sessions are designed to provide a level intellectual framework for all students as they approach the JMO syllabus. With that educational framework in view, the CF sessions address four main areas of focus:

1. CF-1, CF-2, and CF-4 explain the intellectual linkage between the JMO trimester and the Strategy and Policy and National Security Decision Making educational disciplines; to provide the student with an overview of what the JMO syllabus will entail as it proceeds through the main educational building blocks; and to explain in detail what is required of the student to complete the course successfully. Specifically, CF-4 fully describes the requirement for the Operations Research Paper, and its purpose in partially fulfilling the requirements for completion of the NWC master's degree, as well as its utility in furthering the critical intellectual literature on current and future operational warfare issues.
2. CF-3 and CF-5 are designed to start the student thinking about the differences between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare—first in CF-3 by describing historically why the American military approaches warfare the way it does, and then in CF-5 by focusing that discussion more precisely on the naval officer's perspective.
3. CF-6, CF-7, and CF-8 complete the preliminary structure for the JMO course by examining the necessary and continuing relationship between political, diplomatic, economic, informational and military actions. This is accomplished in CF-6 by discussing the relationship between diplomacy and military force for the complex world in which the President, SECDEF, CJCS, and the combatant commanders must operate; and in CF-7 by discussing the issues that arise in warfare caused by the civil/military tensions inherent in our national military organization. Lastly, CF-8 builds upon earlier discussions and serves as the transition into Block I's study of operational art by directing student attention firmly to the strategic objective as centerpiece of all military planning and execution.
4. CF-9, the JMO final exam, tests the individual student's understanding of the JMO course's themes and concepts to fulfill a portion of the Naval War College's masters degree requirement.

COURSE OVERVIEW (Lecture)

Extraordinary as it may appear, the naval officer whose principal business is to fight is not taught the higher branches of his profession. The U.S. is not singular in this respect. The defect is common to nearly all navies and is an inheritance of a past and less enlightened age. But with the recent revolution in naval warfare comes a demand for a higher order of talent in the conduct of naval operations.

—Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, 8 August 1877
Founder and First President of the Naval War College

A. Focus:

The Chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department will overview the Joint Maritime Operations course.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the objectives of the Joint Maritime Operations Course.

C. Background:

For the century ahead, the use of military and naval power and their interrelationships with the political, diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of national power will remain a key challenge. During this course, we will study how to wield the military instrument of power, in peace and war, to achieve the national policy goals. We will examine the power relationships at two levels, strategic and operational, which incorporate the varying perspectives of the Congress and the Executive Branch (President, Cabinet members, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, joint task force commanders and their naval component commanders). Our focus remains joint operations at the theater and task force level; however, national level strategy formulation, implementation and campaigning are discussed. This course is designed to develop students' abilities to craft regional strategies and translate them into naval, joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

We will review current theory of operational art, compare it to the doctrinal basis for contemporary application of military power, and begin to distill the next generation of doctrine for our armed forces. Today's operational art theory and the doctrinal basis for the U.S. armed forces reflect the zenith of our wisdom and knowledge of Industrial Age warfare and nation-state relationships. The advent of the Information Age creates an additional challenge in the creation of the next generation of doctrine as some of our theoretical fundamentals may change. The joint community and each of the military services are exploring this issue. The U. S. Navy advocates Network Centric Warfare as its conceptual basis for 21st century warfighting. Through this prism, we will examine our nation's near term challenges and the tenets of 21st century warfare.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Theodore L. Gatchel, C-413.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, *Joint Maritime Operations Syllabus and Study Guide for Joint Maritime Operations 2002,* Course Description. Read pp. vi-xx, 26, 81-82, 125, 148–150**.** (Issued)

F. Supplementary Readings:

Hattendorf, John B.; Simpson III, B. Mitchell and Wadleigh, John R., *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U. S. Naval War College.* Naval War College Press, Newport, RI, 1984.

The Constitution of the United States. Article 1, Sections 8 & 9; Article 2, Section 2; Article 3, Sections 2 & 3. (Issued).

INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR

A. Focus:

This session is devoted to the introduction of seminar faculty and student members, a review of the administrative requirements and procedures for the trimester, an introductory discussion of the Operations Research Paper and the general "ground rules" of seminar conduct.

B. Objectives:

- Identify the background and expertise of the faculty and student members of the seminar.
- Establish seminar guidelines for conduct and evaluations.
- Identify linkage of JMO to National Security & Decision Making and Strategy & Policy.
- Explain course requirements, including the Operations Research Paper requirement.
- Discuss social and administrative matters.

C. Guidance:

The introductory seminar provides the opportunity for the moderators to identify faculty and student background and expertise, and for moderators and students to discuss relevant social and administrative matters pertaining to the conduct of the seminar. The Operations Research Paper, discussed in more detail in a later session, is introduced.

In preparation for the seminar, students are asked to complete a short, one page questionnaire, which was distributed to student mail boxes and will be collected at the beginning of the session.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel W. F. Brown,U. S. Army, SP-212.

D. Required Reading:

Operations Paper: Guidance for Students, Newport, RI, October 2002 **(NWC 2062J**) (Issued)

E. Supplementary Readings:

None.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR (Lecture)

A. Focus:

The JMO course focuses on the theater-strategic and operational levels of war across the spectrum of conflict, from all-out war to military operations other than war (MOOTW). Throughout this course of study, it is important to understand the historical context and resulting American mindset on the use of military force. After introducing the spectrum of conflict, this lecture traces American war-making habits and examines a set of unique and contradictory relationships: conventional versus unconventional warfare; professional versus citizen soldiers; and preparedness versus unpreparedness. The specific focus is on the formative period prior to American preeminence as a military power.

B. Objectives:

- Analyze American perceptions about war and peace.
- Understand the historical relationship between U.S. professional and citizen service members.
- Examine our legacy of contradictions regarding war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.

C. Background:

The JMO course concentrates on the theater-strategic and operational levels, i.e., that level which provides the coherent connection between the strategic level and the tactical level. As we look at this across the full spectrum of conflict, from all-out war to military operations other than war, it is important to understand the historical context and resulting American mindset on the use of military force.

Every nation has a predisposition as to how it fights its wars, a bias that is the result of culture and experience. For the U.S., there is a strong dependence on mobilization, a penchant for reliance on technology, a tendency toward rapid action once engaged, a willingness to use a high level of violence, and a precipitous demobilization and return to "peacetime," viewed as normality.

There is a uniquely American approach to national defense based in part upon our prejudice against standing armies. This prejudice influenced how the regulars and the people's militia and volunteers evolved, along with the national defense establishment. There is a tradition of friction between citizen soldiers and regulars.

In the 18th, 19th and most of the 20th century there was a disconnect between the U.S. military's doctrine and military education and the missions it was actually called upon to accomplish—a disconnect that often led to early disasters in our wars or difficulty in dealing with small wars.

These issues or sets of relationships constitute distinctly American cultural baggage. Examining our historic approach to war and the baggage we carry with us into the 21st century helps us understand our political, social and cultural evolution. You will have the opportunity throughout the Joint Maritime Operations Course to determine the

extent to which these influences still apply.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. D. Waghelstein, C-421.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

John T. Fishel, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night," pp. 375-379 (**NWC 3077**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine For Joint Operations*, 10 Sep 2001 (Issued). Read Preface, Chapters 1 and 5.

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War,* 16 June 1995 (Issued). Read Glossary definitions.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Cunliffe, Marcus, *Soldiers and Civilians, The Martial Spirit in America 1775-1865*. Boston & New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1968.

Millett, Alan R. and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense, A Military History of the United States of America.* New York: The Free Press, 1994.

Millis, Walter, *Arms and Men, A Study of American Military History.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981.

Millis, Walter (Ed), *American Military Thought*. Indianapolis, New York and Kansas City: the Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966.

Waghelstein, John D., "Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War—Educational and Doctrinal Failure 1865–1891," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 10(1999): 1-33.

Weigley, Russell F., *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. The Macmillan Wars of the United States*, ed. Louis Morton. New York: the Macmillan Company, 1973.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH PAPER—REVIEW (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This seminar amplifies Operations Research Paper requirements addressed briefly during the Introductory Seminar (CF-2), detailing requirements, guidance, deadlines, grading criteria, and suggested topics. The Paper constitutes an appropriate, objective method for students to demonstrate competence at the Master's degree level. Further, it is ecumenical in regard to the JMO curriculum, affording opportunity to address a topic relevant to any of the syllabus sessions. Thus the Paper is consistent with the mission specified for U.S. Intermediate Level Colleges, reflected as the Paper PJE Objective in the paragraph below.

B. Objectives:

- The Operations Research Paper achieves the following purposes:
  - Production of formal, written work dealing with the theater-strategic or operational level of war, operational art, or a topic of current interest to a theater-strategic or operational level commander.
  - Development & refinement of original ideas in military strategy and operations through research and analysis.
  - Advanced operational and strategic thinking.
  - Timely address of topics that reflect current and future operational issues of interest to Service and joint staffs, and operational level commanders.
  - Candidate work for publication in professional journals and military periodicals.
  - Competition for prizes and awards offered by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Naval War College, and other sources.
- **PJE—**Demonstrate student understanding of joint force employment at the operational level of war.

C. Guidance:

The Operations Research Paper provides the opportunity to study a theater-strategic or operational-level issue, conduct research and analysis on the topic, and prepare a paper that advances the literature in the selected area. It is a chance for students to address topics that they personally feel are of value. It requires independent thought and competent writing because the final product should be suitable for publication in a professional journal. The amount and depth of research should be adequate to support the student's approach, and justify sufficiently the conclusions and recommendations or lessons learned. Another use of the paper may be to contribute innovative thinking to Service component and joint force staffs involved with the many complex issues associated with military force employment.

Combatant commander, operating force, and headquarters staffs actively solicit papers and monographs on topics of current interest to support initiatives, develop concepts, and provide fresh looks at the methods of accomplishing missions. The Naval War College is canvassed frequently for papers on particular subjects, and requested to

stimulate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. A recent example is a project dealing with innovation in the application of naval force and options in organization of that force -- how to accomplish the goal of fighting *smarter* rather than fighting with *more*. While some aspects of this project fall outside the parameters of the Operations Research Paper requirement, many of the issues therein are JMO-applicable. These especially include doing the right things and doing them right—the synergistic effect of combining effectiveness and efficiency. Quality papers are provided to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) where qualified users can access them to meet a variety of needs.

1. ***Requirements.*** The Operations Research Paper comprises the following:

   a. A thesis—a definitive position that the paper will aim to defend, support, or justify.

   b. Sufficient research to analyze the thesis properly.

   c. Arguments and counter-arguments that allow thorough contrast of conflicting points of view.

   d. Logical conclusions drawn from the material presented within the paper.

   e. Recommendations or lessons learned, as appropriate, demonstrating the paper's relevance to the modern operational commander.

2. ***Topics.*** Topics should be taken from one of the following areas:

   a. A current issue at the operational or theater-strategic level of war.

   b. A topic on operational art, or the use of operational art to examine or analyze a historical case.

   c. An option in support of a military strategy or a new doctrinal concept.

   d. An issue dealing with planning, execution, tasks, or functions at the operational level of war.

   e. Innovative topics such as the application of naval force at the operational level of war.

   f. A topic that applies to current, near-term, or future major operations or campaigns.

   g. A topic of value to an operational level commander.

NOTE: The Operations Research Paper should not be an examination of tactics, technology, force structure, or future force planning concepts. Also, it should not be a library search and recitation of published material. The paper should not contain proposals or recommendations regarding numbers and types of weapon platforms, nor modifications to platforms, weapons, sensors, or force structure (i.e., it must not be an NSDM-type force planning paper). Moderators will answer any questions on specific issues relating to topic selection.

Required reading NWC 2062J contains the JMO Chairman's guidance for selecting a suitable topic and crafting a research question. It also contains candidate topical areas from requesting commands, a list of topics dealing with the operational level of war, extracts on the awards program, and instructions for submission of papers to professional journals. This is an excellent resource for developing ideas and selecting a topic.

3. ***Paper Proposal.*** A paper proposal is required and due to the moderators on 09 December, using the format of enclosure (1) to NWC 2062J. The proposal will state the student's thesis, approach, relevance, and methodology so that the moderator team can determine if the paper will satisfy the requirements of the course. Once the moderator team accepts a proposal, this constitutes an understanding between the student and the moderator grading team. An accepted proposal means that both the student and the moderator team have a good appreciation of the depth of research, extent of analysis, and quality of writing that are expected of the student, in addition to the requirements that are discussed in paragraph 1 of this section.

4. ***Research and Writing.*** Research and writing shall meet graduate-level standards. *The Naval War College Writing Guide* offers suggestions and additional references on writing skills.

5. ***Format.*** Turabian's *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations* (6th ed.) is the standard for unclassified written work. Format and style for classified papers are contained in the *Naval War College Style Manual and Classification Guide.*

6. ***Report Document Page.*** The report document page is a completed DD Form 1473. Students must fill in blocks 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 15 of the report document page. The academic representative for each seminar will be given a computer disk with the report document page included as a file. Only the original of the paper requires the DD Form 1473—copies do not.

7. ***Length.*** The text of the Operations Research Paper should be 14 to 17 double-spaced pages in Times New Roman font size 12 to conform to commonly accepted limits for publication and award submissions. Your moderators may accept longer papers depending on the paper purpose and topic, but this acceptance must be obtained prior to paper submission.

8. ***Faculty Advisor.*** An advisor can help a student define the scope of the research effort; keep research, analysis, and writing on track; and review outlines and drafts. While there is no requirement for a student to have a faculty advisor, one is strongly recommended. Faculty and staff members are quite willing to act as advisors. Your moderators may not serve as your paper advisor, but can suggest appropriate advisors depending on topic. *Please do not ask your advisor to evaluate your paper in terms of a grade;* grading is a moderator function.

9. ***Grading.*** The Operations Research Paper represents a substantial portion of the JMO Course grade. The paper will be evaluated for both substance and writing quality. Grades will be based on the criteria specified in the Course Description section of the JMO Syllabus.

10. ***Prizes and Awards.*** Operations Research Papers may be submitted in competition for the prizes and awards bestowed annually during the June graduation ceremony. Students are encouraged to prepare their Operations Papers with the additional purpose of competing for one or more of these honors. In a few cases, this will require expanding the Operations Paper to meet the length specification for the prize. Details are included in Required Reading, NWC 2062J.

11. *Schedule:*

09 December: submit paper proposal to seminar moderators.

10-13 December: conduct individual tutorials per schedule arranged with moderators; moderators and student agree on research topic and course of action.

06 January: suggested date to terminate research, commence analysis and writing.

24 January: suggested latest date for submission of *final* draft to faculty advisor.

03 February: deliver paper to seminar moderators.

The point of contact for this session is Professor P. A. Romanski, M-11.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

Operations Paper: Guidance for Students. Newport, RI: Naval War College, October 2002. (**NWC 2062J**) (Issued. Also available online at <*http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo /research/*>.*)*

Naval War College Writing Guide. Newport, RI, August 2000. (Issued. Also available online at <*http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research*>/.*)*

Naval War College Style and Classification Guide. Newport, RI, August 2000. (Issued. Also available online at <*http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research*>/.*)*

F. Supplementary Readings:

Research in the Library, Autumn 2002. Newport, RI: Naval War College Library, 2002. (Issued)

Strunk, William, Jr. *The Elements of Style,* 4th ed. With revisions, an introduction, and a chapter on writing by E.B. White. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1999.

Turabian, Kate L., *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 6th ed., revised by John Grossman and Alice Bennett. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. (Issued)

THE NAVAL WAY OF WAR (Lecture)

Do not refer to the captain by name. He is The Captain.
—Recruit's Handbook, *U.S.S. West Virginia* (1935)

A. Focus:

This lecture builds on the themes introduced in CF Session-3 "The American Way of War," as it examines the historical context in which the U.S. Naval Service—the Navy and Marine Corps—has evolved its way of "doing business," and illustrates how and why Naval warfare is uniquely different from other types of warfare. The objective is to enhance student understanding of the naval culture and specifically naval traditions of planning and conducting operations, especially as such affect joint operations. This lecture also provides a foundation for understanding the Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and limitations addressed in Sessions II-3 and II-5.

B. Objectives:

- Examine the spectrum of conflict as it involves naval forces.
- Understand the historical relationship between senior Navy and Marine Corps officers and their Army and Air Force counterparts.
- Understand the historical basis of the current U.S. defense establishment; its structure, policies, and strategies; understand how the functions, capabilities, and limitations of U.S. military forces affect the development of joint military strategy and military operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.

C. Background:

In their two centuries of existence, the Navy and Marine Corps have developed unique ways of defining, planning, and conducting their operations, distinct from those of the other military services. These experiences are codified in their organization, doctrine, and operating procedures, as well as in less obvious, informal usages and patterns of assumptions and beliefs. They include deeply held beliefs about (1) how decisions should be made; (2) the place of the naval services in the implementation of national policy; (3) command relations and the importance of discretion for subordinates; (4) the relationship of plans to operations; (5) the relationship of technology to naval warfare; and (6) the appropriate relationship of the naval services to the other military services in the conduct of joint operations. They are reinforced by professional training programs, career patterns, and day-to-day operations; and, although subject to change, they tend to lag changes in immediate circumstances.

The peculiarly American naval way of war has been and continues to be conditioned by: (1) the fundamental characteristics of naval warfare; (2) the historical era during which the naval services were created and formed; (3) U.S. national policy; (4) the technologies of naval warfare; (5) developments in thinking about naval warfare; (6) operational

experience, especially pivotal points of success and failure; and (7) relations with the other military services, especially competition for mission and budget, and cooperation in conduct of operations.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

None.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Baer, George, *One Hundred Years of Seapower: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Barlow, Jeffrey, *The Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Bartlett, Merrill L. (editor), *Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1983.

Chisholm, Donald, *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793-1941*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Coletta, Paolo E., *The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947-1953*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981.

Davis, Vincent A, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1966.

Herrick, Walter R., Jr., *The American Naval Revolution*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1966.

Huntington, Samuel P., "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy." *Naval War College Review*, May 1954: 483-493.

Isley, Jeter A. and Philip A. Crowl., *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951.

Karsten, Peter, *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*. New York: The Free Press, 1972.

Keiser, Gordon, *The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944-47*. Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company, 1996.

Krulak, Victor H., *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1984.

McKee, Christopher, *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Navy Officer Corps, 1795-1815*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Millett, Allan R., *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, Revised and Expanded Edtion. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

Spector, Ronald, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1946.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943.

Uhlig, Frank, Jr., *How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1994.

U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940.

U.S. Marine Corps, *Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996.

U.S. Navy, *Forward...From the Sea: the Navy Operational Concept*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997.

Vlahos, Michael, *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980.

Wylie, Joseph C., Jr., "Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 83 (1957): 811-817.

The military are… most comfortable when the objectives are clear and precise. Institutionally, the military are solution oriented…. On the other hand… diplomacy is often the art of managing the insoluble.

—General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, 16 November 1994

A. Focus:

A common American view of foreign policy holds that power politics and old-fashioned diplomacy are bad, powerful standing militaries are to be mistrusted, peacetime international commitments are dangerous entanglements to be avoided, and military force should only be employed when vital national interests are at stake and objectives are clearly defined. Nonetheless, the United States regularly employs military assets in support of political objectives across the entire spectrum of conflict—from deterrence through war.

This session examines the particular ways that leaders, civilian (diplomatic) and military, orchestrate military actions in the pursuit of national objectives. In so doing, it builds on themes considered in the Strategy and Policy course. Military forces, used in various ways under various circumstances, can influence the actions of other governments or non-state actors. Successful conflict termination and transition to post-hostilities require diplomacy. This session provides a foundation for Session II-9, "Joint and Multinational Warfare Considerations" and Session III-3, "The Interagency Process."

B. Objectives:

- Explain the link between national objectives and supporting military objectives, and the importance of conflict termination.
- Comprehend the link between diplomacy and military force in pursuing the National Security Strategy and the derivative National Military Strategy (NSS/NMS).
- Understand the resources that diplomacy can provide the operational commander for achieving his objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations.

C. Background:

Diplomacy among nations largely entails negotiation or bargaining. Such may be polite or rude; and it may involve threats as well as offers. Military force can be used effectively in concert with the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) to deter, compel, support, or coerce other actors. Military actions can be designed primarily to support political or diplomatic goals (with the intermediate goal of preventing war) to achieve national objectives. In order for these actions to be credible, however, there must exist the actual capability and will to conduct large-scale combat actions.

"Flexible Deterrent Options" (FDOs) illustrate how the instruments of national power

can be mutually supporting. What military force the combatant commander selects and how it is used must be matched to the stated national objective, in concert with political, diplomatic, and economic actions, and appropriate to the level of national commitment. Overseas presence is customarily a factor in the selection of military force in a crisis; however, developing technologies and increasing international economic ties suggest the potential for reduction in our dependence on traditional presence missions.

At the same time, military leaders cannot accomplish their objectives absent the expertise and assistance provided by the diplomatic community.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

How does General Shelton's position on the use of military force differ from the positions of Secretary Weinberger and General Powell?

General Anthony Zinni has argued that "If you read the Weinberger Doctrine and adhere to every one of its tenets, you will be able to fight no war other than World War II." Is the Weinberger Doctrine a realistic guide to the employment of military force in a world characterized by military operations other than war?

How do we convince a potential adversary that our military threats are serious? Can military forces in CONUS be a credible force for influencing the behavior of other governments and non-state actors, or is actual overseas presence essential?

Is diplomacy still useful when confronting a non-state foe such as Al-Qaeda?

E. Required Readings:

Weinberger, Caspar W. "The Uses of Military Power," Remarks prepared for delivery to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 28 November 1984 (**NWC 1013**) (Issued).

Powell, Colin L. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1992-1993, pp. 32-45 (excerpts) (**NWC 1015**) (Issued).

Shalikashvili, John M. "Force and Diplomacy in the 21st Century." Oscar Iden Lecture, Georgetown University, 16 November 1994 (**NWC 1016**) (Issued).

Shelton, Henry H., "From the Chairman: The U.S. Military and Foreign Policy" (**NWC 3002**) (Issued).

"Flexible Deterrent Options," Extracts from Armed Forces Staff College *Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (**NWC 3081**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Forces Staff College. *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JFSC Pub 5) (Seminar Reserve).

Arnold, Edwin J., Jr. "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Objectives." *Parameters* (1994): 4-12.

Craig, Gordon A. and George, Alexander L. "Coercive Diplomacy," pp. 189-204 in *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1990 (2nd edition).

Cable, James, *Gunboat Diplomacy* 1919-1979: *Political Applications of Limited Naval*

Force. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. (Seminar Reserve).

Iklé, Fred Charles. *Every War Must End.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1971 (Seminar Reserve).

Owens, William A. "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings,* 120 (1994): 30-34.

Tangredi, Sam. "Are We Firing Tomahawks Too Easily?" United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* 122(1996)8-9.

White, Donald. "Mutable Destiny: The End of the American Century?" *Harvard International Security Review* (Winter 1997-1998): 42-47.

Where there is no vision, the people perish.

Proverbs, XXIX, 18

…Our National Security. This is the most basic commitment of America's government, and the greatest responsibility of an American President. Our nation's ideals inspire the world, but our nation's ships and planes and armies must defend these ideals and sustain our allies and friends.

President George W. Bush, February 2001

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the organization and roles of the Department of Defense (DOD) and its components, and the methods and doctrine employed to achieve unity of effort, if not unity of command. To begin this seminar, we will analyze the role of DOD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—with particular emphasis on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the Services, and the Reserve components. We will also examine the current plan for the organization of U.S. military forces throughout the world, and the authority that a commander can exercise over joint forces.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Explain the purpose, roles, functions relationships of the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, joint force commanders (JFCs) and combat support organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Understand the factors influencing joint doctrine.

C. Background:

First, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield directed in January of 2002 that the use of the term "National Command Authorities" be discontinued. Then, a few months later, he personally noted that the terms "Commander in Chief" and "CINC" were being applied incorrectly. The goal of this session is to expose the student to the history behind the military as it structured today, and to comprehend and understand how joint doctrine factors shape the structure. Furthermore, it is our goal that students become conversant with the National Military Organization; especially with respect to recent term changes and the Unified Command Plan (UCP) restructuring.

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first legislative attempt to achieve unity of military effort in U.S. history. This Act provided for a Secretary of Defense and established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a permanent agency. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 had extensive impact on DOD. Two of the

principal aims of this legislation were to reduce the effects of service parochialism on defense policy and to improve unity of effort by increasing the authority of the Unified Combatant Commanders (UCC). The UCP provides guidance to the DOD to carry out the provisions of legislative action. Just as the National Security Act of 1947 has been amended several times, the UCP is reviewed and amended as the political/military climate changes in an effort to optimize the warfighting and support command structure.

Direction of U.S. military forces is currently accomplished through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. The operational (and strategic) direction of combatant forces is accomplished through the operational chain of command, which runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the UCCs, with communications running through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For matters not involving strategic and operational direction of combatant forces, guidance is issued through the administrative branch of the chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to Service secretaries and chiefs to commanders of Service forces. The preparation and provision of forces to the combatant commands are accomplished through this "administrative" branch of the chain of command, separate and distinct from the operational branch.

Various command relationships may exist among active duty and reserve component organizations involved in joint operations. How much authority a commander can exercise over a supporting or subordinate organization depends upon the specifically delineated command relationship that exists with that organization. A thorough understanding of command relationship alternatives is, therefore, essential in joint operations. Some important command relationship alternatives to be cognizant of are:

- Combatant Command (COCOM)
- Operational Control (OPCON)
- Tactical Control (TACON)
- Administrative Control (ADCON)
- Coordinating Authority (COORDAUTH)

Point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Dill, U.S. Air Force, C-217.

D. Questions:

On 1 October 2002, the newly published 2002 UCP assigns USJFCOM'S entire AOR to USEUCOM and USNORTHCOM. USJFCOM's functional responsibility will be joint tactics, techniques and procedures and doctrine publications as well as joint force training. Do you agree with this decision or do you a think USJFCOM must control an AOR to provide credibility to publish joint doctrine? Additionally will this shift in responsibility help the Services abide by the Goldwater-Nichols Act better by utilizing a Combatant Command to primarily focus on penning Joint Doctrine?

In addition to USNORTHCOM's receiving the AOR as specified by the 30 April 2002 UCP, it assumes the following tasks: providing military assistance and/or technical assistance to U.S. civilian authorities in consequence management operations in response to CBRNE incidents; providing military assistance to civil disturbances; overseeing planning of bi-national land and maritime defense of Canada-U.S. region; and

Deputy CINCNORAD. For a new Command is its plate too full?

The 17 April 2002 decision by Defense officials to establish USNORTHCOM has been called the most sweeping change of the UCP since the system was set-up in 1946. In your opinion are we shaping our combatant commands in the right direction for future threats to America or are we focusing too much military attention on internal defense?

As highlighted in the readings, the CJCS exercises control over no forces, nor can he deploy forces. What are the pluses and minuses of that arrangement for the U.S. military in its relationship with its civilian overseers and with allied/coalition partners?

In almost any envisioned conflict, the Unified Combatant Commander (UCC) with primary responsibility for employment of forces will require support from other UCC's. Does the "in support of" relationship between supporting and supported commanders provide sufficient authority to the supported combatant commander to ensure unity of effort?

The National Guard, though its units are designed for federal missions overseas, has a long-established state and federal role and will almost certainly have the closest troops to any incident within our borders. Should the new Deputy CC of NORTHCOM be an Air or Army Guard Officer?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Forces Staff College, *Joint Staff Officers' Guide*, JFSC PUB 1, 2000, pp. 1-2 to 1-57. (Issued).

Unified Command Plan, 30 April 2002, (**NWC 2021B**) (Issued). (Scan).

Joint Pub 0-2: *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), 10 July 2001, Focus on the following areas: pp. vii-xviii, Chapter I (I-1 to I-12) Chapter III (III-1 to III-13) and Chapter V (V-5 to V-11), (Issued). [Scan]

F. Supplementary Readings:

Grossman, "A Joint Venture" (**NWC 4101**) (Seminar Reserve).

Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" (**NWC 4055**) (Seminar Reserve).

White, "Meeting the Needs of the Secretary of Defense" (**NWC 2112**) (Seminar Reserve).

Shalikashvili, "Goldwater-Nichols Ten Years From Now" (**NWC 2113**) (Seminar Reserve).

"Summary of Major Provisions of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986" (**NWC 4022**) (Seminar Reserve).

THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the *Strategic Objective* and how it must drive military thinking and actions through the entire range of military operations. We will discuss the direct relationship between national strategic objectives and operational objectives and will introduce the concept of "regressive planning" as a method to focus execution on these objectives. We will look at the interrelationship between the four elements of national power (political, military, economic, and information) and how the *Strategic Objective* relates to the *Desired End State* (the strategic vision for how things should look when a crisis is resolved). Our discussion will also include a brief look at the policy documents that provide strategic direction to the military: the *National Security Strategy,* and the *National Military Strategy.*

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend how the elements of the *National Security Strategy* and *National Military Strategy* influence actions at the operational level of war.
- Examine the interrelationship between the four elements of national power (political, military, economic, and information) and how the *Strategic Objective* relates to the *Desired End State.*
- Introduce the concept of regressive planning, which is key to the operational perspective and planning processes that are the focus of the JMO course.
- Introduce the "Five Questions" and analyze how they can help the operational commander apply assets in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
- **PJE**—Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the President/Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, joint force commanders (JFCs), and combat support organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations.

C. Background:

The *National Military Strategy* (NMS) establishes principles for the employment of U.S. military forces across the spectrum of conflict. Its purpose is to implement the military portion of the President's *National Security Strategy* (NSS). The most recent versions of these two documents reflect core national goals long pursued by the U.S. They also, however, reflect a continued shift in emphasis toward a more regional approach. The idea is for the Theater Commander (and others) to "shape" the situation in a particular region in order to minimize the chances for conflict while maximizing U.S. advantages should conflict nevertheless erupt.

In keeping with the NMS and NSS, when a problem arises which the President or Secretary of Defense believe may require military involvement, they will turn to the appropriate Combatant Commander (most frequently through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for possible solutions. In responding to such requests, the Combatant Commander should assess attainment of the strategic goal in terms of "five questions:"

1. What **military** (or related political and social) **conditions** must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
2. What **sequence of actions** is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
3. How should the **resources** of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
4. What is the likely **cost or risk** to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?
5. What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the JFC's **exit strategy**?

The Combatant Commander should ensure the responses to the "five questions" (the essence of a plan) remain in line with strategic guidance. While some situations allow for independent military solutions to these questions, in most cases there will be no "military condition" which will fully accomplish the strategic objective. In other cases, the appropriate action may be diplomatic or economic, with the military in a supporting role. When a period of military conflict appears necessary, commanders must also anticipate and plan for war termination and post-conflict activities (including both military and civilian elements). Failing to consider these aspects early frequently precludes even the best-planned military operations from achieving the Desired End State.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-411.

D. Questions:

How does the NMS help operational commanders translate strategy into operational plans?

How can the "Five Questions" help operational commanders respond to strategic guidance?

What is the connection between planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations? Why does it matter when you do this planning?

Who decides when and under what terms a war ends?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001, pp. I-1 to I-12, II-1 to II-4. (Issued).

JMO, "Putting First Things First," Newport, 1999. (**NWC 3012**) (Issued).

National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, 1997. (Issued). [Scan].

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002. (Issued). [Scan].

"U.S. Military Debates Link Between Kosovo Air War, State Objectives," *Inside Washington,* 20 April 2000, (**NWC 3043**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

"Flexible Deterrent Options," Extracts from *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (**NWC 3081**) (Issued).

Iklé, Fred C., *Every War Must End,* pp. 1-16 (Seminar Reserve).

Reed, James W., "Should Deterrence Fail: War termination . . . ," *Parameters*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 41-51 (**NWC 2171**) (Issued).

JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS COURSE—Final Examination

A. Focus:

This is the final session of the JMO course. Details regarding the format, method of delivery (on-line or in person in the seminar room), and guidelines for completing the exam will be discussed in detail by your seminar moderators.

B. Objectives:

- Assess the success of the student in mastering the material of the Joint Maritime Operations Course.
- Submit completed End of Course Questionnaires.

C. Guidance:

This session concludes the JMO course. The End of Course Questionnaire (on-line) must be completed prior to this session; responses to the questionnaire, however, will not be released to the faculty until grades are posted.

D. Required Readings:

Joint Maritime Operations Syllabus 2002-2003, End of Course Questionnaire, pp. 159-163.

BLOCK ONE LISTING
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS/LAW

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

A. Focus:

The first block of the Joint Maritime Operations Course aims to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the operational concepts that will be discussed in greater detail throughout the remainder of the course. The sessions in this block offer an intensive exposure to operational art, the basic elements of operational warfare, and a multitude of operational terms that are essential to the study and mastery of the material that follows. Our focus in the CNC&S course is at the joint force level of planning. Block One concludes with a survey of operational law and rules of engagement considerations.

B. Guidance:

The material offered in Block One may be more familiar to some students than to others depending upon Service background, operational experience, and previous military education. In an age when it is incumbent upon all military officers to be able to communicate with colleagues from other Services and other nations, you will find a wealth of invaluable material to be gained—not only from the readings, but particularly in the daily seminar discussions. Upon completion of this block of study you should be comfortable with the terminology and concepts of operational art—the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns to accomplish operational and/or strategic objectives in a theater.

The first two weeks of Block One are designed to provide you with a quick introduction to some of the terminology, elements, and principles of operational art. The Leyte Gulf case study will be used to provide illustrative examples. Finally, during the third week, you will do an in-depth analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas case study using the terms, elements, principles, and concepts you have learned during the first two weeks of the course.

We will not teach you operational art in a week or even in a full trimester. This block addresses all the most important components of operational art. It is not intended or designed to serve as a manual for operational art. The Operational Concepts block will have been successful if, at the end, you have a basic understanding of the concepts of operational art and the importance of its practice.

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ART (Seminar)

The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of what it is that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the power of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the effective power of conduct.

—Julian Corbett

A. Focus:

This session will focus on: defining the concept of *operational art*; understanding the historical roots of operational art; the linkage between *operational art* and *strategy* and *tactics*; and the relationship between *operational art* and the *operational level* of warfare. Additionally, this session provides important background for developing the skills required for effective operational planning which are exercised in subsequent JMO lesson blocks.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and evaluate key ongoing and anticipated technological developments pertinent to the military instrument.
- Understand the historical evolution of the operational level of warfare and its relationship to the emergence and development of operational art.
- Comprehend the meaning of the term operational art.
- Comprehend the linkage between operational art, strategy and tactics.
- Comprehend that an understanding of the components of operational art will facilitate the use of these components as analytical tools for evaluating historical examples of operational level warfare and conducting operational level planning and employment of military forces.
- Understand the importance of applying sound operational art concepts to military planning and force employment.

C. Background:

Operational art, in its essence, deals with the study, theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns designed to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a given theater. Operational art is one

of the three components of military art, along with strategy and tactics. All of the components of military art are inextricably linked. Operational art is applied across the three *levels* of warfare, strategic, operational and tactical, and across the *range* of military *conflict*, that is, from military operations other than war (MOOTW) to war.

As will be seen during the discussion of this lesson, the *conduct* of warfare at the operational level preceded the emergence of formal operational art. The operational *level* of warfare emerged as a result of various deliberate national policy decisions and the explosion of military technology. The search by military professionals for effective methods of conducting war at the operational level led to the emergence and evolution of operational art. This interaction among study, theory and practice continues to this day.

Operational art is *not* doctrine. Effective doctrine is a *derivative* of sound operational art. In that regard, the combat employment of ground, naval, air and space forces manifests some functional commonalities, but there are also clear differences in practice, due primarily to differences in the "medium" (land, sea, air, and space) in which these forces operate and the weapon systems each Service employs in these media. Therefore, as a result of these and other influences, each Service develops and practices its own adaptation of operational art and related doctrine, while the joint employment of forces is guided by joint operational art and derivative joint doctrine. It is relevant to note that, in a modern context, no employment of combat forces at the operational or theater-strategic level has taken place without some involvement of two or more Services.

Operational art is also *not* strategy. Strategy is normally developed and implemented at the national level, while operational art is applied across the spectrum of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare, in order to develop the operational level concepts and plans which will integrate national strategic objectives with battlefield tactical actions, defined by tactics, through effective theater and joint task force level operations. Operational art is thus the enabling function for theater/task force operations. In addition, operational art and the operational level of warfare are *not* synonymous. Operational art is a cognitive, analytical *process*, while the operational level of war is a *category* of military operations.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. M. Goodrich, C-420.

D. Questions:

What is the operational level of warfare? How/why did it develop? When?

What is operational art? How/why did it emerge? When?

What is the relationship of operational art to the operational level of warfare?

Briefly, how would you define strategy and tactics?

What is the relationship of operational art to strategy and tactics?

Why study and learn operational art? What is its utility for you as future joint operations and staff officers?

E. Required Readings:

Helms, Chester E.; "A Short History of Operational Art". **(NWC 1059A)** (Issued)

Vego, Milan; "On Operational Art," *Operational Warfare,* Part I: Fundamentals; pp 1-25. (Issued)

Schneider, James J.; "The Loose Marble-and the Origins of Operational Art". (**NWC 4004**) (Issued)

F. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan; Glossary of Operational Terms; *Operational Warfare.* (Issued).

Goerlitz, Walter; *The German General Staff*, 1657-1945; Fredrick A, Praeger; New York, NY; 1961.

Stoecker, S.W.; *Forging Stalin's Army - Marshal Tukachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation*; Westview Press; Oxford, UK; 1998.

Orenstein, Harold S. (Trans.); *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art - The Documentary Basis, 1927-1991* (Two Vols.); Frank Cass Publisher; Portland OR; 1995.

Corum, James S.; *The Roots of Blitzkrieg - Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform*; Univ. of Kansas Press; Lawrence, KS; 1992.

Corum, James S.; *The Luftwaffe - Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940*; Univ. of Kansas Press; Lawrence, KS; 1997.

"I think it is fair to say that while good theory will not guarantee good generalship, bad theory will certainly guarantee the reverse ... It seems to me there was a profound decline in the quality of strategic thought. The decline finally took the form of a search for axioms which were simple and easy to grasp, something Clausewitz had scrupulously avoided...Clausewitz insists that there are no principles of war; that there is no system of rules which, if pursued will guarantee success...I consider it to his great credit rather than a ground for criticism..."

—Dr. Bernard Brodie

A. Focus:

This session examines the relationship of *operational art* to *doctrine*, and the differences between the two concepts. In addition, current *Service* and *Joint doctrine*, and their relationship to *operational art* are briefly examined, and the *Joint doctrine development process* is discussed.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between *Service* and *joint* doctrine.
- **PJE**—Understand the factors influencing joint doctrine.
- Understand the relationship of *doctrine* to *operational art*, to include the differences between the two concepts.
- Understand how *operational art* developed in the United States.

C. Background:

Every military Service operates in a unique environment, employing forces (*ground, air, space* or *naval*) in accordance with war fighting methods developed over many years and optimized for each service-unique operating environment. These methods constitute each Service's doctrine. In parallel, *joint* doctrine has been established to prescribe the methodology that will facilitate integrated, multi-service operations to achieve national and theater-level objectives. An extensive joint publications system, with a topical hierarchy and a prescribed development process, has been produced to ensure that sufficient authoritative joint operations guidance exists to "fundamentally shape the way we think about and train for war."

Doctrine, both Service and joint, must evolve as influencing factors change. Modern history is replete with failed rulers and defeated nations whose doctrine failed to change or changed incorrectly, because of a fatal misinterpretation of influencing factors and/or ignorance of the operational concepts upon which predecessor doctrine was founded. Doctrine, by its nature, involves specific application of general insights regarding "how to fight," as influenced by relevant political and military perspectives, economic factors, geography, weapon systems, etc. Thus, effective doctrine is clearly a *derivative* of sound Operational Art.

Because the forces and assets of each Service must train and fight synergistically

with those of the other Services as elements of joint or multi-national forces, our study of operational art begins with a review of each of the Services' doctrinal perspectives, and then proceeds to a consideration of operational art as applied to joint operations.

A key point to remember as we start into the analysis of operational art and its many components is that military "truths" established and verified through history have evolved from experience and lessons learned, for the most part, in combat. Many of these truths will remain valid and vital to future joint military planning and operations, even as technology, such as Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and its "system of systems" evolve. However, some of our doctrinal thinking may no longer be relevant in that context. The challenge ahead is to discern what to keep and what to discard. Understanding the historical, theoretical and practical underpinnings of doctrine and operational art is vital for the development of sound future doctrine.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. M. Goodrich, C-420.

D. Questions:

What is *doctrine?* What is its role? What is the relationship of *operational art* to *doctrine?*

Is Carl Builder still relevant in his assertions about *Service Culture*? Does culture affect *doctrine*?

Is the *joint* perspective on *operational art* comprehensive? Should it be? Are today's *Service* perspectives on *operational art* really distinct?

What precautions are appropriate when rewriting *doctrine?* Does our current *joint doctrinal development system* effectively account for significant influencing factors and safeguard against, for example, "change for its own sake"? What precautions might be particularly important when rewriting *joint* doctrine, since it is specified as **authoritative?**

What are some *factors* that influence *doctrine*?

Does the specification of *joint doctrine* as **authoritative guidance** conflict with Dr. Brodie's quoted observations at the beginning of this lesson overview?

How does *service* doctrine relate to *joint* doctrine*?*

The military Services and the joint community are rational organizations dedicated to promoting the interests and protecting the security of the United States. As such, they value predictability, stability and certainty, because these characteristics reduce risk and facilitate the training and equipping of military forces. Moreover, these organizations generally exhibit behavior that favors incremental, gradual change. Many believe the start of the 21st Century coincides with the dawning of a new era—the Information Age. New eras herald great change and demand innovation. Are the military Services or the joint community prepared to facilitate innovative thinking, attuned to the new era?

Have the services embraced and facilitated information operations in doctrine? Does NCW represent such innovative thinking? Is the Navy prepared to include NCW in its doctrine?

E. Required Readings:

Builder, Carl H.; *Mask of War,* "Personalities", Part 1, pp.1-44; The Rand Corporation; Johns Hopkins Press; Baltimore, Maryland; 1991. (Issued).

Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., Capt, USN (Ret); "The Power in Doctrine"; *Naval War College Review, Summer 1995.* (**NWC 1018**) (Issued).

Meilinger, Phillip S., Col, USAF; "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power"; *Airpower Journal, Spring 1996.* (**NWC 1011**) (Issued).

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi; "AirLand Battle," Chapter 7, pp. 44-56; *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century.* (**NWC 1019**) (Issued).

Joint Doctrine and Capstone and Keystone Primer; "The Joint Doctrine Story", pp. 83-86. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0; *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* pp. III-9 to III-24. (Issued).

In all Services there is a dynamic of doctrinal introspection that is outdistancing most published critiques and official publications on the subject. Listed below are the doctrinal proponent Internet sites for each of the Services and the Joint Staff. Students should browse these sites to become familiar with the organization-unique perspectives provided at each.

Joint Staff:	www.dtic.mil/doctrine
Army:	www.tradoc.army.mil
Navy:	www.nwdc.navy.mil/doctrine.asp
Air Force:	www.doctrine af.mil
Marine:	www.doctrine.usmc.mil
Coast Guard:	www.uscg.mil

F. Supplementary Readings:

Clay, John S.; "The Fifth Service Looks at Doctrine"; *Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 96-97.* (**NWC 1010**) (Issued).

Lovelace, Douglas C. Jr., and Young, Thomas-Durell; "Joint Doctrine Development: Overcoming a Legacy"; *Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 96-97.* (**NWC 1039**) (Issued).

Owens, William A.; "Making the Joint Journey"; *Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999.* (**NWC 1068**) (Issued).

Tritten, James J.; "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine"; *Naval War College Review, Spring 1995.* (**NWC 1064**) (Issued).

"An Assessment of Joint Doctrine"; *Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 96-97.*

Cox, Gary C., Major, USAF; "Beyond the Battle Line: U.S. Air Attack Theory and Doctrine, 1919-1941"; School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, April 1996.

Kagan, Frederick; "Army Doctrine and Modern War: Notes Toward a New Edition of FM 100-5"; *Parameters, Vol. xxvii, No. 1, Spring 1997.*

Matheny, Michael R., Major, USA; "The Development of the Theory and Doctrine of Operational Art in the American Army, 1920-1940"; School of Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College; 22 March 1988.

Millett, Alan R. and Murray, Williamson (eds.); *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*.

Romjue, John L.; *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982;* TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, June 1984.

Weigley, Russell F.; *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*.

Posen, Barry P.; *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars.*

Tritten, James J. and Donolo, Luigi, Vice Admiral, Italian Navy (Retired); *A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Spain; Newport Paper Number Nine.*

Waghelstein, John D.; "Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War, Educational and Doctrinal Failure, 1865-91"; *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 1999.

THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF—Film (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session is designed to provide the student a broad overview of the concept and execution of the Allied invasion of Leyte in 1944.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the concept and execution of operations associated with the invasion or defense of Leyte from both Allied and Japanese perspectives.

C. Background:

Operational art has its genesis in the necessity to move, employ and sustain large military forces. Some aspects of operational art certainly are applicable to operations other than war and low intensity conflict, but a full understanding of the subject requires analysis in the context of full-scale military action. The Battle of Leyte Gulf provides that context. We will examine two mature but differently organized warfighting opponents in the planning and execution of major combat operations. The challenges they faced in command relationships, command and control of forces, intelligence, sequencing and synchronizing maneuver, fires and logistics, etc., are still very much relevant to the current world.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest naval battle ever fought and epitomizes joint warfare in the littorals. On the Allied side, it was joint (multiservice) and combined (multinational). For both sides, forces came together from more than one theater to cooperate in tactical actions designed to achieve operational and theater-strategic objectives in support of national strategic objectives. These forces had to be moved to the area of operations, employed effectively and sustained. How this was accomplished will be used to illustrate the concepts being explored during the study of operational art.

The overview of Leyte Gulf provided by the Time-Life video, *The Battle of Leyte Gulf,* is designed to provide a basic understanding of the events of the battle. With this foundation, the student can then concentrate on analysis and understanding rather than spending time trying to discern the sequence of actions.

The point of contact for this session is Captain C. E. Helms, U.S. Navy, C-422.

D. Required Readings:

None.

E. Supplementary Readings:

None.

OPERATIONAL FACTORS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session addresses the operational factors of space, time and forces. It uses examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf to illustrate the application of operational art to the maritime theater of operations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the operational factors of space, time and forces; their interrelationships; and the need for the operational commander to balance these factors against each other in order to obtain freedom of action.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations of employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for the employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

The key operational factors are *space, time*, and *forces*. However, recently some theorists have argued for including *information* as an operational factor.

Military operations take place in a given space, in a given elapsed time, and with some quantity and types of forces. One or more of these factors may be beyond the commander's control and, thus, require adjustments to those factors that can be controlled. Because these factors are interrelated, adjustments in one will usually affect the others.

The size, shape, and character of a space affects the quantity and types of forces, and the time required to conduct a successful military operation. The commander may not be able to choose or shape the space. While mere gain or loss of space in itself is not inherently a disadvantage or advantage, the relationship between space and forces may be decisive.

In like manner, space and time have a reciprocal effect upon each other. The attacker aims to expend the least time possible in gaining space: the less time he uses for mobilization, deployment, and concentration, usually the less prepared will be the defender. In the extreme case the attacker may cause the defender to give up without fighting. Moreover, quickly seizing or controlling an objective area will reduce the defender's area of operation, and consequently his freedom of maneuver. Delay usually benefits the defender by causing the attacker to increase his efforts, thereby depleting his combat power over time. Hence, defenders try to increase time expended by controlling space.

Simultaneously, the quantity and types of forces that a commander can or will commit directly affect the time required for a military operation and the size of the space that can be used. Smaller forces may require more time and a smaller space for achievement of objectives; larger forces may allow faster action in a larger space.

Thus, the art of warfare, especially at the operational and strategic levels, consists of

effectively balancing the factors of space, time, and forces to allow the commander to obtain freedom of action.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

How did the Allied and Japanese commanders at the Battle of Leyte Gulf view the operational factors of space, time and forces?

How did Halsey's focus on the Japanese carriers (factor force) affect factors space and time at Leyte Gulf? Is this what the Japanese intended? Why or why not?

E. Required Reading:

Vego, Milan, "Operational Factors," "The Factor of Space," "The Factor of Time," "The Factor of Force," "The Factors of Space, Time, and Force," "Information and Operational Factors" (*Operational Warfare*) (Issued).

Goodrich, David (compiler), Part II: Operational Factors, pp. 40-72, *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Reading:

None.

LEVELS OF WAR (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session addresses the levels of war and the application of operational art across those levels. In so doing it builds a connection between the Joint Maritime Operations curriculum and that of Strategy and Policy, and provides a foundation for understanding the concepts introduced in Sessions I-6, "The Theater," I-7, "Operational Functions," I-8 "Elements of Operational Warfare," and I-13, "Operational leadership." Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf are used to illustrate the importance of understanding the levels of war and deciding and acting accordingly.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the distinctions between the *strategic*, *operational*, and *tactical* levels of war, and how operational art is applied at the different levels.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employing joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.

C. Background:

Understanding the fundamentals of operational art requires delineating the levels of war and comprehending their application to the construction of national and military plans.

The levels of war are not easily delineated because they are closely interrelated: events at a lower level often directly influence higher level(s), and vice-versa. However, effective planning requires a clear understanding as to which level applies.

There are three principal levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level may be divided into the national-strategic and theater-strategic sub-levels. Some theorists also discuss the operational-strategic and operational-tactical sub-levels.

Generally, each level of war corresponds to a specific command echelon. However, command echelons are actually established based on the objectives to be attained, while levels of war normally relate to the size and extent of the physical environment in which one's own forces operate, constrained by a specific command echelon's ability to influence events and command and control forces.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

Are operational art and the operational level of war the same thing? If not, how are they different?

How might a geographic combatant commander serve as either a strategic-level

commander or an operational-level commander.

Was General MacArthur a strategic or operational-level commander during Operation King II? How about Admirals Nimitz and Halsey?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, *Operational Warfare*, "Levels of Command and Levels of War," pp. 17-25 (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* pp. II-1 - II-3, (Issued).

MCDP 1, Warfighting "Levels of War," pp. 28 - 32, (**NWC 2006**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

THE THEATER (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session connects our discussions of the operational factor space and the levels of war by introducing the concept of the theater at the operational level of war. Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf are used to illustrate the application of operational art to the maritime theater of operations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend how peacetime and wartime "theaters" are designed, including the key elements of a maritime theater.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employing joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.

C. Background:

Once the objectives of major operations and campaigns have been established, the physical space needs to be delineated in order to: (1) tie together the command echelons and the specific objectives to be achieved, and (2) provide a framework for the management of space. The operational level of war typically encompasses a theater or an area of operation.

A theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of war. A theater of war does not necessarily (or even usually) encompass a given geographic combatant commander's entire peacetime area of responsibility. In some cases, it might straddle the boundary between two geographic areas of responsibility. In a global conflict, several theaters of war might exist simultaneously—distinguished by geography, priority, or existing infrastructure. Theaters and/or areas of operation may be organized, depending upon the nature and size of the joint action and the objectives to be achieved. For operations limited in scope or duration, a Joint Force Commander may establish Joint Operations Areas, Joint Special Operations Areas, or other smaller areas of operations as part of a theater or as a stand-alone area.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

What is the usual relationship between command echelon and theater?

Why was the Allied Pacific Theater during World War II divided into several areas? Why was it divided up the way it was? What effect did these divisions have on the planning and execution of the Leyte Gulf operation?

How does war against a non-state actor such as *Al Qaeda* affect the organization of factor space? Is the "theater" still a useful concept in such cases?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. *Operational Warfare*, "Theater Organization and Structure," and "Theater Geometry," pp. 109-122 and 151-182 (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* pp. II-1 - II-3, (Issued).

MCDP 1, Warfighting "Levels of War," pp. 28 - 32, (**NWC 2006**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan. *Operational Warfare*, "Theater Physical Features," pp. 123-149 (Issued).

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session is intended to further define the framework within which Operational Art is practiced. It deals in some detail with theater-wide or operational functions intended primarily to support the planning, preparation, conduct, and sustainment of major operations and campaigns. Operational functions are sequenced and synchronized in the employment of one's own and friendly forces across the range of military operations-from military operations other than war (MOOTW) to war.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for the employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of *operational command and control*.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of *operational movement and maneuver*.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of *operational intelligence*.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of *operational fires*.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of *operational logistics*.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of *operational protection*.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of *synchronization* of the key operational functions.

C. Background:

The existence of an operational level of war suggests the concurrent existence of operational level functions. The synchronization of these operational functions ensures and enhances the ability of operational commanders and their subordinate elements to carry out their missions in both peace and war. In a *mature theater*, operational functions will normally be established nearly in their entirety. However, in an *immature theater,* they may exist in a rudimentary form, or not at all. Understanding the impact and interaction of these functions at the operational level of war is critically important for proper planning, preparation, employment, and support of one's own forces in attainment of their assigned objectives.

The key operational functions are: *Operational command and control, operational movement and maneuver, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational logistics,* and *operational protection*. The required readings provide a brief overview of each of these functions and associated activities. During your reading, you will probably find that you are already familiar with these functions at the tactical level.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel W. F. Brown, U.S. Army, SP-212.

D. Questions:

Are there advantages or disadvantages of having operational functions in place during peace and war? Discuss and explain the purpose of each operational function.

What impact did the following operational functions have on the Leyte Gulf operation from the perspective of both belligerents?

Command and Control—What are some of the factors that influenced the composition of specific command structures? This particular area is cited for many of the difficulties and poor decisions that occurred throughout the operation. Identify the flaws and their associated consequences with specific command structures and guidance/orders issued to subordinates. Can you find elements of IO in the Leyte Gulf operation? If so, discuss them.

Movement and Maneuver—How did the opposing forces plan and employ movement and maneuver at Leyte?

Operational Intelligence—To what extent did the Allies operate on a basis of Japanese intentions rather than capabilities? What result did this have on the eventual outcome of the battle?

Operational Fires—Were operational fires used during the Leyte Operation? If so, where and how? To what extent were they effective? Why (or why not) were they effective?

Operational Protection—Did either of the opposing forces at Leyte consider and plan adequately for operational protection? Discuss examples of where and how operational protection was provided. What is the relationship of operational protection to the more commonly used term—force protection?

Operational Logistics—How did the Allies address this area? What was the operational impact for the Allies? What impact did operational logistics have on the Japanese?

Did the Allies synchronize their operational functions? If so, what functions did they synchronize and what effect did it have on the operation?

As our armed forces become ever more information based, what are the impacts on the operational functions?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department, "Operational Functions," (**NWC 4103A**) (Issued).

Goodrich, David M., (Compiler), Part III: Operational Functions, *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings*, (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Bates, Richard, et al., "Allied Arrangements." pp 77-89.

Bates, Richard, et al., "Japanese Command Relations." pp 91-101.

Bates, Richard, et al., "Allied Arrangements—Information Available to the Allied Commander." pp. 103-112.

Bates, Richard, et al., "Japanese Command Relations—Information Available to the Japanese Commander." pp. 114-119.

Commander Third Fleet: "Operation Plan 21-44 (4 October 1944): Forces Under W.F. Halsey, USN, to Conduct Air Strikes on Okinawa, Formosa, Luzon, and the Vision Island in Support of Landing on and Occupation of Leyte." pp. 121-123.

Goodrich, David M., "Forgotten Mission: Land Based Air Operational Fires in Support of the Leyte Gulf Invasion." pp.124-138.

Joint Pub 2-0: *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations,* (Scan) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations, pg. III-17, (Forces and Functions)* (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-13.1: *Joint Doctrine for Command & Control Warfare (C2W),* (Scan) (Issued).

Joint Pub 4-0: *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*, (Scan) (Issued).

F. Supplemental Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Operational Command and Control Warfare (C2W)," and "Operational Protection," Part IV: Operational Functions, *Operational Warfare*, (Issued).

Bolick, Joseph A., "The Influence And Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection of Operational Level Intelligence during the 1914 and 1943 Kursk Campaigns."

Handel, Michael I., "Intelligence and Military Operations."

Hutcherson, Norman B., "Command and Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighter's Data Base."

Porter, Laning M., "Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experiences: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking."

Rockwell, Christopher A., "Operational Sustainment: Lines of Communication and the Conduct of Operations."

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session continues to examine the theoretical framework and fundamental concepts of operational art. It focuses on the elements of operational warfare; specifically deployment/redeployment, "critical factors," concentration, operational maneuver, and the concept of the "culminating point."

B. Objectives:

- Identify and examine the principal elements of warfare as applied to the operational level of war.
- Know and understand the meaning and concept of the terms "critical factors," "culminating point" and "center of gravity."
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for the employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

The essence of operational art is applying decisive force against the enemy's main source of strength. This session will examine several key concepts that are essential to effectively plan and employ military forces to achieve desired military objectives.

Initial planning must include identifying "critical factors" that pertain to both enemy and friendly forces. The term critical factors is used to describe the critical strengths and critical weaknesses of both sides in a conflict. "Critical strengths" are those capabilities considered vital to achieve a given military objective. "Critical weaknesses" are those elements that, while essential, are grossly inadequate by themselves to perform their intended function or task. Critical strengths and weaknesses may become "critical vulnerabilities" if they are directly related to the center of gravity and are vulnerable to attack.

Successful planning and employment of combat forces hinges on the proper identification of a "center of gravity" for both the enemy and one's own and friendly forces. In generic terms, a center of gravity is defined as a source of "massed" strength—physical or moral, or, a source of leverage—whose serious degradation, neutralization, or destruction will have a *decisive* impact on a military force's ability to accomplish a given military objective. The enemy's COG must be neutralized or destroyed, while one's own COG must be protected in order to accomplish the assigned military objective.

Success in combat is largely dependent on rapidly massed, superior combat power at a decisive time and place on the battlefield. A series of specific actions is required to successfully concentrate forces at a desired time and location. This series of actions includes deployment, employment, and sustainment.

Deployment is the process of moving one's own forces and assets to their planned starting positions or designated lines and areas for the commencement of actions. Time

phasing of forces into the area of operations is critical for success at the higher levels of war (operational and strategic). Errors in deployment at the operational or theater-strategic levels cannot be easily corrected, if at all, once hostilities start. Deployment precedes employment and maneuver.

Employment of military forces frequently involves maneuver. The principal aim of maneuver is to obtain a position that offers a force an advantage relative to the enemy. Forces can employ maneuver in both the offense and defense. Maneuver facilitates direct or indirect attack on the enemy's COG or strikes at the enemy's critical capabilities such as logistical support. Maneuver is categorized as tactical, operational, or strategic based on the nature of the desired objective (tactical, operational, strategic).

An important element of warfare, especially at the operational and strategic levels, is the concept of a culminating point, (or culmination.) Culmination applies to both offensive and defensive actions. In the offense, the culminating point is the point when the attacker no longer has sufficient combat power to successfully continue the attack. The attacker seeks to secure his objective before reaching his culmination point. In the defense, the culminating point is the point where the defender has inadequate combat power to defend successfully. The defender wants to draw the attacker to his culmination point and then strike when the attacker has exhausted his resources and is no longer capable of a successful defense. The ability to prevent one's own culmination while causing the enemy to reach his is one of the prerequisites to operational success. In general, the point of culmination occurs in time and space, when and where the attacker must stop and defend his gains if he wishes to avoid losing them. It is the combat power that culminates, and the operational commander must determine his combat power relative to that of the opponent.

Point of contact for this session is Colonel W. F. Brown, U.S. Army, SP-212.

D. Questions:

What is the purpose of strategic and operational deployment? Explain and analyze operational deployment. Did the Japanese and the Allies correctly assess the challenge of deployment in building their plans for the Philippines?

What is the relevance of the concept of "critical factors?" Explain the relationship between "critical strengths" and "critical weaknesses."

What is your understanding of the concept of the "center of gravity?" What is the relationship between the objective and the enemy center of gravity (COG)?

To what extent did the plans of the Allies and the Japanese clearly address the operational concept of the center of gravity (or recognition of appropriate critical factors)? What critical factors did each side identify? Do you agree with them?

What forms of operational maneuver did the Allies and Japanese employ during the Leyte operation? Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the forms of operational maneuver.

Explain and analyze the concept of "culmination." What key factors cause "culmination"? Did the Japanese or Allies reach a culmination point in the Leyte operation?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department, "Elements of Operational Warfare," (**NWC 4096A**) (Issued).

Huber, Jeff, "You Can't Defy the Laws of Gravity," (**NCW 1083**) (Issued).

Izzo, Lawrence L., "The Center of Gravity is not an Achilles Heel," (**NWC 1026**) (Issued).

Webb, George S., "The Razor's Edge: Identifying the Operational Culminating Point of Victory," (**NWC 1027**) (Issued).

F. Supplemental Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Stages and Elements of Operational Warfare," "Force Deployment," and "Concept of Culminating Point," Part V: Stages and Elements of Operational Warfare, *Operational Warfare,* (Issued).

Goodrich, David M., (Compiler), Part IV: Operational Plans, *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings,* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Goodrich, David M., (Compiler), Part VI: The Execution, *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings,* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Anderson, Charles R., "Leyte, The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II." pp 298-329.

Potter, E. B., "The Battle for Leyte Gulf." pp 279-297.

Mendel and Tooke, "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity."

METHODS OF COMBAT FORCE EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

"The beginnings of wisdom is to call things their right name."

—Confucius

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to explain and analyze the principal methods of combat force employment to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a theater.

B. Objectives:

- Know and understand the principal methods of combat force employment in general.
- Understand the proper definition and meaning of the term "major operation" and its importance in planning as a part of a campaign.
- Describe the differences between tactical actions, major operations, and campaigns, and how they relate to the levels of war.
- Understand theater command and control relationships, with special emphasis on the functions and employment of a JTF.
- **PJE**—Understand the factors influencing joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns and operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.

C. Background:

Methods of combat force employment are an important component of operational art. While battles and campaigns have received inordinately greater attention in U.S. doctrinal publications, the same cannot be said about *major operations*. This lack of interest has been compounded by differences in terminology. Each Service, although using the same or similar terms, defines methods of combat force employment differently (even differently from joint doctrine). The full extent of Service differences is such that some of the terms used are not recognized by other Services, while other terms have no generally accepted definition or are not defined at all. More often than not, terms are used loosely and without regard to their real meaning or commonly accepted definitions.

Modern methods of combat force employment are the result of a long evolution of warfare. In the nineteenth century, "decisive" battles were the area of study and practice of *tactics,* while *strategy* was concerned with the conduct of campaigns. In that era, primarily a single Service conducted campaigns, although there are examples where navies took part as well (the American War of Independence, the Peninsular War, the Crimean War, the American Civil War, etc.).

The principal methods of combat force employment today are *tactical actions, major operations,* and *campaigns*. The terms are differentiated by the *military objectives* they are intended to accomplish and the corresponding command echelon responsible for their planning, preparation, and execution. Tactical actions are normally conducted to accomplish tactical objectives, while the principal methods for accomplishing strategic or operational objectives are major operations and campaigns.

Tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, etc.) are aimed at accomplishing major or minor tactical objectives in a given combat zones or sectors and, in some cases, can encompass an area of operations. They are usually an integral part of major operations. Tactical actions are predominant methods of combat force employment in some warfare areas, specifically, attack on the enemy's and defense and protection of one's maritime trade. When conducted over time and in a certain sea or ocean area or airspace, tactical actions can cumulatively accomplish operational objective(s). Tactical actions can be either defensive or offensive in nature and are differentiated by the physical environment (land, sea, or airspace) in which they occur.

In the U.S. military, the term "major operation" is not a widely understood or accepted term. The more generic term "operation" is used so often and interchangeably that it has lost its true meaning. U.S. joint doctrine defines operation as "a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign." The term "major operation" was introduced by the U.S. Army to make a clear distinction between combat force employment to accomplish operational objectives and the employment of combat force for other purposes. The most recent, U.S. Army manual FM 3-0 *Operations* defines, however, a major operation as "a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational, and sometimes strategic objectives in an operational area."

In generic terms, a *major operation* consists of series of related battles, engagements, and strikes and other tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and space to accomplish an operational objective. Major operations are normally an integral part of a campaign. Sometimes, a major operation could be planned to accomplish a strategic objective in a situation short of war, and usually in an undeveloped theater. Examples of such major operations are the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (Operation *Urgent Fury*), the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 (Operation *Just Cause*), and NATO's actions in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999 (Operation *Allied Force*).

In contrast to tactical actions, major operations are invariably planned. With respect to their purpose, they can be offensive or defensive. Ground (or land), naval (or maritime), air (space), and special forces major operations are differentiated with regard to the

physical environment in which the preponderance of the major operation is conducted. With respect to the degree of Service participation, *independent, joint* (multi-Service), and *combined* (multi-national) major operations are differentiated. *Independent major operations* are conducted *predominantly* by the combat arms of a single Service. A joint *major operation* is conducted by forces of two or more Services, while a *combined major operation* is conducted with two or more Services of allied countries or coalition member states. A major operation can be both joint and combined (as was the case during the Coalition's air offensive against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1990–1991, and NATO's action against Serbia in 1999). When only a single-type force is used, a major operation can be combined without necessarily being joint (e.g., the combat employment of a multi-national naval forces or air forces).

The term *campaign* is used interchangeably by the U.S. military for describing a wide range of military actions. The DOD and the Services differ in their understanding of what constitutes a campaign. Joint Pub 1-02 (2001) defines a campaign as a "series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space." Joint Pub 5-0 (1995) describes a campaign as "a series of related *joint major operations* that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space."

In generic terms, a *campaign* consists of a series of related major operations (land, air/space, naval, special forces) sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and space to accomplish a military *strategic* or *theater-strategic objective* in a given (declared or undeclared) theater of operations. These operations are executed simultaneously or sequentially and are conducted according to a common plan controlled by a theater commander. The main purpose of a campaign may be either *offensive* or *defensive*. *Land campaigns* and *maritime campaigns* are differentiated according to the physical environment in which major operations predominantly take place.

In contrast, a campaign in "military operations other than war" (MOOTW), such as counterinsurgency consists of a series of related minor or sometimes major tactical actions rather than major operations. These actions are coordinated in time and place to accomplish strategic objectives within a given part of the theater commander's area of responsibility. Some campaigns in MOOTW, specifically counter drug or counter terrorism campaigns are not limited to a specific theater, but are conducted in several theaters that might or might not be adjacent to each other.

As in the past, new technological advances will affect the methods of combat force employment in the future. Battles and engagements will probably be less important than strikes. Major joint/combined operations will most likely emerge as the principal method of accomplishing strategic objectives in a theater, while campaigns could become rare except in the case of war between two major powers.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. N. Vego, C-414.

D. Questions:

Why is it important to know and understand the true meanings of the key terms dealing with the methods of combat force employment?

Explain the principal methods for accomplishing major and minor tactical objectives. What are the differences between a battle and an engagement and between a strike and

an attack?

What is the true meaning of the term "major operation"?

Explain what constitutes a "campaign." Is there such a thing as an "air campaign"?

Might NCW blur the differences between tactical actions and major operations? Why?

Will the planning of tactical actions become in the future the purview of the operational commander? Why or why not?

Leyte Case Study:

Did the Allied amphibious landing at Leyte aim to accomplish an operational or strategic objective?

How would you describe the type of major naval, ground, and air operations in terms of their main purpose (offensive vs. defensive; fleet vs. fleet, fleet vs. shore, air vs. ground; main or supporting, etc.) and timing (main, supporting, preliminary, initial, etc.) conducted by the Allied and Japanese forces in the Philippines and the adjacent sea/airspace between 17 and 26 October 1944?

What naval battles and engagements constituted what is popularly known as the "Battle of Leyte Gulf?" Were all battles or engagements planned or are they simply seen as such in retrospect?

What were the key elements of the major naval and air operations conducted by the Japanese forces in defense of the Philippines in October 1944?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Methods of Combat Force Employment," "Major Naval Operations," Part VI: Methods of Combat Force Employment, pp. 373-409, ibid., *Operational Warfare* (Issued).

Potter, E. B., "The Battle for Leyte Gulf," Part VI: The Execution of the Operation, pp. 279-297, Goodrich, David H. (Editor), *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings,* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

OPERATIONAL WARFARE AT SEA (Seminar)

Knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be attended to at idle times …

Pericles, 460 B.C.

In giving up the offensive, the Navy gives up its proper sphere.
In war, the proper objective of the Navy is the enemy's navy.

Mahan, Naval Strategy, 1911

A. Focus:

This session explains the influence of physical factors on warfare in the littorals. The objectives of naval warfare on the open ocean and in the littorals are explained in some detail. The focus is on operational and strategic objectives in fighting war at sea.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the operational characteristics of the littorals and their influence on the combat employment of major naval forces and aviation.
- Comprehend and analyze the meaning and complexities of the terms "sea control," "sea denial," "choke point control," and "basing/deployment area control."
- Know and analyze the theoretical and practical implications of sea control in terms of its scope, duration, and degree.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns and operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.

C. Background:

The U.S. Navy is typical of a blue-water navy, capable of operating in all the waters of the world's oceans. There are, however, significant differences between operating on the open ocean and in the waters close to continental landmass euphemistically called "littorals." The "littoral" in the strict definition of the term means "shore" or "pertaining to a shore." In U.S. terms, this term pertains to the U.S. Navy's ability to influence events by projecting its power ashore.

Littoral warfare can take place not only in semi-enclosed and enclosed seas but also in marginal seas and the waters of an open ocean bordering the continental landmass. The littoral waters are not necessarily "shallow" (depths less than 200 fathoms) but can be both shallow and very deep. In practical terms, war in the littorals can be conducted within the confines of an enclosed sea such as the Arabian Gulf; semi-enclosed sea such

as the Sea of Japan; the marginal sea of an ocean such as East China Sea or the waters bordering the open ocean such as West Africa. Obviously, each of these sea areas, while being "littoral," poses quite different sets of challenges and opportunities for the U.S. Navy.

War in the littorals differs considerably from that on the open ocean, primarily because of the small size of the theater and the proximity to the continental landmass. No maritime theater is more directly affected by the geomorphologic and hydrographic/ oceanographic features of the environment than the littorals. Their usually highly indented coasts are endowed with numerous islands and islets. This, in turn, can greatly restrict the maneuverability of one's surface ships, especially major surface combatants and submarines. In shallow waters, large surface ships must greatly reduce their speeds. The littorals also often have numerous shoals, reefs, strong tides and currents, which make safe navigation very difficult.

War at sea is almost never conducted alone, but is an integral part of war as a whole. Strategic objectives of a war are normally accomplished by the employment of all the Services of a country's armed forces. Therefore, war at sea should be considered not in isolation of, but as intrinsically related to war on land, and in airspace. Political strategic objectives determine the part to be played by each Service in a war. All Services must cooperate closely because no war could be won by the efforts of a single Service. The highest degree of jointness is absolutely necessary in conducting war in the littorals in particular.

Depending on the military objectives to be accomplished, war at sea is fought at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For each of these objectives, a number of tasks should be determined that collectively ensure the accomplishment of a given objective. In general, a strategic objective in a maritime theater could be offensive, defensive, or a combination of these two. Whether a war at sea would be conducted primarily offensively or defensively would depend on, among other things, a country's geostrategic position on land and at sea, the initial balance of strength at sea and in the air, and the overall war objectives. A stronger fleet normally goes on the strategic offensive, while a weaker fleet is usually forced to stay on a strategic defensive until the balance of forces shifts to its favor. No war at sea has ever been won without going on a strategic offensive.

The principal objective of any fleet in the past was to obtain and maintain what was called *command of the sea* (or *maritime supremacy* in modern terms). The meaning of this term underwent great changes with the advent of submarine, aircraft, and guided missiles. The term used today, *sea control*, more accurately conveys the true state of affairs in a war at sea. It is extremely difficult to completely control the seas for one's use or to completely deny them to a strong and resourceful opponent. Sea control essentially means the ability of one's fleet to operate with a high degree of freedom in a limited sea or ocean area, but for a limited period of time. The objective for a weaker opponent at sea would normally be *sea denial*.

The term *sea control* should be applied only when referring to the *strategic* or *operational* levels of war at sea. It is a stretch to call "sea control" control of the waters in a maritime defense zone or approaches to one's base/port, as is all too often the case in many U.S. Navy's tactical publications. Likewise, the increasing and almost exclusive use of the term *battlespace dominance* in the U.S. Navy pertains to a fluid zone of control

in a given naval combat zone or, at most, a maritime area of operations. In its very essence, this term refers to a *tactical*, not operational level of war. Therefore, it should not be confused with the term "sea control" in its proper definition.

In terms of its physical scope, sea control can be general or local; in terms of duration it can be permanent or temporary. In terms of the degree, sea control is differentiated as absolute, limited or disputed.

General or *complete sea control* on the open ocean was usually a decisive factor in a war against an opponent heavily dependent on commerce or vulnerable to naval blockade. A blue-water navy may possess general command of the respective ocean or major part of the world's oceans, but still be unable to control adjacent narrow seas.

Local sea control exists when one side possesses superiority in one part of the sea for the purpose of executing a specific mission. Sometimes, local sea control must be obtained to conduct an amphibious landing on the opposed shore and bombardment of enemy's coastal installations/facilities.

Permanent sea control exists when one side in the conflict completely dominates a given theater of operations. This does not mean that the opponent can do nothing, but rather that he cannot interfere with one's own maritime shipping or amphibious landings in such a way as to seriously affect the course of the war.

Temporary sea control is usually the result of the inability of either fleet to obtain a decision. In a war between two strong opponents at sea, temporary control prevails in vitally important ocean/sea areas. This is especially the case in an enclosed or semi-enclosed maritime theater.

In practice, sea control varies from absolute to disputed; it can also mean the free use of only particular types of ships, but not others. *Absolute sea control* means, in practice, that one's fleet operates without major opposition, while the weaker fleet could not operate at all. It aims in general to obtain control of an entire maritime theater or its major part so that one's fleet could be employed whenever and wherever needed without threat from its adversary. In the modern era, absolute control of the sea, even in a part of the ocean, has been extremely difficult to accomplish.

Limited sea control (sometimes also called *"conditional"* or *"working" sea control*) exists whenever one fleet has a high degree of freedom of action, while the other operates at high risk. It can also be described as a situation where only one type of ship can operate without high risks, while other types of ships operate at high or unacceptable risks.

Disputed or *contested sea control* normally prevails in a war between two strong opponents on the open ocean or in a large narrow sea. It often occurs in the initial phase of a war and is characterized by an almost uninterrupted struggle for control of a certain sea area. Once control is obtained, however, it is usually not maintained for a long time, but is lost from time to time and then regained. In a typical narrow sea such as the Arabian Gulf, sea control by a stronger fleet can be contested even if the major part of a weaker fleet is destroyed. Besides ground forces and land-based air, defensive mine fields and coastal missile/gun batteries are used to dispute control by a stronger fleet.

A unique feature of narrow seas is the extraordinary influence that straits and narrows—commonly called *choke points*—play in naval strategy. One of the objectives of a stronger fleet is to obtain *choke point control* while the weaker force's objective is to

deny it (*choke point control denial*). The general control of a narrow sea can be accomplished by physically controlling or seizing in wartime one or both shores of a sea's only exit. Control of a sea's exit by itself usually, however, cannot secure absolute control within an enclosed or semi enclosed sea. To obtain such a control it is necessary to seize or neutralize some *operationally* significant positions (a strait/narrows, an island or stretch of the mainland coast) within the confines of a given a narrow sea.

One of the most important and principal tasks of any fleet is to obtain and maintain control of its own basing and deployment areas. Otherwise, one's fleet cannot accomplish its assigned strategic and operational objectives. It is established and maintained in peacetime. Once the hostilities at sea starts, control of one's basing/deployment areas must be maintained and possibly expanded. It is one of the most important navy's *operational tasks*, but accomplished over time through series of diverse tactical actions and measures. Yet, for all its importance, the theoretical aspects of the basing/deployment area control are generally not well appreciated in the U.S. Navy.

Control of one's basing/deployment area is an integral part of a much broader task, *operational protection* established in given maritime theater. It is intended to provide safety of one's naval and other forces at their bases and deployment areas from the enemy attacks from the sea, the air and on the ground. Its main elements are coastal surveillance and reporting system on the enemy's movements and actions in an area, defense of the coast and naval bases/airfields and ports in particular, defense against enemy submarines, combat craft, mines, and weapons of mass destruction, protection of coastal sea routes, airspace control and air defenses, defense of the rear area, and measures of cover, concealment and deception.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. N. Vego, C-414.

D. Questions:

Explain and discuss in general terms the principal differences between war at sea and wars on land or in airspace.

Explain and discuss the meaning of the term "littorals" and "narrow seas."

Discuss the operational impact of geography, oceanography, and weather/climate on the employment of major combat forces in the littorals. In which ways do the influence of these factors differ from those on the open ocean?

Explain the meaning of the term "command of the sea" and "sea control."

Discuss and explain sea control in terms of its scope, duration, and degree. Why does "battlespace dominance" not pertain to the operational level of war at sea?

Discuss and explain the meaning of the term "choke point control?" Provide some historical examples?

What is the meaning of the term "basing/deployment area control?" Is it an important concept and why?

What are your thoughts on the future of war at sea? In your view what is the true potential of network centric warfare in enhancing U.S. Navy's capabilities at the operational level of war? Provide advantages and disadvantages.

Leyte Case Study:

What were the effects of the archipelago features of the Philippines on the employment of the Allied and Japanese surface forces and aviation?

Explain how the littoral nature of terrain, oceanography, and climate/weather affected the Allied amphibious landing at Leyte and subsequent battle ashore?

What were the Allied operational objectives at sea prior to the landing at Leyte on 20 October 1944? Did the Allies aim to obtain general or local sea control in the Philippine waters?

What were the Japanese objectives at sea in defense of the Philippines? Was their objective to obtain local sea control or sea denial?

Did the Japanese possess control of the principal straits and their approaches? What were the consequences for the Allies?

How would you characterize the situation that prevailed in the waters adjacent to Island of Leyte in October-December 1944? Which side did possess local and temporary sea control there?

Did the Japanese plan for and obtain control of their basing/deployment areas?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, Chapters: "Influence of the Physical Environment on Warfare in the Littorals," "Objectives of Naval Warfare;" *Operational Warfare Addendum* September 2002, (**NWC 1001A**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Corbett, Julian, S., *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

Castex, Raoul, *Strategic Theories*. Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, MD: 1994.

Rosinski, Herbert, *The Development of Naval Thought*, edited by B. Mitchell Simpson III. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR (Seminar)

Under the glass top of Nimitz's desk were several cards bearing military slogans, and in a central position one small card with a list: ''Objective, Offensive, Surprise, Superiority of Force at Point of Contact, Simplicity, Security, Movement, Economy of Force, Cooperation.'' Some people call such lists ''principles of war,'' but Nimitz thought of his merely as reminders, a check-off list of things to be considered before launching an operation…

E.B. Potter, *Nimitz*

A. Focus:

This session deals with the principles of war as listed in current joint doctrine, their applicability to operational art, and the question of whether they are true principles as opposed to guidelines that are subject to change as the nature of warfare changes.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine regarding the principles of war.
- **PJE**—Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- Analyze historical case studies using the principles of war.

C. Background:

Historians and military leaders have always studied past wars in an effort to discover if there are underlying principles or elements that would help to explain the victories of successful commanders and that would serve as guides for the conduct of future operations. These studies have consistently identified several "principles" as being worthy of consideration.

The armed forces of most nations accept the general validity of certain fundamental principles of war and teach them to each new generation of officers. Although the principles vary in name, number, and definition from nation to nation, it is important for military officers to know that such principles exist and to decide for themselves how and to what extent to apply them when making operational decisions.

Admiral Mahan wrote that principles are "fundamental truths correctly formulated. They are nothing more than the proper conclusions from the observation of a large number of naval campaigns in the past." He also stated that "historical examples are more valuable than principles, because by being narrative of the past events they are a story of practical experience."

Errors and failures are generally more illustrative of principles than are successes. The principles of war must be continuously reexamined in the light of changes in doctrine and technology over time. They are not recipes, but guides which, appropriately invoked, can enhance the probability of success. Adherence to any one principle may frequently require violation of another.

The point of contact for this topic is Professor T. L. Gatchel, C-413.

D. Questions:

Principles of war are fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war, and their application is essential to strategic, operational, and tactical success. Do you agree or disagree? Support your position.

Do the tenets of network-centric warfare change the principles of war or their application?

Some historians have criticized Admiral Halsey's actions as the Third Fleet Commander during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Yet, Halsey, until his death, believed that his actions were correct in view of the information he had and his interpretation of his mission. Do you think Admiral Halsey acted properly in carrying out the tasks of operational protection and support of the Leyte operation (King II)? Defend your position in terms of the principles of war.

Can the failure of the Japanese plan at Leyte Gulf be explained in terms of violations of the principles of war? If so, how?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations, Appendix A, "Principles of War," (Issued).

Brodie, Bernard. "The Worth of Principles of War," (**NWC 1057**) (Issued).

Dahl, Eric J. "Network Centric Warfare and the Death of Operational Art," Unpublished JMO faculty paper, September 2001 (**NWC 1012**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Alger, John I. *The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).

Bennett, William C. ''Just Cause and the Principles of War.'' *Military Review* 71 (March 1991: 2-13).

Brown, C. R. "The Principles of War," **(NWC 1025)** (Seminar Reserve).

Fishel, John T. ''Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles, New Realities.'' *Military Review* 77 (July-August 1997: 22-30.

Glenn, Russell W. ''No More Principles of War?'' *Parameters* 28 (Spring 1998): 48-66.

Leonhard, Robert R. *The Principles of War for the Information Age* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1998).

Murdock, Paul. "Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force." *Parameters* 32 (Spring 2002): 86-95.

Nelson, Bradford K. "Applying the Principles of War in Information Operations.'' *Military Review* 78 (September-October-November 1998): 31-35.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING (Seminar)

"No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end."

—Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., 1871.

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the fundamentals of operational planning, and selected elements of operational design in planning major operations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the meaning and the practical application of the selected elements of design for a major operation.
- Know and understand the importance and key elements of an operational idea (scheme).
- Know and understand the purpose and difference between operational sequencing, synchronization, and phasing and the important contribution these elements of operational scheme play in the formulation and plan development of major operations.
- Understand and appreciate the use of operational/strategic deception in the planning and the execution of major operations.
- Translate national security and military direction into development of theater strategies, and strategies of supporting combatant commanders, for use in the geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) identified in the Unified Command Plan.
- Translate national military objectives, guidance, and theater strategies into theater strategic guidance, objectives, and operational focus in theater campaign plans.
- Understand the fundamentals, considerations, and design elements of campaign planning including integration of unified, joint multinational forces into theater and subordinate campaign plans.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns and operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.

- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how IO is incorporated in to both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes at the operational and JTF levels.

C. Background:

Military planning, in general, is a continuous process in preparation for assigned or future objectives/tasks. It involves a detailed and methodical evaluation of all aspects of contemplated military action. Planning makes future actions easier by allowing for quick subsequent and coordinated actions by the staff and other elements of the command. Proper planning allows for detailed and systematic examination of all factors involved in a forthcoming military action.

Major operations and campaigns are planned and conducted by the theater commanders and their staffs. Sometimes a joint task force commander (COMJTF) and the staff will be required to plan for a major joint/combined operation when assigned an operational (or sometimes even strategic) objective.

A major operation or campaign contains a number of elements that collectively ensure the accomplishment of the selected or assigned military objective(s). Thus, an overall *operational design* should exist to ensure that one's forces are employed in a coherent manner, and focused on the assigned operational or strategic objectives in the theater. The principal elements of operational design for a major operation are: *desired end state,* (in case a major operation is intended to end the hostilities) *ultimate operational* (and sometimes *strategic*) *objective, interior vs. exterior lines*, *identification of the enemy's critical factors and center of gravity, direction/axis,* and *operational idea* (*scheme*).

The basic operation plan (OPLAN) normally contains only the most important elements of operational design in a rudimentary form. Many aspects of the design are elaborated in detail in the annexes to the OPLAN, and plans of subordinate component commanders. An operational idea (or scheme) represents the very heart of the design for a major operation or campaign. In its essence, it is very similar to what is commonly known today as concept of operations (CONOPS) or "scheme of maneuver" (used in the past). An operational idea should describe in broad terms the intended sequence for the employment of service or functionally based forces (in a campaign) or combat arms (in a major operation) necessary to accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objectives. Optimally, an operational idea should be novel, avoid stereotyped employment of one's forces, present the enemy a multi-dimensional threat, provide surprise and deception, and ensure the speed of execution. It should clearly focus on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's strategic (in a campaign) or operational (in a major operation) center of gravity.

Operational sequencing is one of the key elements of any operational idea. A sound sequencing is also the prime prerequisite for effective synchronization. Sequencing is the arrangement of events aimed to create overwhelming combat power in the order most likely to accomplish a given objective. Normally, these events are arranged by deriving a series of tasks/objectives carried out simultaneously and/or sequentially.

Operational synchronization is the coordination of actions by diverse combat arms and/or service forces in terms of objective and time aimed to generate a synergistic effect, at the decisive point. The effect of all the elements of force combined should

exceed the sum of their individual capabilities. Among other things, synchronization is ensured by proper command relationships and by assigning missions based on common operational concepts. Clarity of the commander's intent is the critical factor in ensuring synchronization of efforts, especially in the employment of multi-service or multi-national forces.

Operational/strategic deception is one of the principal force multipliers in a given major operation or campaign. The *operational/strategic* level of command allows the commander to employ multi-service and often multi-national forces and assets in planning and executing *operational/strategic* deception. When properly conceived and executed, *operational/strategic* deception can significantly enhance the effectiveness of one's forces, prevent surprise, and reduce the effectiveness of the enemy forces. To realize possible benefits, operational commanders must not only understand the concept but also must be willing to dedicate the time and forces required for operational deception to be successful.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. N. Vego, C-414.

D. Questions:

Discuss and analyze the fundamentals of operational planning.

How are the elements of operational design integrated in planning a major operation?

What is "strategic guidance" and why is it important?

Explain the process of identifying "critical factors," and "center of gravity" in designing a major operation.

Explain the concept of operational sequencing. What is the linkage between operational objective, tasks and the factor of time?

Explain the concept of operational synchronization. What is its main purpose?

What is the purpose of *operational/strategic* deception? Explain the relationship between tactical and *operational/strategic* deception.

Applying the principal elements of operational design, analyze the naval aspects of the Leyte Operation:

1. How would you assess the operational objectives determined by Admiral Toyoda? To what extent did the operational idea employed by the Japanese provide an opportunity for success? How would you have made it more effective?

2. Explain and analyze the Japanese plan for operational deception. To what extent was the plan successful and why? To what extent did the Allies apply operational deception in executing the Leyte Operation? Provide examples to support your arguments.

3. How are sequencing and synchronization different? Give examples of each from the Japanese plans. Did Admiral Toyoda have a better option to apply operational sequencing in his plans for naval defense of the Philippines?

How did the Japanese plan envisage operational synchronization?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Major Operation Design," "Operational Sequencing," and "Operational Synchronization," pp. 469-494, and 531-558. Part VII: Operational Planning, *ibid., Operational Warfare* (Issued).

Critz, Mike, "Operational Deception," (**NWC 4083**) (Issued).

Goodrich, David, M., (Editor), Part IV: Operational Plans, *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings,* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Cannon, M, Hamlin, "Plans are Made and Forces are Readied," pp. 147-165.

Magari, Toshimo, "Philippine Defense Plans, July 1944," pp. 228-244.

Bates, Richard, et al., "Japanese Command Relations — Japanese Plan," pp. 245-250.

Vego, Milan, "Operational Aspects of the SHO-1 Plan," pp. 251-256.

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP (Seminar)

During an operation decisions have usually to be made at once: there may be no time to review the situation or even to think it through… if the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.

—Clausewitz, On War

A. Focus:

This session addresses the basic elements of operational leadership. It contrasts the responsibilities of operational commanders, operational thinking, and operational decisions with the analogous endeavors at the tactical level.

B. Objectives:

- Know and understand the major responsibilities and tasks of operational commanders.
- Know and understand why operational commanders and their staffs need an operational perspective
- Develop a framework of thought through which the distinction between decisions made at the operational and tactical levels of war can be examined and understood.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, doctrine, and political developments on the planning process.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

In contrast with tactical commanders, operational commanders must focus on broad military objectives that lie beyond immediate tactical actions—ranging from destruction of enemy forces in the field to undermining the enemy's will to fight. Effective operational commanders need what is known as an *operational perspective* on all the aspects of the situation in a given area of operations or theater. They need to understand how actions at each level of war affect actions at the other levels. Such broad objectives also require the ability to look beyond current operations, visualizing trends in the military, political, economic, and other elements of the strategic or operational situation into the future days, weeks, or even months.

Unfortunately, little opportunity exists for most future operational commanders to develop that broad vision through practice; hence it is typically acquired through professional education and/or systematic self-study of military history. Study of past wars, their major operations and campaigns, in particular, has proven to be the most effective method for acquiring an operational perspective.

The broader operational level perspective also renders decision-making processes more complex and challenging than those at the tactical level. While the tactical commander focuses on fighting battles and engagements, the operational commander is concerned with setting the stage for conducting a major operation or campaign.

Operational courses of action must be evaluated and decided upon, based on key assumptions and the information actually available, usually in a short time and in the face of considerable uncertainty about future events. Their impact is almost immediate, affecting the actions of forces over an entire area of operation or a major part of a theater. Careful analysis of the situation weighing all advantages and disadvantages of each possible course of action is frequently impossible and operational commanders must decide on the basis of instinctive judgment.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

Explain and analyze the main responsibilities of an operational commander. What personal traits do you think an operational commander should have to be successful?

Discuss the meaning of "operational thinking." What are the differences between tactical and operational perspectives? Explain and analyze the principal types of decisions made by operational commanders.

What did General Ridgway believe to be his principal responsibilities upon taking command of U.S. Eighth Army in December 1950?

Discuss the main organizational and operational decisions made by the operational commanders on both sides during planning, preparation, and execution of the Leyte operation and their relationship to the resulting operational and strategic consequences.

Compare and contrast General Ridgway's approach to his command with that of Admiral Halsey.

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, *Operational Warfare,* "Exercising Operational Leadership," and "The Decisions," pp. 577-592; and 603-616 (Issued).

Ridgway, Matthew B. and Harold H. Martin, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 191-220 (**NWC 1002**) (Issued).

Goodrich, David M., (Compiler), *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings*, William F. Halsey, "The Battle for Leyte Gulf," and Koyonagi, "With Kurita in the Battle for Leyte," pp. 414-422 and 438-452 (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Thomas B. Buell, *The Quiet Warrior. A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988) (Seminar Reserve).

THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY (Seminar)

A senior officer said after the war that it had proved 'the things we did on the basis of well-tried and proven formation worked, and the ad hoc arrangements turned out much less happily.' Joint-service liaison and staff work left much to be desired.

Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands

A. Focus:

This session serves as the synthesis event for the components of operational art explained and discussed in preceding Block I sessions. Emphasis is on the decisions and actions of operational-level commanders on both sides.

B. Objectives:

- Analyze how commanders and staffs applied operational art in a historical case study.
- Comprehend the key factors that affect the development of joint plans and assess the relative influence of these factors.
- Analyze the operational lessons valid for the employment of modern, multinational and joint forces.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how opportunities and vulnerabilities are created by increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations.

C. Background:

This case study is presented in three consecutive sessions. Monday, 9 December, will start in Spruance Auditorium with a faculty presentation on the historical/strategic background of the war. This will be followed by a 60-minute video on the background and highlights of the conflict. Students will have the remainder of the day and the morning of 10 December to study the case materials and develop presentations. The morning of 11 December is devoted to presentations and discussion of the case study.

This session is designed to reinforce the aspects of operational art studied and discussed in preceding sessions. Historical examples provide an excellent opportunity for illustrating the complexities of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns and the reasons why certain military actions either succeeded or failed. This particular case is used because it is rich with examples of the application, lack of application, misapplication, or inability to apply the concepts associated with

operational art.

The goal of this session is to provide in-depth discussion and analysis of major aspects of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982 from an operational perspective. As the major synthesis event for the operational art concepts portion of the syllabus, the motivations, planning, and actions of both sides in the conflict will be examined in some detail. Seminar moderators will assign specific responsibilities for student discussion of the case.

Point of contact for this session is Professor T. L. Gatchel, C-413.

D. Questions

(To be answered from both the Argentine and British perspectives):

Was the Falklands/Malvinas conflict a campaign, a major operation, a battle, or something else?

What guidance did senior military and political leaders give the operational-level commanders regarding aims, resources, constraints, and restraints? Was it adequate?

What role did ROE play in the conflict? What was the impact of the MEZ/TEZ?

What was the desired end state for the British? For the Argentines?

What was the strategic objective for each side? What did the opponent perceive it to be?

How did the operational factors of space, time, and force affect the operations of the two sides?

What were the critical factors for each side? What did the opponents perceive them to be? Did they change as time progressed?

Which aspects of the principles of war did the Argentines consider in their planning, and which aspects did they appear to overlook or disregard? What about the British?

Did either side have an operational scheme? If so, what was it?

How well did each side employ sequencing and synchronization in its operations?

What was the Argentine C2 organization? How did this affect the outcome?

What was the British C2 organization? How did this affect the outcome?

Which key operational functions had a significant impact on how each side employed its forces? For example, how did both sides employ operational fires?

How did the actions at sea impact the land operations? What was the impact of the MEZ/TEZ?

What role did airpower play in the conflict?

Did either side reach its culminating point during the conflict? What role did culmination play in war termination?

What were the operational-level lessons learned on each side?

E. Required Readings:

Thompson, Julian. Extract from *The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflicts,* Chapter 8, "Amphibious Logistics-Falklands 1982." (**NWC 1086**) (Issued).

Scheina, Robert L., *Latin America: A Naval History 1810-1987,* Chapter 14, "The Malvinas Crisis, March-April 1982" and Chapter 15, "The Malvinas War, May-June 1982." (**NWC 1138**)(Issued).

Gatchel, Theodore L., "Operational Art and Joint Task Force Operations During the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict." (**NWC 1044**)(Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Clapp, Michael, *Amphibious Assault Falkland Islands: The Battle of San Carlos Water* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996).

Freedman, Lawrence, and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. *Signals of War*. (Library Reserve).

Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins. *The Battle for the Falklands*. (Seminar Reserve).

Middlebrook, Martin. *Task Force: The Falklands War,* 1982. (Seminar Reserve).

Selected extracts from Conflicto Malvinas, Official Report of the Argentine Army, Vol. II, (**NWC 1038**) (Seminar Reserve).

Selected extracts from Falklands Islands Campaign: Understanding the Issues, Vol. 1. (**NWC 1115**) (Seminar Reserve).

Summers, Jr., Harry G. "Strategic Lessons Learned: The Falkland Islands Campaign." (**NWC 1111**) (Seminar Reserve).

Thompson, *No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985).

U.K., The Defence Council. "The Falklands War 1982 from the Viewpoint of Doctrine." (**NWC 4060**) (Seminar Reserve).

Woodward, Sandy, Admiral, RN. *One Hundred Days—The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*. (Seminar Reserve).

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS EXAMINATION

A. Focus:

This writing requirement is intended to measure your knowledge and understanding of the operational concepts discussed during Block One of the curriculum.

B. Objectives:

- Demonstrate an understanding of operational concepts.
- Demonstrate the ability to deduce operational lessons valid for the employment of modern military forces.
- Evaluate student understanding of the operational employment of military force in joint and combined operations.
- Provide feedback on student understanding of operational concepts as they translate into naval, joint, and multi-national operations.

C. Background:

The operational concepts examination is an open-book examination. The exam may be taken at the location of the student's choice. Students are encouraged to prepare for the exam in group discussion; however, once the exam is issued to students, no collaboration is permitted—only individual work will be accepted. Students will be allowed to use any course materials when developing their answers. However, the examination will contain sufficient specific factual information so that there is no need to use any external references for the scenario.

The examination will reflect a synthesis of the course material covered up to this point. The basis for evaluation of the examination will be:

1. Complete, logical, and well-supported solutions to each question or problem presented.
2. Application of appropriate course concepts to the specific question chosen.
3. Clear and concise articulation of ideas.

The student should prepare complete responses to the questions and problems posed. The examination does not require recall of specific facts, but rather the integration and application of major principles, ideas, and concepts addressed during Block One of the Joint Maritime Operations curriculum.

The point of contact for this session is Captain C. E. Helms, U.S. Navy, C-422.

USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Seminar)

At all times, commanders shall observe, and require their commands to observe, the principles of international law. Where necessary to fulfill this responsibility, a departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.

Article 0705, U.S. Navy Regulations (Rev. 1999)

A. Focus:

This seminar introduces the operational law portion of the operations curriculum. International law affects the planning and conduct of military operations in a number of critical ways. This session will address sources of international law and the international legal basis for the use of force by one nation against another.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the development of international law in its historical context.
- Identify the primary sources of international law, compare the sources of international law with the sources of domestic U.S. law, and understand important provisions of the UN Charter.
- Discuss the impact of the UN Charter on the development of international law, particularly with respect to the concept of individual and collective self-defense.
- Understand how international law definitions and concepts affect the operational commander in planning and executing military operations.
- **PJE—**Understand the legal factors influencing joint doctrine.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the legal considerations for employing joint and multi-national forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

Relations among nations necessarily involve the application of international law. International practice and agreements regulate such diverse activities as aviation safety, communications, financial transactions, nautical rules of the road, environmental protection and the use of force. While the international legal system, like its domestic counterpart, is not perfect, nations nevertheless comply with most international law most of the time.

Nations create international law by long-standing practice and by agreement—as a result, they usually regard it as fair and find it in their best interest to comply with its provisions. As an example, to ensure their military personnel are treated in accordance with international law, a nation will seek to comply (the concept of "reciprocity"). Compliance is also a function of reciprocity by which nations follow the law out of concern for adverse responses by other nations against unlawful conduct. Moreover, nations usually desire the reputation of reliably keeping promises. They want to foster respect for the "rule of law," while being sensitive to the pressures of domestic and world public opinion and valuing the need for order and predictability.

For many, international law appears to lack the precision and predictability that is more

evident in domestic law. Nevertheless, there are principles of international law. These principles are by and large the "standards of conduct" by which nation-states or countries seek to characterize their actions as compliant with international law.

So, "what is the law" in the international context? The commonly accepted sources of international law are:

1. "Customary law" formed from the widespread practice of nations out of the belief that such a practice is legally required;
2. International agreements (treaties or conventions) between and among nations; and
3. General principles of law, usually employed in areas not already settled by customary practice or agreements.

Secondary factors include the general principles of law reflected in the domestic legal systems of nearly all nations, court decisions, and the publications of recognized scholars. Resolutions of international organizations may also be a factor; by virtue of the UN Charter, one type of binding, law-declaring resolution is a "decision" by the UN Security Council.

The early development of international law involved exclusively rules of conduct between and among nations. More recently, international law has focused increasingly on the rights and responsibilities of individuals. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which the U.S. and nearly all nations are parties, are examples of humanitarian law applicable during armed conflict. Human rights law, written in treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the U.S. in 1992) is another example. Many international human rights principles are similar to U.S. Constitutional guarantees.

Defining the authority of a nation to use force against another nation is the primary purpose of the UN Charter. The Charter specifies that a nation may use force either pursuant to an authorization from the Security Council (or in limited circumstances a regional arrangement under the Charter), and in individual or collective self-defense. However, recent events such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo highlight that customary international law may provide additional authority for a nation to use force (such as on the basis of humanitarian intervention). The reading by Professor Lillich suggests that this is the case.

The U.S. regards itself as a country, which abides by international law and it is increasingly looked to as a chief proponent (and sometimes enforcer) of the rule of law in the international community. Violations of international law by the U.S. military commander can be detrimental to U.S. national interests and the military mission. However, international law can have a "force-multiplying" effect, such as the coalition operations in the Terror War being justified under the UN Charter (Article 51 guaranteeing the rights of individual and collective self-defense) and UN Security Council resolutions.

A note about the law-related sessions: Sessions I-16 through I-19 are intended to provide an overview of international law influences on the conduct of military operations. The purpose is to instill awareness of how law can affect the planning and execution of operations and to convey that operational commanders should seek advice from qualified legal advisors.

Some of the issues addressed in these sessions will be illustrated in the case study during Session I-20 and in the seminars and exercises during the Blocks that follow. We will discuss how legal considerations are factored into the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) process, and consider legal issues in the context of the Multi-crisis Planning Exercise.

The point of contact for this session is Commander B. J. Waltman, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Questions:

What are the sources of international law? Why do nations care about international law? What motivates them to comply with its provisions?

What role does international law play in the President's / SECDEF's policy-making process?

What role does international law play in the military decision-making process in general? At the strategic level? At the operational level?

How can the commander ensure planning and execution of operations are accomplished consistent with international law.

What are the legal bases for coalition operations in the Terror War?

E. Required Readings:

Robertson, H.B., Jr., "Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today's World?" (**NWC 5002**) (Issued).

Lillich, Richard B., "Forcible Self-Help Under International Law" (**NWC 1063**) (Issued).

The Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945. (**NWC 5003**) (Relevant articles: 1, 2, 23 [1963 text], 24, 25, 27 [1963 text], 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53) **(Scan Only)** (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Bunn, George, "International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?" (**NWC 1074**) (Seminar Reserve).

Zinni, A. C., "The SJA in Future Operations" (**NWC 1048**) (Seminar Reserve).

OPERATIONAL LAW AND FACTOR SPACE (Seminar)

The Department of Defense strongly supports U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. A universally respected ocean regime, with strong, unambiguous guarantees of fundamental operational rights, such as passage through foreign territorial seas, through international straits, and through the world's archipelagoes, preserves the ability of the U.S. to deter and respond to threats whenever and wherever required.

—Secretary of Defense, 2001 Annual Report to the President and the Congress

A. Focus:

This seminar focuses on a basic understanding operational law affecting the operational factor of space. The right of all nations to complete control of their land and air boundaries, and the right of all nations to navigation and over flight within international waters and airspace are essential considerations in planning military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the operational considerations resulting from the sovereign right of all nations to limit the entry and movement of foreign forces within their land territory and national airspace.
- Consider the impact of operational law and factor space issues at the operational level of war.
- Understand the traditional international legal rights of belligerent nations and neutral nations and how these rights impact military operations during armed conflict.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the operational law and factor space considerations for employing joint and multi-national forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

Among the operational art tools used by the operational planner are the three key operational factors of time, force and space. Factor space is heavily influenced by widely accepted international law rules governing the establishment and meaning of land, sea and air boundaries (a key characteristic of factor space). These boundaries directly impact the freedom of movement of the operational commander. During the deterrent (or pre-hostilities) phase of a military operation, military forces must respect the sovereign rights of all nations within the boundaries of their land territory, national waters and national airspace. This means that with a few limited exceptions, military forces may not operate within another nation's boundaries without its permission.

During the hostilities phase of an operation, our movement will be conducted without regard to the sovereign rights of the enemy belligerent nation. However, the traditional sovereign rights of neutral states will likely continue to be respected and hence limitations on the freedom of movement of our forces within the land, sea and air boundaries of neutral states must be factored into our operational planning. Where limited navigation and over flight rights within neutral air and sea space prove

insufficient, operational planners must notify the State Department of the need to obtain access and transit agreements in order to facilitate a planned operation.

Freedom of navigation and over flight over and through *international* waters and airspace (as well as the limited right of navigation and over flight in *national* waters and airspace) are fundamental requirements in implementing U.S. military strategy. These freedoms allow support and reinforcement of forward-deployed forces, enable U.S. and coalition forces to operate worldwide, and ensure uninterrupted world commerce. This session will include a study of the freedoms of all nations to navigation and over flight, as well as the rights of coastal nations to exercise jurisdiction over some portions of the sea and airspace for certain purposes.

Customary international law, as reflected in the UN Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention, provides widely accepted rules for global navigation and over flight. These rules have as their basis internationally agreed upon air and sea boundaries defined in the LOS Convention, and depicted in NWC 1049. These boundaries, and the navigation and over flight rights associated with them, strongly impact the planning and conduct of military operations.

Since 1983, U.S. policy has recognized the non-deep seabed mining provisions of the LOS Convention to be customary international law. Since that time, it has been Presidential policy for U.S. forces to "exercise and assert [United States'] navigation and over flight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention." Moreover, Presidential policy has been that the U.S. would not "acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and over flight and other related high seas uses."

In July 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution containing an agreement to modify the LOS Convention's deep seabed mining provisions. The U.S. signed the agreement on 29 July 1994. As a result, the basic LOS Convention, along with this supplemental agreement, was submitted to the Senate in October 1994 for its advice and consent. The Senate has not ratified the Convention. The U.S. is still not a party to it. The U.S. Navy has published guidance on the LOS regimes in Part I of The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M. This handbook is a great resource for the operational commander and his/her staff.

The point of contact for this session is Commander B. J. Waltman, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Questions:

What sovereign rights does a nation have within its land territory and national airspace, and how does this affect the movement or operation of foreign military forces therein?

What are the distinctions between innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage, and high seas freedoms of navigation?

What are the rights and responsibilities of maritime and coastal nations with respect to each of these concepts?

To what extent may military operations of a belligerent nation be conducted within the land territory, national airspace and national waters of a neutral nation?

E. Required Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Chapters 1 and 2, and pages 7-1 through 7-4. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Legal Regimes of Oceans and Airspace Areas". (**NWC 1049**). Issued.

F. Supplementary Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, "Warning Zones" **(NWC 1046)**. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of Defense, *National Security and the Convention on the Law of the Sea* **(NWC 1017)**. (Seminar Reserve).

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea **(NWC 1003)**. (Seminar Reserve).

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Seminar)

Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao (the way of humanity and justice) and preserve the laws and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War

A. Focus:

When planning and conducting military operations, commanders and their subordinates must comply with the international law that governs the conduct of hostilities. This session is devoted to discussing the law of armed conflict for land, air, and naval warfare.

B. Objectives:

- Examine the origins of and the purposes served by the law of armed conflict and comprehend the reasons that nations comply or attempt to comply with it.
- Know the basic principles of the law of armed conflict.
- Apply the concepts of the law of armed conflict to the operational level of war.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the law of armed conflict considerations for employing joint and multi-national forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

The law of armed conflict (LOAC) was historically referred to as the law of war. It is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is based on international custom and practice and on international agreements or conventions.

There are three general principles of the law of armed conflict: military necessity, proportionality, and humanity. The principle of **military necessity** allows a belligerent to apply force to achieve legitimate military objectives, while the principle of **proportionality** means that the degree of force used must be no greater than what is necessary and proportionate to the prompt realization of those legitimate military objectives. The principle of **humanity** forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. These principles require, for example, that belligerents distinguish as much as reasonably possible between combatants and noncombatants when targeting.

The law of armed conflict is also consistent with certain principles of war, such as objective, mass, and economy of force. Both the law of armed conflict and the principles of war stress the importance of directing force against critical military targets, while avoiding the waste of resources against objectives that are militarily unimportant.

Part II of the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations presents an overview of the rights and duties of military personnel under the law of armed conflict. In DOD Directive 5100.77, the Secretary of Defense directed that the U.S. Armed Forces comply with the law of armed conflict during all armed conflicts and to apply the principles and spirit of the law of armed conflict during all other military operations.

The point of contact for this session is Commander B. J. Waltman, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Questions:

Why is it in a nation's interest to comply with the law of armed conflict? Why is it in the interest of the military commander?

To what extent does the law of armed conflict apply to civil wars and to Military Operations Other Than War?

What are the major protections afforded by the law of armed conflict to the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilians in occupied areas?

What are the principal international law considerations with respect to selection of targets and selection of weapons?

What are the requirements to be a lawful combatant or noncombatant? What is an illegal combatant?

E. Required Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Chapters 5 through 12. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Capece, Christian M., "The Ottawa Treaty and Its Impact on U.S. Military Policy and Planning." (**NWC 1075**) (Seminar Reserve).

Shotwell, C. B., "A Look at the Aerial Rules of Engagement in the 1991 Gulf War." (**NWC 1076**) (Seminar Reserve).

Rodriguez, Cara L., "Slaying the Monster: Why the United States Should Not Support the Rome Treaty." (**NWC 1077**) (Seminar Reserve).

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (Seminar)

"The determination of hostile intent is the single most difficult decision that a commander has to make in peacetime."

Admiral Frank Kelso

A. Focus:

This session concerns rules of engagement (ROE), which define for operational forces the circumstances and extent to which they may use force. The session highlights the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), and then reviews the foundation for and process involved in developing ROE and how they are employed in military missions (whether we are dealing with conventional warfare or military operations other than war).

B. Objectives:

- Gain a basic understanding of ROE and the process by which modifications to ROE are obtained from higher authority.
- Understand the need for clear and comprehensive ROE, the principles underlying them, and their role in the civilian control of the military.
- Examine ROE development in the planning process. Examine ROE development in the planning process.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the issues in drafting, approving, and issuing rules of engagement for employing joint and multi-national forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

ROE are the primary means by which the President / Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders guide U.S. military forces in the use of force. U.S. forces operate under the SROE contained in a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3121.01A). The SROE provide direction and guidance regarding the inherent right of **self-defense,** which applies at all times (from peace to war). The SROE also provide a list of supplemental measures from which appropriate ROE can be requested for a given operation to provide additional ROE for **mission** *accomplishment*.

Both the inherent right of self-defense and mission accomplishment ROE have as their legal basis the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Depending upon the circumstances surrounding a given operation, mission accomplishment ROE may also be justified on a specific U.N. Security Council Resolution.

When mission accomplishment ROE are issued for international armed conflict, the law of armed conflict applies and will shape the ROE selected. Although international law relating to the use of force is an important consideration in drafting ROE, political guidance and operational requirements are the most significant factors, which shape ROE.

All ROE should be consistent with national policy, military strategy, and the missions assigned by higher authority. ROE must be framed and interpreted in conjunction with

the mission and should support, not inhibit, mission accomplishment.

In operational planning, the adequacy of ROE is assessed during the mission analysis in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. In all subsequent phases of the military decision-making process, it is vitally important that commanders and their planning staffs continue to be alert to the effect that ROE have on mission accomplishment, and to seek changes to the ROE when appropriate. The J-3 is normally responsible to the Commander for ROE development, with the assistance of other staff officers, including the staff judge advocate.

The point of contact for this session is Commander B. J. Waltman, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Questions:

What factors lead to the need for unit or individual self-defense?

What are the limits of actions that may be taken in self-defense?

Is preemptive action consistent with the SROE?

How can a combatant commander ensure that subordinate commanders do not misinterpret the ROE or put an undesired "spin" on the approved ROE?

To what extent should the SROE continue to be used during armed conflict?

What measures have to be incorporated into the SROE to transition from MOOTW to war?

What additional ROE considerations are involved in coalition warfare? In UN operations?

What is the appropriate role of the legal advisor in developing and implementing ROE?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, Chapter III, paragraph 6.g. (Page III-35) (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, Chapter IV, paragraph 9. (Page IV-6 to IV-8) (Issued).

Duncan, James C., "The Commander's Role in Developing the Rules of Engagement" **(NWC 1066)** (Issued).

Rose, S., "Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti" **(NWC 1051)** (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, Extracts from CJCS Instruction 3121.01A, "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement" **(NWC 1062)**.(Scan) (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Blue War Game Rules of Engagement" **(NWC 1139)**. (Scan) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

OPERATIONAL LAW CASE STUDY (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This seminar provides the opportunity to apply operational law and to discuss the effective application of ROE to specific military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Demonstrate a working knowledge of the basic elements of the law of the sea and airspace and the law of armed conflict by applying them in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the various political, military, and legal considerations involved in crafting rules of engagement for a specific military operation.
- Apply the CJCS SROE in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Practice using a set of supplemental ROE in a specific military operation.

C. Background:

See OPS Sessions I-16 through I-19.

The point of contact for this session is Commander B. J. Waltman, JAGC, USN, C-424.

D. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, "Case Study for Operational Law, Operation UPHOLD PAPUA" (**NWC 1070**) (Issued).

E. Supplementary Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Chapters 1-2 and 5-12 (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Extracts from CJCS 3121.01A, "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1062**) (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Blue War Game Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1139**) (Issued).

BLOCK TWO
MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING CONCEPTS

INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING CONCEPTS

A. Focus:

Block II sessions build upon the Block I framework and components by relating them to current U.S. military organization and planning concepts. Block II sessions afford a comprehensive view of: Service cultures, doctrine, and capabilities; essential supporting systems; and the foundations of formal planning. Each student brings to the seminar unique expertise and experience in one or more of the Block II topics. The overall educational objective is to weave faculty seminar presentations, student contributions, readings, lectures, and assigned case studies into a seamless fabric of baseline, joint and operational competence. It is expected that this competence will be reflected in student understanding and application of formal planning and decision-making principles to the proper employment (selection, assignment and tasking) of forces in joint and combined environments to accomplish assigned missions.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed
- **PJE**—Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Through the framework provided by joint planning processes, explain the relationship between national objectives and means availability.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.

- **PJE**—Explain how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national, joint, and Service intelligence organizations support JFCs.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- **PJE**—Understand how command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems apply at the tactical and operational levels of war and how they support a joint information operations (IO) strategy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how IO must be integrated to support the national and military strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how IO is incorporated into both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes at the operational and JTF levels.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how opportunities and vulnerabilities are created by increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations.

C. Background:

Sessions II-1 through II-9 comprise a logical sequence of essential warfare supporting systems, Service doctrine and capabilities, and joint and multinational warfare considerations, which enable the student to commence consideration of how best to deploy and employ forces and functional support systems to accomplish assigned missions.

Sessions II-10 and II-11 develop knowledge and skills for planning and directing force employment, and introduce the processes of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), that deal with the development of plans and issuing orders.

Session II-12 provides an insight into the capabilities and limitations of C4ISR and Information Operations as well as the role of the J2 (Intelligence Officer) during planning situations.

Session II-13 exposes the seminar to the operational challenges faced when the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction is threatened or actually employed.

Block II concludes with Session II-14, a Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) case study problem. With operational art principles as the foundation, students will apply planning process and force employment knowledge to the development of a plan appropriate to accomplishing the mission and solving the problem.

By the end of Block II, students should be able to use common sense and logic in a joint planning framework to develop the correct sequence of actions that properly employ available resources to accomplish a mission.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Readings:

None.

MAJOR OPERATIONS IN THE LITTORALS (Seminar)

The question of landing in face of an enemy is the most complicated and difficult in war.

Sir Ian Hamilton: Gallipoli Diary, 1920.

It is a crime to have amphibious power and leave it unused.

Winston Churchill: Note to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 1 December 1940.

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the major operations in the littorals aimed at obtaining, maintaining, and exercising sea control. Also, addressed are major operations that may be employed by a weaker navy aimed at disrupting or nullifying the efforts of a stronger navy to impose sea control.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- Comprehend the distinctions between strategic/operational objectives and corresponding tasks in war at sea.
- Comprehend major operations conducted by a stronger navy to obtain and maintain sea control in the littorals.
- Comprehend major operations conducted by a stronger navy to exercise sea control in the littorals.
- Comprehend major operations conducted by a weaker opponent in disputing or denying the enemy sea control.
- Know and analyze the types of major naval and joint/combined operations planned and conducted in the littorals.
- Comprehend and synthesize the mutual relationships between a campaign plan and plans for the component major operations conducted in the littorals.

C. Background:

The principal methods of *obtaining sea control* are:

- Destruction and/or attrition of enemy fleet at sea or its bases
- Destruction of enemy land-based air
- Neutralization of enemy fleet (blockade and its modern variants, maritime exclusion zone/total exclusion zone, and sortie control)
- Attack on enemy maritime trade
- Destruction of enemy forces and installations/facilities on the coast
- Seizing enemy naval basing areas

- Blockading and/or capturing choke points
- Offensive mining and offensive mine counter measures (MCM)

It should be no surprise that these methods of obtaining sea control will become operational or strategic tasks in time of war. Each of these, in turn, consist of a number of component or subsidiary tasks that collectively accomplish the respective operational or strategic task. Upon obtaining sea control in a certain part of the maritime theater, a blue-water navy or a coastal navy must then consolidate operational or strategic success by carrying out a number of operational tasks aimed at *maintaining sea control*. The next step is to *exercise sea control* which means to exploit previous operational or strategic successes. This concept of *exercising sea control* includes several broadly stated tasks such as projecting power on hostile shores, destroying the enemy's sea-related military-economic potential and defending and protecting one's own sea-related military-economic resources.

The tasks of obtaining, maintaining, and exercising sea control are accomplished principally through the conduct of *major operations*, conducted primarily by naval and joint forces.

Because the nature of major operations in the littorals significantly differ from those on the open ocean in terms of one's forces' size/mix, extent of the area, and duration, it therefore follows that tasks carried out will be different. History has shown that littoral operations are more complicated to plan, prepare and execute than those on the open ocean. In terms of factors time and space, littoral operations are likely to be shorter in duration and are likely to be conducted in a much smaller *operational space*.

The compression of time and space contributes to a complex environment where rapid and drastic changes in the situation can be expected. The high speed of modern ships and aircraft along with their ability to combine maneuver with fires offer both sides the ability to achieve surprise. Given the high intensity of naval actions, it is possible for the situation to change so rapidly that forces on the offense may be forced to shift to the defense and vice versa.

The principal objective of a weaker fleet in a conflict with a stronger fleet is to obtain *sea denial*. In this case a navy's tasks range from avoiding decisive encounter with enemy's fleet (passive and active fleet-in-being), strategic diversion, naval counter-blockade, defense of the coast (anti-amphibious defense and defense of one's own naval basing area in particular), interdicting/cutting-off enemy maritime trade, and choke point defense. To be successful, a weaker opponent at sea would conduct major operations intended to dispute control by a stronger navy. The compression of time and space also means that littoral operations can normally be conducted by a weaker side regardless of the general situation in a given theater.

The United States and its allies are greatly concerned with future operations in littoral regions (especially in strategically important enclosed seas) because of the growing threats that include advanced conventional submarines, mines, and coastal missile batteries capable of striking even the largest surface combatants. However, major operations in the littoral are not just the purview of naval forces; the diverse combat arms of all services are likely to be employed in combat in the littorals.

One of the main characteristics of a war in a typical narrow sea is close cooperation between naval forces and the ground troops operating on the coast. Throughout history,

support of naval forces has been vital for the success of ground troops operating in the littoral area. Because a navy can carry out other missions simultaneously, support of an army flank will require a command and control arrangement that is well-thought out and flexible. The ideal situation is one that allows naval forces to carry out other missions on short notice.

The task of supporting the army flank has been carried out by fleets operating within the confines of an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea or on large lakes and river estuaries since ancient times. Whenever the cooperation was well organized and executed, the results were beneficial for the progress of the war as a whole. A fleet can facilitate the advance of one's own troops on the coast by obtaining command, even temporarily, of a body of water through which a critical supply line passes.

Since 1776, the U.S. Navy has regularly supported ground troops along a coast. During the American Civil War, cooperation between the Union Army and the Union Navy in the Chesapeake Bay and Virginia was vital for the success of the war on the ground. The Navy's support played a large role in General George B. McClellan's Peninsula Campaign of 1862, and again in General Ulysses S. Grant's offensive against Richmond in 1864-65. The Union naval forces covered the army's movement across otherwise impassable terrain and guarded the vital sea lines of communications.

During World War II, all of the navies that operated in the littorals conducted diverse operational and tactical tasks in support of ground troops. This was particularly the case in the Allied campaign in North Africa in 1940-43 and in Italy in 1943-45. The campaign in North Africa was characterized by cooperation between the Army and the fleet in both offensive and defensive operations. Similarly, Allied naval forces provided significant support to the troops on the coast during the New Guinea campaign in 1942-44.

The importance of naval support of troops involved in coastal operations has been demonstrated during a number regional conflicts fought since 1945. In the Korean War, 1950-1953, the Vietnam War 1964-1975, and the Gulf War of 1990-1991 the U.S. Navy carried out numerous tasks in support of the U.S. and friendly troops along the coast. In recent events in Afghanistan, naval forces (now with extended reach) directly supported ground troops in the theater of operations. Despite all of this experience, the U.S. Navy has been slow to address the theory and doctrine of supporting friendly ground troops operating near the coast.

The successful outcome of a war in the littorals will require the highest degree of participation and closest possible cooperation or true *jointness* among all services of a country’s armed forces. Land-based air will have a decisive role on the outcome of war at sea in the littorals. In the littorals, major operations conducted predominantly with naval forces will be rare. Almost all major operations will require the contribution and involvement of two or more services. Without inter-service cooperation, it will be difficult or impossible for a Commander to accomplish the assigned operational or strategic tasks.

The point of contact for this session is Commander J. L. Barker, U.S. Navy, C-409.

D. Questions:

What are the methods used for obtaining sea control on the open ocean? Which methods are applied in the littorals? What are the differences between obtaining sea control on

the open ocean and in the littorals?

Explain and discuss the principal methods of maintaining and exercising sea control on the open ocean and in the littorals.

What methods are open to a weaker fleet to obtain sea denial? Is that objective relevant today? If not, why not?

Why does the warfare in the littorals require a higher degree of jointness compared to war on the open ocean?

Discuss and explain the types of major operations planned and conducted by a blue-water navy when fighting in the littorals. What are the advantages and disadvantages of destroying an enemy fleet at its bases? What is the role of mines in such operations?

Are the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps capable of successfully carrying out amphibious landings in enclosed seas such as the Arabian Gulf? If not, why not?

What is the possible contribution of U.S. Coast Guard in supporting the Navy's operational tasks in the littorals?

What are the differences and relationship between operational objectives and operational tasks? Give some concrete examples.

Explain and discuss the type of major operations conducted by a weaker fleet in the littorals. What are chances of a weaker navy to successfully conduct counter choke point control or counter sortie control?

What types of major operations are conducted by both stronger and weaker navies in the littorals?

In what way does netting enhance the U.S. Navy capabilities to fight in the littorals? Discuss the case of conducting network centric operations in the Arabian Gulf or South China Sea. What are the prospects in each theater?

What needs to be done to elevate the netting of forces to the operational level and thereby greatly enhancing the capabilities of the U.S. Navy and other sister Services to operate successfully in the littorals?

Why has the U.S. Navy been slow to address the theory and doctrine of supporting friendly ground troops operating near the coast?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, Chapters: "Obtaining and Maintaining Sea Control,"(Read); "Exercising Sea Control," (Read); "Sea Denial", (Scan); *Major Operations in the Littorals* (Read); September 2002 (**NWC 1008**) (Issued).

Goodrich, David, M., "Land-Based Airpower and Littoral Warfare: An Old Refrain in a New Setting?" November 2001 (**NWC 1022**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan and Worlein, Cheryl, (Compilers), *Littoral Warfare: A Book of Readings*, January 2002 (**NWC 2155A**) (Issued).

Navy Warfare Electronic Library (NWEL), October 2002 Release (Unclassified)(Issued).

- Disk # 1.

- NWP 3-20.6 Surface Ship Tactical Employment in Naval Warfare (Formerly NWP 60) (March 1996), Disk # 2, pp. 2-1 through 2-6; 5-1 through 5-9.
- NWP 3-15 Mine Warfare, (August 1996), Disk # 2, pp. 2-1 through 2-19; 3-1 through 3-37.
- NWP 3-10 Rev A, Naval Coastal Warfare, (May 1998), Disk # 2, pp. 1-3 through 1-9; 2-1 through 2-14.
- NWP 3-07.12 Naval Control and Protection of Shipping, (October 1996) Disk # 2, pp. 2-1 through 2-3; 3-1 through 3-3.
- NWP 3-07.11 Maritime Interception Operations (April 1999), Disk # 2.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY (Seminar)

Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.

Winston Churchill, The River War (1899)

USTRANSCOM… their motto should be "try fighting without us."

General Henry Shelton, CJCS

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the national strategic mobility system works. It addresses the organization and mission of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and its component commands. Finally, it examines the United States' ability to deploy in support of global contingencies.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of deploying U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for the deployment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Through the framework provided by joint planning processes, explain the relationship between national objectives and means availability.
- **PJE**—Explain how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.
- **PJE**—Comprehend that opportunities and vulnerabilities are created by increased reliance on technology throughout the range of military operations.
- Comprehend how joint and Service systems are integrated at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend the elements of the strategic mobility triad, which focuses on transportation and sustainment by land, sea and air assets.
- Know the role of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) in working with the regional Combatant Commanders on strategic mobility and sustainability.

C. Background:

The ability of the U.S. military to successfully carry out its assigned tasks per our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy depends greatly on its capability to deploy forces, equipment, and sustainment to a theater of operations within a given period of time. While logistics includes all those supporting activities required to sustain a deployed force, strategic mobility defines that part of the logistics process which transports people, equipment, supplies, and other commodities by land, sea, and air, to enable military force projection. In fact, the operational commander must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the strategic mobility process if he or she is going to successfully execute a major operation or campaign. Force selection, phasing of operations, and risk assessment are directly tied to the ability to project forces and support from the United States to the area of responsibility, area of operation,

or theater of war.

USTRANSCOM oversees the strategic mobility process. USTRANSCOM's charter is to maintain and operate a deployment system for orchestrating the transportation aspects of worldwide mobility planning, integrate deployment-related information management systems, and provide centralized wartime traffic management. Actual movement is executed by USTRANSCOM component commands: Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC-Army), Military Sealift Command (MSC-Navy), and Air Mobility Command (AMC-Air Force). The Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD) bridges MSC, U.S. flag commercial companies, and U.S. unions for sealift procurement and operations.

The Strategic Mobility triad consists of prepositioned material, sealift, and airlift. Each triad component has distinct advantages and disadvantages in terms of response time, expense, availability of carrying assets, and carrying capacity. Sealift and airlift have access to only limited U.S. Government-owned assets, and thus are highly reliant on commercial industry under a variety of programs, including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodel Sealift Agreement (VISA).

Point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Brence, U.S. Air Force, C-410.

D. Questions:

What are the major advantages and disadvantages of each leg of the strategic mobility triad?

How does the Combatant Commander or the CJTF interface with USTRANSCOM? What is the supported/supporting commander relationship?

What are the critical disadvantages of sealift and airlift and their root causes?

What are the major planning considerations facing operational planners in deploying a force to the theater of operations?

E. Required Readings:

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. Read pp. 72-78. (**NWC 3153G**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.* Washington, DC: 7 September 1999. Read Chapter I: Overview. (Issued).

North Africa Vignette, July 2002 **(NWC 2001)** (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Snyder, Thomas J., and Stella T. Smith, "The War in the Persian Gulf." *Air Force Journal of Logistics,* Summer 1998, pp. 16-28. **(NWC 4010)** (Seminar Reserve).

USTRANSCOM Handbook 24-2, *Understanding the Defense Transportation System,* 3rd Edition, Scott AFB , IL: 1 September 2000, pp. 1-17. **(NWC 4006)** (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*. Washington DC: 17 June 1997. (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-17, *Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations*. Washington DC: 20 July 1996. Read Chapter VII. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. NAVY CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

"He who commands the sea has command of everything."

Themistocles (528 – 462 B.C.)

"The seas are no longer a self contained battlefield. Today they are a medium from which warfare is conducted. The oceans of the world are the base of operations from which navies project power onto land areas and targets…The mission of protecting sea-lanes continues in being, but the Navy's central missions have become to maximize its ability to project power from the sea over the land and to prevent the enemy from doing the same."

Timothy Shea: Project Poseidon, February 1961

A. Focus:

"Our three maritime Services-Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard-conduct operations in the world's oceans and littoral regions. (The term naval forces will mean both the Navy and the Marine Corps, and when under Navy operational control, the Coast Guard.) With such capable naval forces, we view the oceans not as an obstacle, but as our base of operations and our maneuver space, which we either can control or deny to an opponent. Whenever we face an adversary without a blue-water fleet, the oceans serve as barriers for our defense. As important though, the oceans provide the United States avenues of world trade and military lines of communication with allies and friends—when they are protected by our strong naval forces. To appreciate operations in the maritime environment, it is necessary to understand the distinctive character of naval forces."

—Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, Naval Warfare, p.6

This session focuses on the spectrum of capabilities and limitations which naval forces offer to operational and strategic commanders and the associated doctrine and organization that underpin those capabilities. This session will also discuss Navy transformation initiatives anticipated to meet future threats. This seminar also expands upon several of the concepts that were introduced during the Naval Warfare (Block 1) and Major Operations in the Littorals (II-1) sessions.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Navy operating forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Navy forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of U.S. Navy forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current U.S. Navy and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between U.S. Navy service doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

The United States depends upon transoceanic links, commercial and military, to allies, friends, and interests. The nation's maritime strength has enabled us to endure more than two centuries of global crisis and confrontation that have reflected the world's unending religious, ethnic, economic, political, and ideological strife. Whenever these crises have threatened our national interests, our leaders traditionally have responded with naval forces. Naval forces alone, however, never were intended to have every military capability needed to handle every threat or crisis that the nation may face. Just as using complementary capabilities within the naval forces compounds overall strength, combining the capabilities and resources of the other services and other nations in joint and multinational operations can produce overwhelming military power. In future conflicts the nation will answer with joint forces in most cases.

The U.S. Navy's approach to war fighting and military operations short of war is guided by the roles specified in law by Congress and by specific service functions (**Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, and Power Projection**) prescribed by the President and Secretary of Defense, as codified in DOD Directive 5100.1.

Navy roles and functions remained stable from post-World War II through the 1980s, however, the capability to perform functions varied depending on national security strategy and resource decisions of the time. Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War led to the articulation of a new national security strategy in August 1990 that shifted focus from a global foe to regional contingencies. The Navy developed and articulated its vision of the part it would play in this new strategy in a September 1992 White Paper...*From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century.* This was followed in September 1994 by an additional White Paper, *Forward...From The Sea*, which reflected two years' hard operational experience with forward presence and contingency response. In March 1997, *Forward….From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept* was released, promulgating guidance on operational primacy-the ability to carry out swiftly and effectively any naval, joint, or multinational mission, and to prevail decisively over any foe across the spectrum of conflict.

As one of the major initiatives precipitated by ...*From The Sea*, the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) was established in February 1993 in Norfolk, VA. The first major NDC task was to synthesize and promulgate naval doctrine in six major parts: Warfare, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning, and Command & Control. The first of these capstone documents is Naval Doctrine Publication I (NDP-I), *Naval Warfare*, published in 1994. In July 1998, the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) was established at Newport, R.I. Its responsibility includes the formulation and personalization of naval doctrine.

The Navy has identified four key/critical operational capabilities which a theater or joint force commander should expect to be resident in assigned naval forces: **Command, Control, and Surveillance; Battle Space Dominance; Power Projection; and Force Sustainment**. Each key capability relies on the performance of specific, naval warfare tasks by ships, aircraft, and composite groups in order to accomplish assigned missions. Fundamental or primary tasks include: amphibious warfare (AMW); air warfare (AW)/air defense (AD); strike warfare (STW); surface warfare (SUW), undersea warfare (USW), sea combat command (SCC) and command, & control warfare (C2WC). Supporting tasks include: intelligence (I), logistics (LOG); mine warfare (MIW); Navy

special warfare (NSW); ocean surveillance (OS); and space and electronic warfare (SEW).

While all Navy ships are designed and organized to operate independently to various degrees, their individual capabilities are complementary, leading to the formation of composite groups/forces to accomplish core Naval Service tasks. Typical consolidated "building blocks" readily available to the Joint Force Commander include:

- Aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG)—composed of carrier, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, attack submarines, and logistics ships;
- Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)—composed of three amphibious ships carrying a Marine Expeditionary Unit - Special Operations Capable (MEU (SOC));
- Surface Action Group (SAG)—composed of a variable number of surface combatants, but does not include the aircraft carrier. Used for a variety of tasks, but primarily power projection or forward presence missions;
- Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Group—a blend of air, surface and support units;
- Underway Replenishment Group (URG)—assets of the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) that include a tailored mix of oilers, and cargo replenishment ships necessary to sustain the forward deployed force.

A detailed description of organization, capabilities, and operational concepts is contained in the *Forces/Capabilities Handbook* (**NWC 3153G)**. Individual ship descriptions are available in the Almanac of Sea Power.

The point of contact for this session is Commander D. M. Galicki, U. S. Navy, C-410.

D. Questions:

What capabilities and options do U.S. Navy forces bring to a joint force commander, and how can these be integrated into joint operations? What are the strengths and weaknesses?

How relevant to the post Cold War global security environment are the Navy functions of strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and sealift?

What are the implications and operational challenges of expeditionary and littoral warfare concepts for the U.S. maritime force commander and the joint force commander?

What are the issues associated with integration into the joint force?

Using the North Africa Vignette (**NWC 2001**), consider the range of employment options that Navy forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U.S. Navy Briefing, CD-ROM, August 2002 (**NWC 2002**) (Issued).

Rubel, Robert C., Captain, USN, "Naval Operational Concepts." Newport, Rl: Naval War College, August 1998 (**NWC 2004**) (Issued).

North Africa Vignette, July 2002 (**NWC 2001**) (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: *Forward...From The Sea: The Navy*

Operational Concept. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, March 1997. (**NWC 2028**) (Scan) (Issued).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Review pp. 2-14, Appendix C and E, (**NWC 3153G**) (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 1, NDP-1, *Naval Warfare*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, March 1994. (Scan) (Seminar Reserve).

Vego, Milan, Professor, *U.S. Navy and the Emerging Technologies (Compilation of Readings)* Newport, RI Naval War College, September 2001 (**NWC 2153A**) (Scan) (Issued).

Navy League of the United States. *The Almanac of Sea Power 2001*. Arlington, VA: January 2001. (Scan) (Seminar Reserve).

Naval Transformation Road Map, Power and Access… From the Sea (Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing) Department of the Navy 2002) (**NWC 2014**) (Scan) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 2, NDP-2, *Naval Intelligence*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, September 1994 (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 4, NDP-4, *Naval Logistics*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, 20 February 2001 (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 5, NDP-5, *Naval Planning*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, January 1996 (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 6, NDP-6, *Naval Command and Control*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, May 1996 (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

The Coast Guard provides . . . a unique instrument in the nation's national security tool bag.

General Colin Powell

The U.S. Coast Guard provides daily value to America. We provide economic vitality. We enforce laws and treaties. We ensure safe and efficient marine transportation. We protect natural resources. We protect our nation's borders and we provide for the national defense. We live our motto, Semper Paratus. The American taxpayer receives a double benefit-a ready and effective defense force and crisis responder, as well as a cost-effective force delivering vital services everyday.

Admiral James M. Loy,
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard

A. Focus:

The Coast Guard is the country's fifth and smallest Armed Service with myriad capabilities to support both national and military security objectives—but only if national and military commanders are aware of this "unique instrument" in their tool bag. This session examines Coast Guard mission areas, functions, equipment, limitations and capabilities to support joint operations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Coast Guard forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Coast Guard forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of U.S. Coast Guard forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current U.S. Coast Guard and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between U.S. Coast Guard doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

Founded in 1790, the Coast Guard has participated in every American war since then, yet its true contribution to national security transcends its military capability. As a model for coast guards and small navies around the world, and with a humanitarian reputation, the U.S. Coast Guard can often provide forward presence in places where DOD forces would be politically unwelcome. Its personnel can contribute to nation building, help with disaster relief, and provide general humanitarian aid, thus fostering good will for the United States.

The Coast Guard also has expertise of unique value to maritime forces. This includes detailed knowledge of merchant ships, shipping practices, and international law

invaluable for maritime intercept operations; experience with handling thousands of refugees, a skill very applicable to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO); unparalleled skill in search and rescue (SAR); and conducting commerce control and maritime interdiction operations in blue, green, and brown water environments. These skills have been requested more and more by U.S. regional Combatant Commanders and joint force commanders. Opportunities for USCG and DoD forces to work jointly in conducting missions important to U.S. national security have been increasing steadily since the end of the Cold War and attendant increased involvement of the U.S. military in operations other than war.

Point of contact for this session is Captain M. J. Campbell, U.S. Coast Guard, SP-214.

D. Questions:

How does the USCG view itself as a military service? What are its strengths and weaknesses? What unique capabilities does it bring to the joint force?

Which of the USCG's capabilities can be of value to a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander in a contingency/wartime environment?

How does a JTF commander or DOD command request and receive USCG support, and what are the issues associated with integration into the joint force?

Using the North Africa Vignette (**NWC 2001**), consider the range of employment options that Coast Guard forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Loy, James M., "The United States Coast Guard: A Unique Instrument of National Security," *Sea Power,* December 99, pp. 8-13. (**NWC 2078**) (Issued).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. pp. 59-62. (**NWC 3153G**) (Issued).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U.S. Coast Guard Briefing, CD-ROM August 2002 (**NWC 2002**) (Issued).

North Africa Vignette, July 2002 (**NWC 2001**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Stubbs, Bruce B., Captain, USCG, and Truver, Scott C., "America's Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century," pp. i-iii, 53-81, 131-132, 139-140, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (G-O), January 2000. (**NWC 2134**) (Issued).

Commandant Instruction M3000.3A (COMDTINST M3000.3A) Coast Guard Capabilities Manual (CAPMAN) (Library Reserve).

Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, January 2002 (**NWC 2015**) (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

A Military, Naval, Littoral War, when wisely prepared and discreetly conducted, is a terrible Sort of War. Happy for that People who are Sovereigns enough of the Sea to put it into Execution! For it comes like Thunder and Lightning to some unprepared Part of the World.

Thomas More Molyneux, 1759

A. Focus:

During this session you will examine the role of the Marine Corps in national defense and how it functions to fulfill its role; current Marine Corps organization; capabilities and limitations; doctrine for warfighting, and the utility of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) to an operational commander.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations of employing Marine Air-Ground Task Forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE—**Develop an ability to plan for employment of U. S. Marine Corps forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current U.S. Marine Corps and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between U.S. Marine Corps service doctrine and joint doctrine.
- Comprehend the command structure, organizational concepts, and command relationships applicable to the U.S. Marine Corps in joint and combined commands.
- Comprehend how current U.S. Marine Corps doctrine affects joint and combined operations at both the tactical and operational levels of war.

C. Background:

The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force-in-readiness that is manned, trained, and equipped specifically to respond quickly to a broad variety of crises and conflicts across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world. The Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting is based on the tenets of maneuver warfare and is in consonance with joint doctrine. Marines provide a unique combat capability that combines air, land, and naval forces from the sea—the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The key characteristic of these forces is their expeditionary mindset. Marines possess the ability to adapt and engage upon arrival, and then sustain operational momentum. They are logistically expeditionary. Marine aviation is another element that characterizes the unique concept of MAGTFs. The primary function of Marine aviation is, and always has been, support of ground troops; focused, versatile, flexible, and responsive to needs on the ground.

It is the Marine Corps ability to deliver a unique blend of ground, air, and service support elements in a responsive and adaptive manner that makes it the Nation's most effective land combat, forcible entry option.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel D. T. Lennox, U.S. Marine Corps, C-422.

D. Questions:

What is the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine for winning in the uncertain, chaotic and fluid environment expected on the battlefields of the future?

How do the Marine Corps warfighting concepts for the 21st Century fit into the network centric environment expected on future battlefields?

How are MAGTFs structured to perform missions across the range of military operations?

What are the Marine Corps' four fundamental operating concepts for the conduct of expeditionary operations?

Why are Marine Corps forces assigned to Joint Task Forces typically organized under two separate component commands - the Marine Corps component and the Navy component?

Using the North Africa Vignette **(NWC 2001),** consider the range of employment options that Marine Corps forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U. S. Marine Corps Briefing, CD-ROM, August 2002 (**NWC 2002**) (Issued).

MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, Chapter 4, pp 69-96. (**NWC 2006**) (Issued).

MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations,* Chapters 3 and 4, pp 61-94. (**NWC 2008**) (Issued).

Marine Corps; Concepts and Issues 2001, Scan pp. 1-27. (**NWC 2158**) (Issued).

U. S. Marines At The Time of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Scan. (**NWC 3070**) (Issued).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook, Read pp. 31-40. (**NWC 3153G**) (Issued).

North Africa Vignette, July 2002 (**NWC 2001**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

FMFMRP 2-12, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability*. (**NWC 3057**) (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Marine Corps, Krulak, Charles C., "*Operational Maneuver from the Sea*," 4 January 1996. (**NWC 3022**) (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Marine Corps, Rhodes, J. E. and Holder, G. S., *"Seabased Logistics: A 21st Century Warfighting Concept,"* 12 May 1998. (**NWC 2009**) (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Marine Corps, Van Riper, Paul K., *"Ship-To-Objective Maneuver,"* 25 July 1997. (**NWC 2011**) (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Marine Corps, Krulak, Charles C., "*MPF 2010 and Beyond*," 30 December 1997. (**NWC 2013**) (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. ARMY CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

The real object of having an Army is to provide for war.

Elihu Root, 1899

A. Focus:

This session examines the doctrine, capabilities, limitations, and organization of the Army's forces. The primary emphasis is on the contribution those forces make to joint operations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Army forces as part of a joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Army forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of U.S. Army forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current U.S. Army and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between U.S. Army service doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

America's Army is the most potent land combat force in the world. The Army is indispensable to the protection and advancement of our national interests because of its utility across the full range of contingencies. This utility comes from the Army capability for executing a range of operations from nation building and disaster relief to defeating enemies on the battlefield. The Army's most fundamental capability is the exercise of sustained, comprehensive control over people, land and natural resources. Putting American soldiers on the ground is a most effective method to shape the international environment in ways favorable to our interests.

The U.S. Army is a doctrinally based Service capable of handling large campaigns as well as combat in a variety of scenarios. The 2001 edition of *Field Manual 3-0, Operations,* is the Army's keystone warfighting doctrine that describes how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations.

The Army recently implemented a transformation campaign designed to match its capabilities with the Nation's strategic requirements. Advances in information, materials, and weapons systems technologies will enable new organizational concepts that optimize the employment of Army and joint capabilities across the full spectrum of operations.

The point of contact for this session is Professor P. C. Sweeney, C424.

D. Questions:

How does the Army view the battlefield framework at the operational level?

How does the Army envision the use of airpower on the battlefield?

Beyond airpower, how else can the operational commander conduct deep operations as envisioned in Army doctrine?

What are the differences in combat capability between light and heavy forces?

What is the utility of airborne and air assault forces?

Using the North Africa Vignette **(NWC 2001),** consider the range of employment options that Army forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. Review pp. 16-30. (**NWC 3153G**) (Issued).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U.S. Army Briefing, CD-ROM, August 2002 **(NWC 2002)** (Issued).

North Africa Vignette, July 2002 **(NWC 2001)** (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

U.S. AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

"…a buzzword for the rest of this decade is going to be integration-- the horizontal integration of manned, unmanned, and space--the integration of stealth, standoff precision, space and information…and my mission is to close the seams that divide our capabilities today."

—General John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff

A. Focus:

This session takes a brief look at the doctrine, capabilities and employment of aerospace power. It introduces how the Air Force is organized, highlights the core competencies, capabilities, limitations, and transformation philosophy of the Air Force, and discusses considerations for properly employing aerospace power effectively in a joint environment.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Air Forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Air Forces and how other services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of U.S. Air Force forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current U.S. Air Force and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between U.S. Air Force doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

The Air Force is an integrated aerospace force with a domain that stretches from the earth's surface to the outer reaches of space in a seamless operational medium. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 states that the Air Force is the ***only*** U.S. Service specifically directed to "organize train, and equip forces for both the conduct of and prompt sustained combat operations in the air" and for strategic air and missile warfare. The Air Force will employ their aerospace assets globally and jointly to achieve strategic, operational and/or tactical objectives. Most air and space assets can perform multiple functions to achieve the desired level objective; some even perform these functions in a unique way. This strength is what the USAF brings to the operational planning table for the joint task force commander to be dominant over his adversaries. By Naval War College students understanding fully this inherent Air Force versatility that also includes speed, flexibility and global reach, the U.S. will continue to develop future joint commanders with competence who analyze the situation in terms of exploiting the whole aerospace continuum as just one distinguishable piece of the whole commander's estimate puzzle on their way to being victorious on the three dimensional battlefield. It is only then that the joint operational commander will fulfill the strategic desired end state and lead *both* his forces and nation to victory.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Dill, U.S. Air Force, C-217.

D. Questions:

In your opinion, what are the Air Force's strengths and weaknesses? At the operational level and as the Joint Force Commander how will you work these capabilities into your plan?

The Air Force lists aerospace superiority as a core competency that enables the successful conduct of all other operations. What are the risks of failing to achieve aerospace superiority?

How does the Joint Force Commander organize, command, and control his aerospace forces? What are some options for the command and control structure? What are the traditional duties of the JFACC?

How does an asymmetric strategy provide benefits to a joint force commander?

What unique capabilities does the USAF bring to the Joint Task Force commander?

At the operational level, why is it important to link the target selection process to the operational objectives and the desired end state? From an operational standpoint, have we been successful in this endeavor in our latest three conflicts?

Using the North Africa Vignette (NWC 2001) consider the range of employment options that Air Force assets could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Services Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U.S. Air Force Briefing, CD-ROM, August 2002 (**NWC 2002**) (Issued).

Lambeth, Benjamin S., *The Transformation of American Air Power*, pp. 260-296. (Issued).

North Africa Vignette, July 2002 (**NWC 2001**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

AFDD1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1 Sep 1997. (Seminar Reserve).

AFDD2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 17 Feb 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

AFDD2-1, Air Warfare, 22 Jan 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

AFDD2-2, Space Operations, 27 Nov 2001. (Seminar Reserve).

ACH-JFACC, Aerospace Commander's Handbook for the JFACC (AFDCH 10-01), 27 Jun 2001. (Seminar Reserve).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. pp. 41-58. (**NWC 3153G**) (Issued).

Horner, Charles A., "The Air Campaign." (**NWC 3094**) (Library Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-09, Fire Support, 12 May 1998. (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 Nov 1994. pp. v-xiv, I-1 - II-4, IV-1 - IV-5. (**NWC 2125**) (Seminar Reserve).

Meilenger, Philip S. "The Future of Airpower—Observations of the Past Decade." (**NWC 2144**) (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Air Force, America's Air Force Vision 2020. (**NWC 2140**). (Issued).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

"A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change and USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by a comprehensive enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team."

—General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA

A. Focus:

This session provides an understanding of the organization, capabilities, and missions of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their support to the regional combatant commanders. It will briefly introduce the roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, theater Special Operations Commands and Command and Control of SOF. The session addresses the integration of joint SOF capabilities with conventional forces and takes a brief look at SOF equipment, training, and support. Also highlighted will be considerations for interagency operations, mission employment and insights into civil affairs and psychological operations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Special Operations Forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Special Operations Forces and how other Service can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of U.S. Special Operations forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current U.S. Special Operations Forces and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between U.S. Special Operations Forces doctrine and joint doctrine.

C. Background:

In every conflict since the Revolutionary War, the United States has employed special operations tactics and strategies to exploit an enemy's vulnerabilities. These special operations were carried out by specially trained people with a broad inventory of special skills. Since the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987, SOF have been trained, equipped, and prepared by one commander to conduct unilateral, joint, and combined operations in peace, conflict, and war. These special operations are in support of the regional combatant commanders, U.S. ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies. Each military department has established a major command to serve as the Service component of USSOCOM.

The point of contact for this session is Captain D. A. Jones, U.S. Navy, C-407.

D. Questions:

Why do the characteristics of SOF and their principal mission areas result in an

operational capacity-based vice an operational capabilities-based force?

How should SOF be integrated into theater peacetime activities? Contingencies? What unique command and control considerations apply?

How and why do SOF emphasize the indirect application of military power? Does this require SOF to be more sensitive than general purpose forces to cultural and political considerations?

Why, how, when, and under what conditions should SOF be employed as a force multiplier?

What unique roles can SOF perform in coalition warfare?

Using the North Africa Vignette **(NWC 2001),** consider the range of employment options that U.S. Special Forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Forces/Capabilities Handbook, Review pp. 63-71. (**NWC 3153G**) (Issued).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, SOF Briefing, CD-ROM, August 2002 **(NWC 2002)** (Issued).

North Africa Vignette, July 2002 **(NWC 2001)** (Issued).

U.S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 2000. Review pp. 1-38, 45-51, 59-69. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.* Scan. (Issued; Joint Electronic Library, CD-ROM).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

JOINT AND MULTI-NATIONAL WARFARE CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

"As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare."

Joint Pub 1

"The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically a single mind."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

"The only thing worse than fighting with an Alliance is fighting without one."

Winston Churchill

A. Focus:

This session addresses the employment of joint and combined forces. It examines and analyzes a Joint Force Commander's organizational options and considerations when standing up a joint force and then extends this to considerations, both tangible and intangible, that he may have to be mindful of when extending his command to the combined arena.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- From an operational commander's viewpoint, understand the practical differences between an alliance and coalition along with the associated advantages and disadvantages such relationships bring.

C. Background:

Combatant commanders face the possibility of executing missions across the full range of military operations. They must plan for Major Theater Wars (MTWs) at the high end of the conflict spectrum as well as a variety of military operations at the opposite end of the spectrum. Whatever the scope or intensity of any particular action, the joint force commander must consider how a force is organized in order to achieve the following goals:

- Clarity of Objective
- Unity of Effort
- Centralized Direction
- Decentralized Execution

To address both the mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained, a wise commander will account for operational functions when structuring a force. To bring the seminar discussion into focus within the framework of joint doctrine, the required readings will include sections of Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Procedures for Forming & Operating a Joint Task Force.* This reading discusses the authorized command relationships and authority military commanders can use; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for the exercise of that authority; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for organizing joint forces; and prescribes policy for selected joint activities.

The *North Africa Vignette* (**NWC 2001**) will be used in order for the seminar to examine the various options for constructing a joint task force and then debate the benefits and liabilities of each organizational option. Once U.S. organizational considerations are understood we can then go on to examine the often more thorny issues of multinational warfare.

A variety of key planning documents, including the U.S. National Security and National Military Strategies, highlight the U.S. preference for operating with alliance and coalition partners to achieve U.S. national objectives. In fact, key tenets of U.S. military strategy (e.g., forward presence and engagement) depend heavily upon other nations to realize success. Current basic joint doctrine for the conduct of multinational operations is contained in the readings from Joint Pubs 3-0 and 3-16. Today the U.S. is a member of five multinational alliances and three bilateral Alliances; her obligations to each can and do vary.

Multinational operations present a variety of unique operational considerations for the military commander, not least of which is the thorny issue of establishing unity of effort/command. It has become fashionable to take the "Unity of Effort/Parallel Command" architecture, as demonstrated by the DESERT STORM operation, as the norm and to assume that Unity of Command, in its purest sense, will be unattainable. Alliances, which offer more formal and enduring command relationships, provide a range of capabilities from which the commander may draw. Organizing an allied force, however, can still present significant headaches given potential diplomatic and political sensitivities (the issue of Macedonia during the Kosovo crises for example). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the best-known of the formal alliances in which the United States participates. NATO has adopted the CJTF concept, however, Thomas Cooke (**NWC 2052**) argues that the CJTF may have too many "moving parts" for it to be a workable and sufficiently reactive option for a political entity such as NATO that is wedded to consensus. Instead, he suggests that the "Lead Nation" concept still has value. It may be significant to note that NATO's latest military actions in the Balkans (Air strikes over Kosovo) were not conducted with a CJTF and, in fact, greatly resembled a "Lead Nation" operation.

Further background information concerning NATO structure, initiatives, and issues is contained in certain of the Supplementary Readings: NATO's fundamental tasks and force structures are laid out in the NATO Handbook extract (**NWC 2097**) and the Fact Sheet No. 5 (**NWC 2136**).

Coalitions, which are normally formed in an ad hoc manner, often represent a disparate group of nation-states responding to a common specific threat at a particular time, thus posing even more demanding challenges to the commander than the more stable alliance. Designing a workable command relationship for coalition forces during

Operation DESERT SHIELD was one example of such challenges. Maintaining the integrity of a coalition may become a critical factor/objective in the successful execution of a combined operation. Consequently, any planning must cater to an astute adversary who, recognizing the strategic importance of coalition cohesion, seeks to exploit any perceived weaknesses.

As a practical matter, coalitions are most often composed of United Nations member states from a specific region or localized area. Legitimacy is claimed by invocation of the U.N. Charter, specifically Chapter 1, Article I: "The Purposes of the United Nations are: ...To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace..."

Finally, much has been written about the advent of the information age causing a technology "gap" between the globally-focused U.S. and the more regionally-focused allied nations. The reasons behind this are clearly outlined in the short extract from the book "Mind the Gap" (NWC 2057). Whether you are pessimistic or optimistic as to the future, a degree of multi-national interoperability remains a demanding pre-requisite for success at the Operational level of War.

The points of contact for this session are Commander J. L. Barker, U.S. Navy, C-409 and Commander R. J. Buckland, Royal Navy, C-409.

D. Questions:

In addition to mission and objective, what other factors might influence the selection of an organizational structure?

Some might argue that the underlying rationale for a JTF is to ensure each Service will be represented. Is this true?

Is the premise for a JTF budgetary in nature or does the JTF reflect a flexible /useful option?

What are some of the critical issues an operational commander must consider when planning and executing a combined operation?

Given the long term obligations of an alliance and the turbulent, changeable world we find ourselves in, has the alliance, as a method of binding force effort together, lost out to the seemingly more flexible coalition or are there enduring qualities that can provide operational military benefits?

What factors are relevant in establishing an effective C2 organization within a coalition? Should we still strive for true unity of command? Include consideration of the situation wherein the overall commander may not be a U.S. military officer.

How can we reconcile the United States' steadfast pursuit of advanced (and expensive) technology with the strategic directive to embrace multinational operations as the expected norm and to seek interoperability with our allies? How does this translate down to the Operational Commander in the field? Will a dependence on superior technology be the final straw that breaks the allies' backs?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of a standing joint headquarters? Could we do the same in the multinational arena?

How can a commander ensure that necessary intelligence, some of which may be the product of very sensitive sources, is disseminated and understood by coalition partners, some of whom may be future adversaries?

What can the commander do during peacetime, given a particular area of responsibility (AOR) and range of potential contingencies, to improve the effectiveness of coalition operations in a future crisis?

Using the North Africa Vignette **(NWC 2001),** consider the range of joint/multinational organizational options that the Joint Force Commander might consider.

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* pp. VI-1 to VI-13. (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Procedures for Forming & Operating a Joint Task Force*, pp. II-1 through II-10 and III-1 through III-13 (Issued).

North Africa Vignette, July 2002 **(NWC 2001)** (Issued).

Gompert, David C, Kugler, Richard L and Libicki, Martin C. "Assessing the Problem," Chapter 1, pp. 3-14, *"Mind the Gap,"* 1999. (**NWC 2057**) (Issued) .

Myers, Gene *A Common Perspective* , pp 6-9 "Concepts to Future Doctrine," April 2002. **(NWC 2003)** (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Pub 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations,* (Ed 1 issued 5 April 2000), pp. vii-x and II-1 to II-15. (JEL).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook, (**NWC 3153G**) (Issued).

Cooke, Thomas. "NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor." *Parameters,* Winter 1998-99. (**NWC 2052**) (Seminar Reserve).

Extracts from the NATO Handbook. "What is NATO, Fundamental Security Tasks" Ch1 21 May 2001. (**NWC 2097**) (Seminar Reserve).

"NATO's New Force Structures", NATO Fact sheet No. 5 (**NWC 2136**) (Seminar Reserve).

Rice, Antony, J. "Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare." Parameters, Spring 1997.

JFSC PUB 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, pp. 1-45 through 1-53 (Issued).

Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), pp. V-1 through V-19 (Issued).

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) PART 1 (Seminar)

During the fall of 1989, during DoD's regular planning process, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) recommended and the Secretary approved a shift in the principal U.S. focus in the Persian Gulf. . . . Accordingly, the Secretary directed DoD to sharpen its ability to counter such a regional conflict on the Arabian Peninsula. In turn, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed CINCCENT to develop war plans consistent with this shift in emphasis.

DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress

Turbulence is a constant: it is what happens when you have to balance the management requirements to plan an operation with the flexibility needed by those who will soon be carrying it out. While it may have certain flaws, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the baseline system for all U.S. deployments, including those supporting peace operations.

Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned

A. Focus:

This session introduces the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). It begins with an overview of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, the Joint Staff, and the Service chiefs and their staffs in translating national policy objectives into definitive planning guidance for the Combatant Commanders and their Service component commanders. Attention will also be directed toward the guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), a CJCS instruction which initiates the deliberate planning cycle conducted by the Combatant Commanders. The session then describes the deliberate planning process, compares and contrasts it with the time-sensitive crisis action planning process. Emphasis will be on an overview of the five phases of the deliberate planning process and the six phases of the crisis action process. We will also examine the tasking and coordination methodologies, and the relationships between the key elements and products of both processes as well as the content and organization of the various plans and directives associated with the joint military planning process.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Through the framework provided by joint planning processes, explain the relationship between national objectives and means available.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Explain how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.
- Know the purpose, roles, functions, and responsibilities and relationships within the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).
- Comprehend the role of the JSCP in the Defense Planning System with emphasis on the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.
- Know the five phases of the deliberate planning process and the six phases of the

crisis action planning process used within JOPES and the products and their functions derived from these processes.

- Understand how to prepare plans and orders using Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) processes and products.
- Demonstrate the ability to analyze military directives for their correct format and content.

C. Background:

As mandated by Title 10 USC, the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS are pivotal in translating national security objectives into definitive planning guidance for the Combatant Commanders. The Service chiefs and their staffs are also involved in the process, both as contributors to the joint planning guidance and in deriving Service plans that provide trained and equipped forces to support that process. The Combatant Commanders are responsible for the actual development and production of the operation plans (OPLANs), but are dependent on support from the Services, other Combatant Commanders, and the combat support agencies during the planning and execution process.

JOPES provides the overall framework for the military planning process, both the five-phase deliberate planning process (DPP) and the six-phase crisis action planning (CAP) process. Prior to JOPES, there existed the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS). The need for JOPES stemmed from the recognition, based on actual crisis situations, that JOPS and JDS focused primarily on deployment and did not adequately support employment activities. JOPES was therefore developed to give senior level decision-makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during both planning and execution of joint operations.

The JSCP is the vehicle by which the CJCS initiates the deliberate planning cycle. It includes regional objectives and planning assumptions; it specifies the type of plan for each task; and it apportions major combat and strategic lift forces to the Combatant Commanders for their planning. The JSCP also provides the Combatant Commanders with a framework for the scope of their plans, plan formats, and the amount of detailed planning that is required. Deliberate planning is a complex and lengthy process, particularly when the Combatant Commanders are required to develop Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).

The six phases of CAP may have to be executed almost instantaneously, and plans may have to be altered substantially once forces are ashore in the crisis area or when strategic objectives change. In certain crises, the phases may be compressed, entirely eliminated, or conducted concurrently. Moreover, the process could terminate during any of the phases should the crisis subside before the execution phase is reached. The 1983 Grenada operation, URGENT FURY, the 1989 Panama operation, JUST CAUSE, and the 1990 Southwest Asia crisis, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, stand as examples of such dynamic situations, as well as the latest operations in Kosovo, ALLIED FORCE and Afghanistan, ENDURING FREEDOM.

The current SecDef Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the JSCP are both based on the assumption that there is utility in developing deliberate plans that may guide the President's response to a crises. If that assumption is true, we must understand how

deliberate plans can be used to guide or expedite crisis action planning and execution, and which agencies are responsible for specific portions of the planning process.

Point of contact for this session is Professor P. C. Sweeney, C-424.

D. Questions:

What is the basis for the planning tasks assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan?

Why has the CJCS developed the concept of adaptive planning and how does a Combatant Commander incorporate that concept into deliberate plans? How does a Combatant Commander address the issue of deterrence?

How are limited resources and forces matched to planning requirements necessary to support the national security strategy and objectives?

Does the JSCP address combat forces only?

How is strategic lift considered during deliberate planning?

Does the Combatant Commander need a tasking from the CJCS to initiate deliberate planning?

How does the Combatant Commander provide guidance to his staff and component commanders?

What types of plans are developed during the deliberate planning process? During CAP?

To what extent are deliberate plans really only deployment plans?

How does the Combatant Commander express how forces are to be employed?

To what extent is CAP sufficiently flexible for "evolving" crises? What happens when major changes occur?

How effective do you think CAP will be in meeting the challenges of the future?

Have recent U.S. military operations validated the hoped-for correlation between deliberate and crisis action planning? If so, what portions of the deliberate plan will normally need to be modified in times of crisis?

What is the "standard five-paragraph format for plans and orders?" What are the key items in each paragraph, and what are some of the "optional" parts of the directive not contained in the five paragraphs?

What is the purpose of annexes and how are they used in directives?

What are the intended actions of, approval level requirement for, and releasing activity for: Warning, Planning, Alert, Deployment, and Execute Orders?

How are synchronization matrices used in the Operation planning process?

E. Required Readings:

"Instructional JSCP, FY 98 with Change 1," Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 November 2001. (**NWC 1-02**) (**SECRET/NOFORN**) (Classified Issued) (This will be issued in class).

JFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*, Norfolk, Va: 2000. Read Deliberate Planning pp. 4-1 through 4-28, Crisis Action Planning pp. 5-1 through 5-9, and the

summary pp. 5-31 through 5-32. (Issued).

Plans and Orders, Sept. 02. Review (**NWC 2159A**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

User's Guide for JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System), Washington, D.C.: 1 May 1995. pp. 1-20 (JEL) (Issued).

CJCSM 3122.01 *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*, Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, 14 July 2000 (Seminar Reserve**).**

CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance*, 31 December 1999, CH-1, 6 September 2000 (Seminar Reserve).

Sample Planning Documents, August 2001, (**NWC 2110A**) (Issued).

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) PART 2 (Seminar)

A robust plan flows best from "plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas....The process may be somewhat untidy, but it is distinctly American. It works."

Admiral J. D. Watkins, The Maritime Strategy

A. Focus:

This lesson focuses on the implementation of national strategy at the theater Combatant Commander level. The first step of the process comes to the Combatant Commander as guidance from the National Strategic Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Based on this guidance, the Combatant Commander develops his theater strategy by means of a strategic estimate. The Combatant Commander's theater strategy produces concepts to both shape the theater and respond to challenges. The final steps are constructing the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) to shape the theater in peacetime and developing campaign plans to respond to regional threats. The JMO course has previously addressed the basic concepts associated with national strategy, campaigns, TEP, and operational art. This session will more closely examine the interrelationship between those concepts and their effect on the geographic Combatant Commander's theater planning.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- Understand the relationship between theater strategy and the Theater Engagement Planning process.
- Translate national military objectives, guidance, and theater strategies into theater strategic guidance, objectives, and operational focus in theater campaign plans.

C. Background:

Theater strategy is the development of integrated strategic concepts and courses of action to accomplish national and multinational objectives within a theater across a wide range of military operations. The key process in developing a theater strategy and the subsequent campaign plan is the theater commander's estimate of the situation. The guidance provided in the NSS, NMS, and JSCP form the basis for the theater commander's strategy.

Today's geographic Combatant Commander has a unique perspective on the current and projected security environment within his theater. His charge is to identify U.S. political and economic, as well as military, interests in the theater. He must focus on identifying opportunities for shaping the environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. The TEP can be described as his "peacetime campaign plan." CJCSM 3113.01, issued in early 1998, mandates a process by which Combatant Commanders translate national strategy into strategic and operational concepts for their individual AORs.

Campaign planning bridges both the deliberate and crisis action planning process. Traditionally, campaign plans establish objectives and seek to synchronize operations within a theater of war. Campaign plans become the basis for subordinate campaign plans by joint forces and supporting plans for component forces. There is a definite art and professional skill in writing a supporting campaign plan that translates the theater commander's strategic vision into a concept of operation and necessary tasks for subordinate forces. Campaign planning is a logical result of the theater commander's estimate process. This session provides the seminar with an opportunity to analyze a selected World War II, Operation HUSKY, with an eye towards its linkage to a strategy and the effectiveness of its construct.

The point of contact for this session is Professor P. C. Sweeney, C-424.

D. Questions:

What are the fundamental responsibilities of the theater commander to provide for strategic direction, unified action, and operational focus?

What is theater strategy and how is it related to campaign planning?

What is the campaign planning process and how is it related to JOPES?

What are the concepts and fundamentals applied by the theater commander in developing a strategic concept for a campaign?

Will the TEP gain and maintain viability as a useful planning document?

How does the Combatant Commander ensure non-DoD agencies comply with CJCS's direction to integrate all theater activities into a single TEP?

Using NWC 4052A as a guide, analyze Operation HUSKY. In your analysis, consider the following additional questions:

How did the multi-national aspect of each campaign influence the strategy?

How well did the campaign apply the tenets of Operational Art and the fundamentals of Campaign planning as found in Joint Pub 5-0?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, Washington, DC: 13 Apr 1995. Read pp. II-16 through II-21 (section F) on campaign planning. (Issued).

"A Guide for Evaluating Campaign Plans." Review. (**NWC 4052A**) (Issued).

"HUSKY – Sicily Campaign." (**NWC 2026**) (Issued).

Jordan, Thomas M. et al., "Shaping" The World Through "Engagement": Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process. Read pp. 1–28.

Carlisle, PA: April 2000. (**NWC 2156**) (Issued).

PACOM Theater Engagement Plan Extract (**SECRET/NOFORN**) (**NWC 01-01**)

Note: This will be distributed and reviewed in the seminar room.

Mission Performance Plan (MPP) for India (**FOUO**)(**NWC 2139**)

Note: This will be distributed and reviewed in the seminar room.

F. Supplementary Reading:

None.

C4ISR AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS (Lecture/Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session focuses on C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and IO (Information Operations) support to the Joint Force Commander at the operational level of war. The 1999 U.S./NATO military operation in Yugoslavia is used as the principal case study to elicit current capabilities and limitations of C4ISR and IO in support of a major multinational military operation. The primary goal is to derive insights and lessons learned with respect to C4ISR/IO systems, operational concepts, and organizations. The Seminar will be preceded by the lecture "C4ISR & The Operational Commander (or…The Top Ten Things a Good Operator Knows He Should Hear From His J2 About C4ISR)."

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Understand how command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems apply at the tactical and operational levels of war and how they support a joint information operations (IO) strategy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how IO must be integrated to support national and military strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how IO is incorporated into both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes at the operational and JTF levels.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how opportunities and vulnerabilities are created by increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations.
- Understand the capabilities and limitations of national and theater-level intelligence assets available to the joint operational commander.

C. Background:

Information superiority (the ability to collect, process, and disseminate information while denying an adversary's ability to do the same) has become recognized as a key enabler in 21st century military operations. Also known as Knowledge Superiority, it is a central aspect of DoD's *Joint Vision 2010* and *2020*, and of the Navy's new *Maritime Concept*. Essential elements of information superiority include robust Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and command, control, communications and computers (C4) systems, and a full spectrum of Information Operations (IO) capabilities.

The 1999 U.S./NATO operation in Yugoslavia (Operation ALLIED FORCE/NOBLE ANVIL) provides an excellent set of case studies that highlight the capabilities and limitations of our current C4ISR and IO systems, concepts, and organizations. In particular, the Yugoslavia operation was the first concerted effort to unify Information Operations under a multi-service organization in accordance with Joint Doctrine.

Within the context of this case study, this lesson explores three different, but integrally related areas of information:

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): Under the organizational

responsibility of the staff J2 (Intelligence), the central focus of ISR is to establish and maintain an accurate picture of the environment and enemy activity in the area of operations. The particular problems posed by mobile targets in a very challenging environment will be explored.

Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4): Under the organizational responsibility of the staff J6 (C4), the primary focus of C4 is the maintenance of robust information networks to link operational forces for all activities from planning through execution. The particular problems of maintaining adequate information throughput capacity and operational security on very distant battlefields will be explored.

Information Operations (IO): Under the cognizance of the staff J3 (Operations), IO is emerging as the primary organizational entity for the attainment of information superiority. The over-arching concept of IO presently includes a broad set of information-related functions ranging from electronic warfare to psychological operations. The development of specific IO goals and operational concepts to accomplish the IO mission will be explored.

The principal focus of this lesson is to develop an understanding of existing capabilities and limitations in the areas of C4ISR and IO at the operational level of war, and to explore how our information challenges might better be met in future operations.

The point of contact for this session is Captain D. J. Maresh, U.S. Navy, Sims Hall, E-115.

D. Questions:

What were the intelligence requirements to support the operations in Yugoslavia?

What national and theater intelligence resources were available to the Joint Force Commanders in the region?

What were their principal capabilities and limitations in supporting U.S./NATO operations?

How were national and theater intelligence assets organized? Did these organizations meet U.S. and Alliance requirements?

What were the principal command and control requirements to support operations in Yugoslavia?

What national and theater C4 assets were available?

What were the principal capabilities and limitations of these assets? How effectively did they support the operational commander?

What were the goals for IO in this operation?

What were the measures of effectiveness for IO?

What principal IO assets were available to the operational commanders?

How effective was the theater IO organization in meeting the overall IO goals?

What overall lessons for future operations can be drawn from C4ISR and IO experiences in this case?

What do our experiences from this operation imply for our efforts to achieve Network Centric Warfare?

E. Required Reading:

JMO Department, *C4ISR and Information Operations in Kosovo* (1999), 2000 (**NWC 2-01**) (**SECRET/NOFORN**) (Obtain from one of three sites: Pubs, Conolly Hall basement; classified library; or the Intelligence Division, Sims Hall E-117).

JMO Department, *National Intelligence-Military Coordination in Kosovo* (1999), 2002 (**NWC 1-03**) (S/NF) (Obtain from one of three sites: Pubs, Conolly Hall basement; classified library; or the Intelligence Division, Sims Hall E-117)

Garret Jones, "Working with the CIA," *Parameters*, Winter 2001-02, pp. 228-39 (**NWC 2005**) (Issued). http://Carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01winter/jones.htm.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Timothy L. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," *Parameters* (Spring 2000), pp. 13-29. (**NWC 2119**) (Library Reserve).

Joint Pub 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,* 9 March 2000 (Joint Electronic Library) (Issued).

Joint Pub 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operation,* 20 November 1996 (Joint Electronic Library) (Issued).

Joint Pub 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations,* 30 May 1995 (Joint Electronic Library) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations,* 9 Oct 1998 (Joint Electronic Library) (Issued).

Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report (Department of Defense, 31 Jan 2000) (**NWC 2102**) (Library Reserve).

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session focuses on critical issues for the operational commander with respect to the use, or potential use, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Primary emphasis is placed on the possible introduction of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons in a theater conflict. It is not unlikely that such weapons will be seen by prospective adversaries as a means to counter the significant technological superiority of U.S. conventional forces. This session will provide an understanding of the nature of the threat, and primary considerations for deterrence, defense, and response. Different cases will be examined to explore the principal issues surrounding the use, or threatened use of WMD in possible future contingencies.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend the unique threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the primary considerations for the potential use of such weapons by an adversary.
- Comprehend the basic elements of deterrence theory and how they might be applied in the case of weapons of mass destruction at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend the current and near term capabilities of U.S. forces to defend against weapons of mass destruction.
- Comprehend the considerations for response to enemy use of WMD against U.S. forces or allies.

C. Background:

More than two dozen nations worldwide possess, or are actively working to acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and the ability to deliver them against military or civilian targets. Although such weapons have seen little battlefield use, they appear to be increasingly viewed by many nations and non-government groups as a potential means to counter the military superiority of the United States or another adversary. The significant technological lead that the U.S. enjoys in conventional military forces may increase the prospect that a future adversary will view WMD as a credible response to U.S. presence and power projection in his region. The possible employment of NBC weapons is of particular concern to the U.S. operational commander given the potential consequences of use and the problematic nature of defense. The problem has recently grown given the potential for Radiological Dispersal Device employment by terrorists. The wide range of prospective foes that may threaten the use of WMD equates to an equally wide range of deterrence, defense, and response considerations for the operational commander.

Point of contact for this session is Captain D. J. Maresh, U.S. Navy, Sims Hall, E-115.

D. Questions:

What are the critical differences in the utility and potential uses of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons?

What are the basic elements of deterrence? How does one establish the credibility and will to employ both defensive and retaliatory capabilities?

What are current and near-term U.S. capabilities (in particular, Theater Ballistic Missile Defense) to defend against WMD?

What are the primary considerations for military response following the use of WMD?

Are deterrence and response options case specific? What are the primary considerations of the operational commander in applying those options against specific adversaries?

E. Required Reading:

JMO Department, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Considerations for the Operational Commander* (**NWC 2115B**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Payne, Keith B., "Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons from History," *Comparative Strategy* (Vol.14 No. 4, 1995) pp. 347-359 (**NWC 3028**) (Library Reserve).

Schneider, Dr. Barry R. "Strategies for Coping with Enemy Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Airpower Journal* (Special Edition 1996) pp. 36-47. (**NWC 2068**) (Library Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense* (11 July 2000) (Joint Electronic Library).

Swicker, Charles C., *Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea,* Newport Paper Number Fourteen (Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, Newport, RI: August 1998) (**NWC 2070**) (Library Reserve).

THE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (CES) (Seminar)

The one who is to draw up a plan of operations must possess a minute knowledge of the power of his adversary and of the help the latter may expect from his allies. He must compare the forces of the enemy with his own numbers and those of his allies so that he can judge which kind of war he is able to lead or to undertake.

Frederick the Great: Letter 1748

A. Focus:

These sessions will introduce you to one of the most critical aspects of the planning process and the framework and steps involved in making a decision by selecting a Course of Action (COA). We will focus on the Navy's Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) as a model for military decision making. The CES Workbook will be used as an instructional tool and a guide as we apply these concepts to a scenario based on warfare in a littoral region. The seminar will use the exercise situation in Borneo to develop a CES, and then deliver a COA decision brief. Following this, the seminar will use the selected COA to further develop a synchronization matrix and discuss its utility in developing an OPORD. While this exercise will highlight activities at all three levels of war, it will focus on the operational planning aspects and is not intended to progress into the execution phase. Additionally, we will review several other planning frameworks to provide insight and exposure to other systems in the art of decision making.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE—**Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE—**Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations of employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Through the framework provided by joint planning processes, explain the relationship between national objectives and means availability.

- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national, joint, and Service intelligence organizations support JFCs.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how IO is incorporated into both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes at the operational and JTF levels.
- Apply Operational Law in operational planning.
- Synthesize operational art at the joint task force level.

C. Background:

Block II began by introducing the capabilities and limitations of the various Services and several key operational issues critical to the planning process. The Commanders Estimate of the Situation applies and synthesizes these, along with doctrine and theory from Block I, for making a sound military decision.

For most of the Twentieth Century, and during all of its major wars, the United States military used the CES to think through real and potential military situations and the myriad of influencing factors in order to arrive at decisions. In 1909, the U.S. Army adopted the Estimate of the Situation from the German General Staff; the U.S. Navy followed a year later.

As you will find out, there is a wide range of CES experience in your seminar, ranging from none to sophisticated use on joint staffs. There are also differences in Service perspectives in the planning framework as well as ideas from outside the military. The main purpose of the CES, and any planning framework, is to provide a logical sequence of actions in analyzing a military problem and reaching a decision.

Military commanders must continually make decisions, often under unfavorable conditions. The opponent's independent will and actions can considerably affect the execution of one's own plans and actions. Moreover, the physical environment, climate, and weather can significantly interfere with the commander's accomplishment of the assigned mission. The CES is designed to ensure that no matter of importance is omitted by the commander.

These sessions focus on describing the CES planning process utilizing the workbook and readings, and then synthesizing the knowledge through the Borneo (PACIFIC TEAK) Crisis Planning Exercise. This exercise focuses on the planning aspects of how to use forces during a crisis that develops in a littoral region. The seminar will act as members of a Joint Task Force (JTF). The concept of a Joint Planning Group (JPG) will be introduced to facilitate the Crisis Action Planning (CAP) process. The group will develop a CES based on the intelligence assessment and information provided in the readings.

An operational planner will be more effective if he or she has a good understanding of the different capabilities, limitations, and doctrines that each Service brings to the joint force. This effectiveness will be increased if the planner has a comprehensive understanding of the critical factors that affect the use of these forces at the operational and tactical levels. The seminar will discuss operational law issues relevant to the

situation. The seminar will also have an opportunity to discuss other planning frameworks. By now you should recognize Operational Art and the Five Questions as a foundation to military success.

The first step in the CES is the **Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) and Mission Analysis (MA)**. The JIPB will be used to define the battlespace's environment; describe the battlespace's effects in terms of time, space and force; evaluate the threat; and determine enemy COAs. The MA is the single most important element of the CES. It results in a proposed restated mission statement and the commander's issuance of his planning guidance. The mission should be constantly reviewed throughout the entire estimate process. The mission is contained in paragraph 1 of the CES and comprises paragraph 2 of the basic plan or OPORD.

The second step is to **develop friendly COAs** with respect to the enemy COAs developed in Step 1. These COAs will be developed through an analysis of relative combat power, the task organization of forces, and the development of a scheme of operation. A prepared statement and sketch will be used to analyze and compare the COAs. The scheme of the operation will be expanded into the concept of the operation (CONOPS) if/when the COA is selected (during the Decision) and comprises paragraph 3 of the basic plan or OPORD.

The third step is to **analyze the courses of action**. The staff will select a war game method and technique to record and display the results. The staff will list all available forces, assumptions, known critical events and decision points, and significant factors and then war game the COA to assess the results.

The fourth step is to **compare the courses of action** with each other to help form the basis for the decision. The staff will consider advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability, weigh relative merits of the COAs, and select one COA that offers the greatest chance of accomplishing the mission. To facilitate comparison between the retained COAs, the staff considers each COA in terms of the governing factors selected by the commander in his guidance.

The fifth and final step is the **decision**. The decision is based on both an objective review of the results of the tabulations and calculations of the outcome of each step in the process, as well as upon subjective analysis. The commander must rely heavily on his professional judgment in making a sound decision.

The point of contact for this session is Captain M. D. Seaman, U.S. Navy, C-412.

D. Questions:

What is the common thread seen throughout the CES?

What are some influences on the superior’s mission that you will have to judge?

What are the shortcuts and pitfalls in planning and decision making?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the various planning frameworks?

What is the overall situation that the CINC is facing? What is the purpose of the mission that the CINC has been assigned? What tasks must be performed to accomplish the mission? What are the limitations on the mission?

What are the considerations for command and control of the assigned forces? Where will the CJTF be located? How will the JTF be organized?

What are the enemy capabilities and courses of action that the CINC might confront?

What are the potential courses of action that the CINC can select?

Is the recommended course of action adequate (accomplishes the mission), feasible (accomplishes the mission with the assets available), and acceptable (accomplishes the mission with the estimated cost)?

What details must be provided in an OPORD in order for the forces to accomplish their mission?

Are actions of all participants synchronized towards this end? Will the proposed military condition lead to achievement of the political objective?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures,* 13 January 1999*,* pp. IX-6 – IX-14, VII-4 – VII-8, and VIII-15 – VIII-16. (Issued).

Joint Pub 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace,* 24 May 2000, Chapters I through III and Appendix A. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, *Commander's Estimate of the Situation: Worksheet for In-Class Work and War Gaming*, 19 Aug 2002. **(NWC 4111F)** (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, *A Borneo Case Study for Expeditionary Warfare*, August 2000. **(NWC 2095B)** (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 5-01, Rev. A, *Naval Operational Planning*, May 1998. (Seminar Reserve).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. **(NWC 3153G)** (Issued).

CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, VOL I (Planning Policies and Procedures),* 14 July 2000 (Seminar Reserve).

CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, VOL II (Planning Formats and Guidance),* CH-1, 6 September 2000 (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Naval War College, *Plans and Orders*, September 2002. (**NWC 2159A**) (Issued).

Block Three
Military Operations Other Than War

BLOCK THREE
INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

A. Focus:

This portion of the JMO Course focuses on the lower end of the range of military operations. The tools provided will assist you to develop your skills in an area of military activity likely to occupy your talents and efforts. Upon completion of Block Three, you should be comfortable in a role that requires you to translate strategic goals into feasible military objectives for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Understand joint, interagency and multinational operations in support of the National Military Strategy (NMS) across the range of military operations.
- Apply Joint Doctrine to MOOTW.
- Understand the effect of political factors on the selection of military objectives.
- Translate political objectives into military objectives for MOOTW.
- Analyze the reasons for the success or failure of selected MOOTW cases.
- Apply the Principles of War to MOOTW.

C. Guidance:

Military officers focus their careers on mastering the application of combat power. Not surprisingly, the Services focus on training and education on the high end of the operational continuum or range of military operations. This block allows you to sharpen your skills in a different environment. You will focus on the lower end of the violence curve in order to develop an understanding of MOOTW and to delve into the interagency, regional, diplomatic and other less obvious applications of military power used to achieve national objectives short of war.

Block III is designed to provide you with the tools, concepts, principles and doctrine (including interagency issues) required for the tasks to follow. During this block you will examine a number of MOOTW situations including insurgency and peace operations. You will also be required to translate the President's and Secretary of Defense's guidance into a Theater Commander's Strategic Plan to support an ally under siege.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session introduces the array of military operations loosely described as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The types of MOOTW, and problems inherent in the conduct of MOOTW are examined.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE—**Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency and multinational operations.
- **PJE—**Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE—**Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

Current doctrine describes MOOTW as a "wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale operations usually associated with war." (Joint Pub 3-0, p. V-1). Those activities include such actions as: Presence; Coercive Diplomacy; Security Assistance; Insurgency/ Counterinsurgency; Humanitarian Assistance; Combating Terrorism; Peace Operations; Peacetime Contingencies; Counterdrug Operations; and Support to U.S. Civil Authorities.

This session introduces the array of activities of MOOTW and the Principles for Joint Operations in MOOTW are examined. Additionally, the seminar will address the questions posed below. Subsequent Block Three sessions will delve more deeply into various types of MOOTW.

Point of Contact for this session is Professor J. D. Waghelstein, C-421.

D. Questions:

Are MOOTW a new mission?

The American view is to distinguish between war and all that other unpleasantness. How useful is the distinction?

How do political objectives differ in MOOTW from those in "traditional" large-scale conflicts?

What effect do political objectives have on the selection of military objectives?

What is meant by a more fragile battlefield in the MOOTW environment?

Is there really a difference between the Principles of War and Principles of Military Operations Other Than War?

Is there a substantive difference in training for war and for MOOTW?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-07, *MOOTW*, Chapters I-IV and Glossary. (Issued; Joint Electronic Library, CD-ROM).

Fishel, John T., "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." (**NWC 3077**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Pub 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*, Chapter I. Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations,* Chapter I. (Seminar Reserve).

Martin & Walcott's, *Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism*, Chapter 10, "El Dorado Canyon." (**NWC 2027**) (Issued).

NDP-1, Naval Warfare…. pp 21-23 (Seminar Reserve).

Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel, *Campaign Planning and the Drug War.* (Seminar Reserve).

White, "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." (**NWC 3060**) (Seminar Reserve).

FAILED STATES (Seminar)

The fundamental problem of failed states is that they do not simply go away, they linger; the longer they persist, the greater the potential challenges to neighboring states, regional stability, and international peace.

—Robert H. Dorff
Parameters, Summer 1996

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the Failed State phenomenon and examines the degree to which the U.S. military may effectively address the problem.

B. Objectives:

- Introduce the concept of Failed (or Failing) States.
- Analyze the pathology of the degeneration of states.
- Assess the impact of Failed States upon U.S. national interests.
- Translate national security objectives, guidance, and strategic or desired endstate into national military objectives and guidance.
- Assess the efficacy of various military measures in addressing Failed States issues.

C. Background:

Although throughout the recorded history of man there are dramatic accounts of the rise and fall of states, the more recent phenomenon of the "failed" or "failing state" was born of the post-World War II process of great power decolonization. Former colonies, often lacking the political and economic wherewithal to prosper on their own as independent nation states, were kept viable by either the East or the West, eagerly competing for their loyalty in the bipolar struggle of the Cold War. With the passing of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, more new states arose, often riven by previously latent ethnic and religious tensions, thus adding to the number of governments whose future stability was in some doubt.

The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a growing number of states unable to survive as stable, viable entities. The resulting deterioration of governance in these states seems to be characterized by serious problems, all of which bear the seeds of crisis. These range from economic collapse to widespread hunger, population dislocation and migration, insurgencies, terrorist acts, human rights abuses, and internal instability affecting neighboring states and the region in general.

In this course we focus on the failed state phenomenon because it is so often commands the willing or unwilling involvement of outside powers, including the United States, in what have become known as "complex contingency operations." Our national leadership may be confronted by difficult policy decisions concerning the U.S. ability to intervene, the appropriateness of intervention, and the options available for the application of military resources. The assessment of those options and seminar discussions of the military role in dealing with complex contingency operations are the goal of the session.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. F. Chandler, C-425.

D. Questions:

What are the characteristics of a state described as "failed" or "failing"?

What are the causes?

Are there common problems or is each unique?

If the states are outside our region, should the U.S. care?

What are the "danger signs" that should forewarn of failure?

Should U.N.-led intervention be the preferred option of choice?

What are the risks of acting unilaterally?

How can military resources be applied most effectively or *can* they be?

E. Required Readings:

Dearth, "Failed State: an International Conundrum." (**NWC 3029**) (Issued).

Helman & Ratner, "Saving Failed States." (**NWC 3026**) (Issued).

Ballard, "Upholding Democracy: the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997" (excerpt) **(NWC 3084)** (Issued). (Moderator may or may not assign this reading.)

Metz, "Somalia: A Country Study" (extract from Introduction). **(NWC 3076)** (Issued). (Moderator may or may not assign this reading.)

F. Supplementary Readings:

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002. (Issued).

Woodward, "Failed States: Warlordism and 'Tribal' Warfare." (**NWC 3033**) (Seminar Reserve).

Manwaring, Max G. ed., *Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder.* Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1993.

THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS (Lecture on Film/Seminar)

"Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the U.S. Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively."

Joint Pub 3-08

A. Focus:

Modern military operations require the proper application of all elements of national power, yet commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges. With this thought in mind, students must understand the key principles associated with the interagency process (both in Washington and abroad) in order to enhance the prospects for success during joint operations. This session will address: joint doctrine for interagency coordination, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), the basic roles and authorities vested in a U.S. Ambassador and country team, and the concepts associated with Security Assistance.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the impact of interagency coordination on strategic, operational and tactical military activities.
- Comprehend the interagency coordination process and the impact of Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56).
- Understand the role of the U.S. Ambassador and the organization and functions of a Country Team in U.S. embassies abroad as they may have an impact on military planning.
- Understand current joint doctrine as it applies to the interagency coordination process as described in Joint Pub 3-08, Volumes I and II.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the military functions with other government agencies, with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and with private volunteer organizations (PVOs); and apply this understanding to operational requirements.

C. Background:

Military commanders need to understand how military advice is formulated at the strategic level through the Washington interagency process and how government agencies contribute to the successful prosecution of the modern joint campaign. Key to success at the operational level is the relationship between affected U.S. Ambassadors, the theater commander and their staffs. Modern operations also require a practical understanding of methods for developing unity of effort among the large number of supra-national organizations (the United Nations and regional bodies such as the Organization of American States), government agencies and even non-governmental agencies (including PVOs) that may be operating within the battlespace. PDD-56 is the

government's policy designed to develop unity of effort for complex contingency operations. Understanding these principles will assist the students in coordinating across the full spectrum of military operations.

A key to this session is knowledge of the range of resources available to military commanders and recent lessons learned in developing successful coordination. NGOs (including—PVOs) often have links with local populations unreachable in any other way. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) acts as the lead federal agency overseas. There are many circumstances when the Department of State, in the person of the in-country ambassador (the President's direct representative), is the lead agency for dealing with a situation. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) can provide a range of information relevant to both military and political success, either via the in-country Chief of Station, via the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) representative to the Combatant Commander, or (along with other members of the intelligence community) as part of a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).

Apart from civilian resources, the military commander has assets particularly well suited to accomplishing MOOTW tasks. For example, civil affairs units and SOF are useful both in their "traditional" roles and as liaison between the military and external agencies or other military forces. In the latter case, liaison officers have been effective in establishing and maintaining unity of effort in a multilateral environment. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) is a proven method of improving coordination during operations.

Security Assistance (SA) applies across the conflict continuum. SA programs often attempt to address the root-causes of the problems facing a nation by helping in the development of host nation internal defense and development plans. Although SA is the responsibility of the State Department, DoD is the executive agent for a number of SA programs. DoD executes its SA mission through an array of organizations operating in CONUS. Within a host nation, the responsibilities of SA are carried out by organizations within the local U.S. mission which go by a variety of titles, e.g., Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Military Groups (MilGps) or Security Assistance Officers (SAOs). At the Unified Command level, the Combatant Commanders provide the means for SA organizations to render that support and provide regional coordination.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-411.

D. Questions:

What do we mean by "interagency coordination" and why is it important?

Describe the characteristics of the interagency working environment, per National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1).

What is PDD-56? What role does it play in the interagency management of complex contingency operations?

How does the interagency process function in Washington? What do we mean by the term "lead agency"?

How does the NSC system work; what are the roles played by National Security Council/Presidential Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs)?

What is the responsibility of the U.S. Ambassador in terms of interagency coordination?

Why might the operational commander be concerned with the interagency process and non-DoD resources?

What are some examples of non-governmental agencies (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and regional and international organizations that may play roles within the modern battlespace.

How may we organize best for success for interagency operations at the operational level?

What are some organizational tools JTFs may employ to enhance prospects for success in interagency operations?

E. Required Readings:

Organization of the National Security Council System (**NWC 3089**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Cooperation during Joint Operations*, Vol. I, Chapters I-III (focus on II-12 to II-24, III-1 to III-11, and III-15 to III-26). (Issued).

PDD-56, *National Security Council White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. (**NWC 3072**) (Issued).

Raach & Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process." *Joint Force Quarterly*. (**NWC 2044**) (Issued). Note: Read only 1st article in NWC 2044.

Joint Warfighting Center, *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, 16 July 1997, pp. i-v, I-6 to I-12 (Sect.5), II-1 to II-11. (Issued).

Clinton, William J., "President's Letter to Ambassadors." (**NWC 2106**) (Issued). (Scan)

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). *The Management of Security Assistance.* Chapter Two. (**NWC 2016**) (Issued). (Scan)

Simmons, "Executing Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept." (**NWC 2010**) (Issued). (Scan)

National Defense University, Extracts on Security Assistance from Strategic Assessment 1996, pp. 97-102, 107, 52-56. (**NWC 3050**) (Issued). (Scan)

Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Cooperation during Joint Operations*, Vol. II. (Issued). (Scan)

F. Supplementary Readings:

Dearfield, Mark, "The CJTF and NGOs—One Team, One Mission?" (**NWC 3006**) (Issued).

Sorenson, Robert "Operational Leadership Challenges in Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Operations," unpublished student paper, Naval War College, June 1997. (**NWC 3085**) (Issued).

Fishel, "War's End: A Strategic Concept for Post-Conflict Operations." (**NWC 2007**) (Issued).

Bentley, David, "Operation Sea Signal: U.S. Military Support for Caribbean Migration Emergencies, May 1994 to February 1996," *Strategic Forum*, No. 73, May 1996.

COMBATING TERRORISM (Seminar)

"The terrorist threat is global in scope, many faceted, and determined. The world's response must be equally comprehensive, multi-dimensional, and steadfast….

The frontlines are everywhere and the stakes are high. Terrorism not only kills people. It also threatens democratic institutions, undermines economies, and destabilizes regions."

—Colin L. Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, 2002

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the nature of global terrorism, the applicability of all the Instruments of Power in dealing with it, and the role of the operational commander with respect to the challenges and complexities of combating terrorism.

B. Objectives:

- Understand U.S. national policy and general objectives with regard to combating terrorism.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between national security direction, military objectives, and strategic end state.
- Understand the role of the lead agencies in combating terrorism and how that may change.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces in combating terrorism.
- Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining military resources, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Understand how the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense perform their crisis action roles of coordinating U.S. Interagency and multinational participation in combating terrorism.
- **PJE**—Translate national security objectives, guidance and strategic endstate into national military objectives, guidance, and "military endstate" for combatant commanders, JTFs and support organizations.

C. Background:

Combating terrorism encompasses two activities: counter-terrorism (CT) and anti-terrorism (AT). While the State Department maintains overall responsibility for U.S. CT activities outside of the U.S., USSOCOM has the lead for planning and executing the DoD's contributions. With the "War on Terrorism" declared by President Bush in the wake of the horrific attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, all combatant commanders have found themselves directly involved in plans for combating terrorist groups. Further complicating the situation, if the President has previously authorized a Covert Action program to combat terrorism in a particular area and later calls on the military to become involved, the CIA may already be on the ground with significant programs and local ties which will need to be taken account of in any military plan. DoD

AT activities are integrated within regional combatant commands and the Services to counter terrorist threats to military installations, bases, facilities, equipment, and personnel.

The trend in terrorism over a period of years has been a movement from state-sponsored terrorist organizations to loose networks of international terrorists without state sponsorship. Extremist groups claiming legitimacy based on their versions of religious teachings have demonstrated the ability to mount sophisticated attacks against the U.S. and its allies. The long term goal of at least one of these groups, al-Qaeda, is the overthrow of a number of regimes in the middle east and elsewhere and the creation of religious-based states; they see U.S. power and influence as the main obstacles to achieving this goal.

Al-Qaeda appears to be adept at finding ways to provoke U.S. responses which are likely to alienate international public opinion. The challenge for the operational commander is to figure out how to avoid that trap. That may translate into determining how best to utilize military forces in dealing with particular terrorist groups, or it may mean providing military support to other instruments of power if those other instruments are likely to be more effective in helping create the desired end state. The principal objective of this session is to increase student awareness of the challenges facing the joint force commander in combating terrorism and to think through how and when to utilize various types of military forces in dealing with this type of problem.

Point of contact for this session is Professor E.A. McIntyre, CIA, C-425.

D. Questions:

What distinguishes terrorism from the legitimate use of force by nations or groups?

Is the U.S. national objective to defeat "terrorism" or to defeat the groups that choose to use it as a tactic? Why?

If one accepts the notion of a "new" type of terrorism, how would defining al-Qaeda as having a "catalytic" strategy influence how one might best take offensive action to defeat it? How might such a definition assist in determining how best to protect our own Center of Gravity from attacks by al-Qaeda?

What are the regional Combatant Commanders' responsibilities for combating terrorism?

What are some strengths and weaknesses of the use of military force in combating terrorism in general and al-Qaeda (or any other global terrorist group) in particular?

How might one take advantage of the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of using military force to combat terrorism? Provide examples to illustrate your points.

What other "instruments of power" are important in any campaign to combat terrorism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each? Why do these other "instruments" matter in practical terms to a Combatant Commander constructing a plan to combat terrorism in his theater?

E. Required Readings:

Pillar, Paul R., *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy,* Read pp 73-129, Scan pp 29-40, pp 57-69, and pp 217-228 (Issued).

Conetta, Carl, "Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to combat al-Qaeda and the new terrorism,"

Commonwealth Institute Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo #23, 17 June 2002 (**NWC 3011**) (Issued).

Woodward, Bob, "Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat Role," *Washington Post,* November 18, 2001, p. A01 (**NWC 3023**) (Issued).

Biddle, Stephen, "War Aims and War Termination," *The U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analysis*, (**NWC 3030**) (Issued).

STRATFOR.COM, "The War From Al Qaeda's Standpoint," *STRATFOR.COM,* 17 June 2002 (**NWC 3032**) (Issued).

Conetta, Carl, "A Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War, Executive Summary," *Project on Defense Alternatives,* 13 February 2002 (**NWC 3035**) (Issued).

Bertrand, Serge C., "Fighting Islamist Terrorism—an Indirect Strategic Approach," 1 August 2002, unpublished paper submitted to Salve Regina University (**NWC 3036**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Juergensmeyer, Mark, "Understanding the New Terrorism," and John Arquilla, et al, "Terrorism in the Information Age," *Current History,* April 2000, Vol. 99, NO. 636. **(NWC 3075)** (Seminar Reserve).

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001. Department of State. May 2002, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/>, sections A, B, I, J, K, O.

Katzman, Kenneth. *Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001,* CRS Report for Congress, Sep 10, 2001, Summary and pp. 1-13, 25-37 (**NWC 3091**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism,* Chapter I-III (Joint Electronic Library, CD-ROM) (Seminar Reserve).

HOMELAND SECURITY (Seminar)

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

President George W. Bush

A. Focus:

This session examines the complex topic of homeland security and the military's role in protecting the American homeland. Seminar discussions should facilitate an understanding of the various responsibilities and issues involved in this rapidly evolving area. Students should draw on previous sessions covering national security direction; organizational and political influences, including Congress and various cabinet-level departments of the U.S. interagency; the relationships and functions of the President, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and Unified Commanders; as well as, individual Service capabilities; to discuss military options for responding to homeland security scenarios, keeping in mind operational art concepts such as centers of gravity and principles of war. The session should help the student appreciate the benefits of military and interagency cooperation, the tremendous complexity of defending the world's largest democracy—with its open borders, and the synergy possible with a unified response.

B. Objectives:

- Understand U.S. national policy and general objectives with regard to homeland security.
- Comprehend the responsibilities of the DoD and the combatant commanders in protecting the United States, its possessions, and bases against attack, threat of attack or, hostile incursion.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

The attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that occurred on 11 September 2001 awakened many in the United States to the reality that their homeland was no longer as safe as they once had assumed it was. In the aftermath of these tragedies, the U.S. government began to reevaluate its homeland security posture, and

while changes are still occurring, the complexity of responsibilities is overwhelming. On 8 October 2001, the President signed Executive Order 13228, which established the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council. Twenty-one days later, the first Homeland Security Presidential Directive was issued, defining the composition of the Homeland Security Council Principals Committee and the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee, while also establishing eleven Homeland Security Council Policy Coordination Committees. On that same date, President Bush appointed then-Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as the nation's first Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. On 6 June 2002, President Bush made a 13 minute speech proposing a change to the Executive Branch not seen since the National Security Act of 1947, with the creation of a new Cabinet level Department of Homeland Security.

While the Secretary of Defense's current Unified Command Plan (UCP) outlines general responsibilities for homeland defense, it also acknowledges that this is a very broad concept. DoD roles require greater definition. "Protecting the United States, its possessions, and bases against attack, threat of attack, or hostile incursion . . . ." is a responsibility shared by all combatant commanders.

The creation of NORTHCOM was intended to address the overlap and seams in geographic responsibilities, as well as clearly assign duties to a Unified Combatant Commander for providing unity of command as well as command and control over military efforts related to Homeland Security within the NORTHCOM AOR. However, many unique and challenging issues remain: the relationship between NORTHCOM and PACOM with respect to Alaska; the specific relationship between NORTHCOM and the Coast Guard as lead federal agency for maritime security; the role/relationship of NORTHCOM with standing Joint Interagency Task Forces, particularly in regard to military support in any Consequence Management scenario; as well as the relationship with the new Department of Homeland Security. With a 1 October 2002 deadline for implementation, the complexity of homeland defense takes on added dimensions.

The point of contact for this session is: Captain M. J. Campbell, USCG, SP-214.

D. Questions:

What other agencies have responsibilities for homeland security and who is/should be in charge overall? How will coordination occur? What are the command and control arrangements?

What role should DoD play in homeland security?

To what extent are there overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities, and how will these be deconflicted?

How can we ensure that homeland defense is cohesive and that seams won't be exploited by potential enemies?

Does the newest UCP adequately address homeland security responsibilities? Are any changes needed?

What is the difference between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense?

E. Required Readings:

Unified Command Plan, Read page 3, para. 11.a., pp. 7-11. April 30, 2002 (**NWC 2021B**) (Issued).

U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, Read pp. 4-25. January 2001. (**NWC 3007**) (Issued).

Wilson, Paul, Major, USA. "The Department of Defense as Lead Federal Agency in Consequence Management: Poised for Success?" Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2002. (**NWC 3003**). (Issued).

Tomisek, Steven J. "Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense". Strategic Forum No. 189. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, February 2002. (**NWC 3005**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

DeGeus, Stan. *"Forces/Capabilities Handbook"* Bring to class for reference. (**NWC 3153G**) (Issued).

FM 3-0 Operations. Read pp. 2-14 through 2-25. (Issued).

NWP 3-10 (Rev. A), Chapter 1, "Naval Coastal Warfare Overview," pp. 1-1 through 1-9. (**NWC 4026**) (Issued).

U.S. President, "Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council," Executive Order 13228, October 8, 2001 (**NWC 4023**) (Issued).

U.S. President, "Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council," Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, October 29, 2001 (**NWC 4024**) (Issued).

PLANNING FOR POST–CONFLICT OPERATIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

In this session we focus on the planning for the post-conflict (or post-hostilities) operations which follow the use of military force. Having briefly examined the difficulties of the interagency process and the combating of terrorism, we now examine the special challenges to the military commander of planning for what comes "after the shooting stops."

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Discuss and comprehend the planning requirements for the post-conflict phases of MOOTW involving the unilateral use of force.
- Comprehend the appropriateness, effectiveness, and difficulty of selecting military forces in MOOTW.
- Analyze the elements of operational art as they apply to MOOTW.

C. Background:

Although we have witnessed many examples of MOOTW which are of a supportive nature (disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, etc.), others may be coercive in nature (raids, NEOs, etc.), involving the use of force. The problem of how to achieve U.S. objectives in an unclear and often undefined situation affects the response of the regional Combatant Commander and the JTF commander. This is especially so when the U.S. must "go it alone." Further, it is a reality that the President, the SECDEF, and the Chairman are often more than passive observers in these types of operations, and may on occasion be dominant players. The prudent course, therefore, is for the joint staff officer to be aware of the dynamics at the national level that may have an impact on the operational commander.

Although one might wish that another agency (e.g. State) would assume the role of "campaign planner" for the period *following* hostilities, the lead role has in the past—more often than not—initially fallen to the military. Joint doctrine, therefore, includes the basic elements of "post-conflict activities" and the essential planning involved for them. Not surprisingly, however, the Combatant Commander's planners are often inclined to emphasize the planning for hostilities over the need to look at how stability is restored after the conflict stops. Such was the case in Panama in 1989 and 1990. Much can be gained by examining what went right and what went wrong in this first post-Goldwater-Nichols use of military force.

In early 1989 President George Bush was facing a dilemma in Panama. He had, during his victorious campaign for president, argued for a tough stand against General Manuel Noriega. Despite economic, political and diplomatic efforts, Noriega not only remained in control, but increasingly challenged U.S. policy in the region. By the fall of 1989, as General Colin Powell assumed the position of CJCS and a new Combatant Commander took over U.S. Southern Command with its headquarters still at Quarry Heights in Panama, the situation had reached the crisis stage. American lives and interests, the integrity of the Panama Canal, the Panamanian people's quest for democracy, and the U.S. fight against illegal drug trafficking all were being threatened by the Noriega regime.

During this session, we will look briefly at the nature of the crisis, the planning that was done to resolve it, and the military action taken in Operation JUST CAUSE. Attention will focus, however, on the way the U.S. dealt with the post-hostilities challenges in Panama. The time devoted to analysis of these two phases, JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, will offer opportunities to see historic "illustrations" of "theory and doctrine" we have studied throughout the trimester: the Principles of War, the Principles of MOOTW, the challenges of interagency planning, and the selection of DoD assets during operational planning. Few examples of military planning in recent history better illustrate the crucial need for timely, thorough planning for what comes after the cessation of hostilities.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. F. Chandler, C-425.

D. Questions:

In defining the breadth of operational options at the Combatant Commander's disposal in MOOTW, which specific actions would best complement the economic and diplomatic FDOs being employed?

As a theater Combatant Commander witnesses the progressive failure of economic and political measures being taken by the President to deter military conflict, to what extent can he and should he proceed with plans for dealing with the ultimate failure?

In planning for post-conflict operations what agencies are available to assist? Which can you turn to for optimizing planning? From the vantage point of the operational commander, what are the "pros and cons" of interagency involvement?

When the helm is finally turned over to a non-DoD agency, how can *military* assets best be used to support interagency efforts in assisting a democratic government?

E. Required Readings:

Shultz, Richard H. Jr. "In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause," Air University Press, 1993. pp. 1-73. (**NWC 2175A**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker, *"Operation Just Cause: the Storming of Panama,"* Lexington Books, 1991. pp. 20-35; 57-69; 70-87. (Issued).

Woodward, Bob, *"The Commanders,"* Simon & Schuster, 1991. pp. 82-196. (**NWC 3058**) (Seminar Reserve).

Joint History Office (Cole, Ronald H.), *Operation Just Cause—The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama—February 1988—January 1990.* Washington D.C.: November 1995. (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-07, MOOTW, Chapter IV (Issued).

Terry, James P. "The Panama Intervention: Law in Support of Policy," *Naval Law Review,* Volume 39, 1990.

A. Focus:

This session examines Counterinsurgency (CI), a specific type of MOOTW. It focuses on the U.S. supporting role in El Salvador. The seminar will examine the case using elements of operational art, joint doctrine, and the Principles of MOOTW.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination as illustrated by a previous campaign.
- Understand how national security objectives and guidance are translated into theater objectives and counterinsurgency campaign plans. Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- Understand how national security objectives and guidance are translated into theater objectives and counterinsurgency campaign plans.
- Comprehend the art and science of developing , deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with the other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- Understand how a "net assessment", like a CES, is a prerequisite to successful operational planning in any military operation. Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- Apply campaign-planning techniques to a situation involving political and economic issues as well as military issues. Comprehend the role and perspective of a unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the combatant commanders.
- Demonstrate an understanding of how CI doctrine and practice operated in El Salvador and the soundness of projecting that experience into future insurgency situations. Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.

C. Background:

In many ways it is easier for the U.S. military to conduct war on a grand scale than at the lower end of the spectrum. The applicability of conventional force in the CI arena is often non-existent, and counter-productive. Additionally, many of the war-fighting concepts that you have studied thus far may have far less relevance.

Of the various types of MOOTW, FID, and in particular counterinsurgency, is likely to be challenging, misunderstood, and problematic in its response to the application of conventional military force. When faced with countering insurgencies, military planners are unlikely to find any one single solution to their problem. Hence, a study of previously successful counter-insurgency operations quite helpful.

The Department of State will usually be in the lead for foreign internal defense, at least in the development of objectives and overarching guidance. Consequently, DOD

activities must be in line with and in support of U.S. policy objectives.

Point of contact for this session is Professor J. D. Waghelstein, C-421.

D. Questions:

What were the U.S. national interests in El Salvador?

How does this case compare with other insurgencies? (e. g., Malaya, Algeria, Greece and the Philippines).

How do the FMLN's organization, objectives and strategy compare with other models?

How did the Principles of MOOTW apply to the El Salvador case?

Consider the advice offered to the U.S. ambassador to El Salvador and, subsequently, the advice offered to the host government and its armed forces in developing the counterinsurgency campaign strategy.

Why was the problem approached via the ambassador and couched in the form of advice?

Assess the success of the campaign.

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, 26 June 1996, Executive Summary, pp. vii-xii (Issued).

Waghelstein's "El Salvador: Observations and Experiences..." (**NWC 3014**) (Issued).

CIA, "Guide to Analysis..." (**NWC 2228**) (Issued).

Evans, Ernest, "El Salvador Lessons for Future U S Interventions." (**NWC 3004**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Hamilton's unpublished draft. (**NWC 2059**) (Seminar Reserve).

Waghelstein's "Ruminations...." (**NWC 2090**) (Issued).

Abrams' "American Victory." (**NWC 2076**) (Seminar Reserve).

Karl's "....Negotiated Revolution." (**NWC 2098**) (Seminar Reserve).

White, "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare."(**NWC 3060**) (Seminar Reserve).

Waghelstein's "El Salvador and the Press," *Parameters,* Fall 1985. (Library Reserve).

A. Focus:

This session examines Peace Operations. It uses two historical examples to illustrate the use of military force and emerging doctrine (to include conflict termination) in Peace Operations. The seminar will conduct a critical analysis of U.S. Peace Operations in Somalia and Haiti. It will then compare and contrast the two operations and discuss the operational lessons learned from them. Specific briefing requirements will be discussed in the seminar.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Know the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces in peace operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint and multinational peace operations.
- **PJE**—Know current joint doctrine regarding peace operations.
- Analyze how theory and the Principles of MOOTW-SLURPO apply to peace operations at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination, as illustrated by U.S. Peace Operations in Somalia and Haiti.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political developments on the planning process in relation to U.S. Peace Operations in Somalia and Haiti.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how Information Operations (IO) were integrated to support national and military strategies in U.S. Peace Operations in Somalia and Haiti.

C. Background:

U.S. military involvement in peace operations has increased dramatically in the past decade. Current world events point to continued involvement in the foreseeable future. Peace operations present a new challenge to those who spent years preparing to fight conventional wars. Peace operations may take place in environments far less defined than combat, where combat power may be less important than non-combat power. The political and cultural dimensions may become central to the conflict and force may be needed to compel, rather than destroy. There are even new principles, The Principles of MOOTW (SLURPO), that supplement the Principles of War and guide our training and mission execution.

Additionally, the terminology of peace operations can be confusing. The subtle differences that characterize almost every mission have created a broad range of definitions to describe them. Joint Doctrine correctly defines the terms associated with peace operations. The student must be comfortable with these definitions, be able to analyze, to discuss, and—most importantly—to conduct peace operations in concert with other military leaders, interagency officials, the media, and non-governmental and private voluntary organizations (NGOs and PVOs).

The two cases provide a variety of political, economic, cultural, legal, and military challenges that faced both the United States and the United Nations in Somalia and Haiti. The student should be prepared to discuss the major lessons learned from each of these cases, analyze their possible impact on current and future peace operations

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel M. J. McKearn, U.S.Army, C-408.

D. Questions:

What are the distinctive characteristics of the following terms: Peace Operations, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Aggravated Peacekeeping, Peace Building, and Peace Enforcement?

Which governmental agency will likely take the lead in each specific type of peace operation?

What is/should be the role of the military commander in planning conflict termination in peace operations?

How effectively were the Principles of MOOTW (SLURPO) applied in Somalia and Haiti?

What lessons from Somalia and Haiti might apply to future peace operations?

What role might Information Warfare play in peace operations?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. Chapters I through XII. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations,* Chapters III, IV and GL-1 to GL-4. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,* Chapter II. (Issued).

Strednansky, "Balancing The Trinity." **(NWC 3013)** (Issued).

Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned.* (Issued).

Bentley & Oakley, "Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti." (**NWC 3083**) (Issued).

Brennan & Ellis, "Information Warfare in Multinational Peace Operations." (**NWC 2038**) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Hayes and Wheatley, "Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti-A Case Study." (Seminar Reserve).

Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Haiti: Initial Impressions," Vol III, July 1995. (Seminar Reserve).

THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION EXERCISE: OPERATION *COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN*

"Joint force commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges."

Joint Pub 3-08

A. Focus:

This exercise is intended to synthesize and reinforce the instruction in Block III by challenging the student to analyze the national response to a terrorist incident and to apply military planning logic in the preparation of an interagency Political-Military Implementation Plan (Pol-Mil Plan) in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56). In the years ahead, officers will be called upon ever more frequently to demonstrate their familiarity with the Interagency process in preparing for or managing contingency situations. Students need to understand both the military requirements of other national organizations and the support the Department of Defense may need to provide as a part of a broader government response.

B. Objectives:

- Apply national strategic guidance in the process of planning for operations in an interagency environment**.**
- Demonstrate the ability to develop input to an interagency Pol-Mil Plan in accordance with PDD-56.
- Analyze the multinational and interagency challenges inherent in post-conflict operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine related to interagency operations.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces in an interagency environment.

C. Background:

As a part of the ongoing global war against terrorism the United States has developed a campaign designed to restore stability in South East Asia. The first major operation in that campaign is nearing completion, a subsequent operation (COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN), now in development, is designed to resolve the multinational and interagency challenges remaining following the completion of the initial major military operation and reach the U.S. desired endstate.

This exercise will be the synthesizing event for Block Three and will encompass a brief introduction session and two three-hour morning sessions capped by a presentation of student input to the Pol-Mil planning effort.

Following the brief introduction session, students will come to the first session prepared to conduct an analysis of the current situation in the affected region and to prepare draft DoD input to the PDD–56 Pol-Mil Plan in accordance with the required readings. In the second session, students will role play as PACOM planners tasked to prepare draft input to the Interagency planning process. Students may discuss how their plan may interface

with other agencies' planning and how other agencies may impact on DoD's role in dealing with the crisis. Clearly, the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and several other agencies will be involved. The main objective of this exercise is not to produce a finished Pol-Mil Plan, but to improve students' ability to analyze such situations and to familiarize the students with the PDD-56 interagency planning process. Students will not be required to play interagency roles *per se*, but a thorough review of Joint Pub 3-08, Volume II, will acquaint students with the functions of the various agency roles in such situations. Students should come to class prepared to discuss interagency functions and points of view.

In Washington, the National Security Council will have the lead in the interagency process on such matters. The NSC will work through the standing interagency within the National Security Council system. Such interagency coordination should be reflected at the strategic theater and operational levels as well, including Theater Staff coordination with affected embassies in the region.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-411.

D. Required Readings:

Operation COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN Readings. (**NWC 3047**) (Issued).

"White Paper on Presidential Decision Directive 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations", 1998. (**NWC 3072**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-08 Volumes I and II, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*. (Issued).

MULTI-CRISIS PLANNING EXERCISE

The war with Japan had been re-enacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people and in so many ways, that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war…

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, 1960

A. Focus:

Block IV of the JMO curriculum consists of the Multi-Crisis Planning Exercise (MCPE). The purpose of the MCPE is to synthesize and reinforce the JMO course material through practical application in a realistic staff environment. This is an educational, planning exercise, designed to provide students with an opportunity to apply the principles and concepts studied throughout the trimester. While the issues students confront in this exercise are real, the situations used to highlight these issues and the solutions students select are only hypothetical.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces and how these forces are organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint, interagency and multinational operations.
- **PJE**—Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.
- **PJE**—Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the President of the United States/Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, Service Chiefs, and Joint Force Commanders (JFCs).
- **PJE**—Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine, the factors influencing joint doctrine, and the relationship between Service and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine and applicable concepts of International Law.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate the ability to plan for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives, and conflict termination.
- **PJE**—Through the framework provided by joint planning processes, explain the relationship between national objectives and means availability.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate an understanding of the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the military planning process.

- **PJE**—Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how opportunities and vulnerabilities are created by increased reliance on technology throughout the range of military operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how information operations (IO) must be integrated to support national and military strategies.
- Introduce collaborative-distributive planning tools to support the military planning process at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

The MCPE will be conducted over two weeks, scheduled generally from 0830-1630 each day. While some seminars may find it necessary to devote additional time, the schedule as published in the CNC&S MCPE Book (NWC **4001**) also includes times when students are not required to be present while the control staff is preparing assessments. Students must read the short article, *It's Time to Train for War* (NWC 4000), the MCPE Book and the Blue War Game ROE (NWC 1139) prior to the start of the exercise. Some additional research may be helpful to students to enhance their MCPE roles.

Student seminars will be assigned roles as staffs at the theater-strategic, operational and operational-tactical levels of war. Seminar moderators will make assignments to specific billets prior to the exercise. Certain billet holders will be scheduled to receive orientation on specific tools and/or procedures unique to their assigned billets; however, all students will receive a general Introduction to the MCPE, Public Affairs orientation and McCarty-Little Information Technology and Network training. While moderators will assign billets, students will be left to organize the flow of information and tasks within and among staffs.

The exercise will be conducted in three phases: pre-crisis and deployment, decisive operations, and post-hostilities.

In the pre-crisis phase, staffs will organize and familiarize themselves with the communications system and read information concerning developing crises.

As the crises blossom, staffs will begin the process of crisis action planning. The exercise is designed to highlight the realities of concurrent and parallel planning in a networked environment. All staffs will conduct their own estimates, make recommendations up the chain-of-command, and respond to tasking from their superiors. Similarly, the flow of information and events will challenge staffs to deal with immediate events while planning for future operations.

The decisive operations phase presents the staffs with the opportunity to respond to new and unexpected situations that will require new planning or execution of various branches or sequels within the original plan.

Issues of how to terminate hostilities and how to deal with the situation after conflict comprise the post-hostilities phase of the exercise and relate to the Desired End State, as defined by the political objective(s).

The Control Team for the exercise will be comprised of the seminar moderators, War Gaming Department representatives, representatives from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Detachment, and faculty members in your exercise's Control Group/ Higher Command Authorities cell. They will assist you with organization, exercise

mechanics, intelligence/information, and assessment. The Control Teams will provide feedback to their respective student staffs in the form of an assessment, enabling them to adjust their estimates and orders for subsequent moves.

Throughout the exercise, several issues will recur with which the students will have to deal, such as: staff processes that integrate political, military, informational and diplomatic factors; information operations; mine warfare; weapons of mass destruction; strategic mobility; and war termination.

The point of contact for this session is Captain R. M. Babb, U.S. Navy, C-423.

D. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, *CNW/NCC Multi-Crisis Planning Exercise Book*, Newport, RI, February 2003. **(NWC 4001)** (Issued separately).

Morgan, Thomas D., "It's Time to Train for War" *Proceedings*, December 1997. **(NWC 4000)** (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Commander's Estimate of the Situation Worksheet." **(NWC 4111F)** (Issued).

E. Supplementary Readings:

Since the MCPE involves application of material covered throughout the JMO curriculum, students can decide which references will be needed based on the role assigned and individual knowledge and experience. The documents listed below may be helpful.

CJCSM 3122.01, (JOPES Vol.1), *Planning Policies and Procedures*, 14 July 2000.

CJCSM 3122.03A, (JOPES Vol. II), *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance*, 31 December 1999, CH-1, 6 September 2000 (JEL) and (Seminar Reserve).

"Blue's War Game Rules of Engagement." **(NWC 1139)** (Issued).

Joint Pub 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, 9 March 2000. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 10 September 2001. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, 17 April 1998. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-12, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*, 15 December 1995.

Joint Pub 3-12.1, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations*, 9 February 1996.

Joint Pub 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, 7 September 1999. (Issued).

Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support for Joint Operations*, 6 April 2000. (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, 13 April 1995. (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures*, 13 January 1999. (Issued).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook, Newport, RI: Naval War College. **(NWC 3153G).** (Issued).

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, Chapters 5-10 (Issued).

Naval Warfare Publication 5-01 (Rev. A), *Naval Operational Planning*, May 1998 (Seminar Reserve).

General Comments:

CF-1 Course Overview (Lecture)
Comments:

CF-2 Introductory Seminar (Seminar)
Comments:

CF-3 The American Way of War (Lecture)
Comments:

CF-4 Operations Research Paper (Seminar)
Comments:

CF-5 The Naval Way of War (Lecture)
Comments:

CF-6 Diplomacy and Military Force (Seminar)
Comments:

CF-7 National Military Organization (Seminar)
Comments:

CF-8 The Strategic Objective
Comments:

CF-9 Joint Military Operations Final Examination (Seminar)
Comments:

General Comments:

OPS-I-1 Introduction to Operational Art
Comments:

OPS-I-2 Operational Art and Doctrine
Comments:

OPS-I-3 "The Battle for Leyte Gulf" (Film)
Comments:

OPS-I-4 Operational Factors
Comments:

OPS-I-5 Levels of War
Comments:

OPS-I-6 The Theater
Comments:

OPS-I-7 Operational Functions
Comments:

OPS-I-8 Elements of Operational Warfare
Comments:

OPS-I-9 Methods of Combat Force Employment
Comments:

OPS-I-10 Operational Warfare at Sea
Comments:

OPS-I-11 Principles of War
Comments:

OP-I-12 Operational Planning
Comments:

OP-I-13 Operational Leadership
Comments:

OPS I-14 Falkland/Malvinas Conflict: Case Study
Comments:

OPS I-15 Operational Concepts Examination
Comments:

OPS-I-16 Use of Force Under International Law
Comments:

OPS I-17 Operational Law and Factor Space
Comments:

OPS I-18 Law of Armed Conflict
Comments:

OPS I-19 Rules of Engagement
Comments:

OPS I-20 Operational Law - Case Study
Comments:

General Comments:

OPS-II-1 Major Operations in the Littorals
Comments:

OPS II-2 Strategic Mobility
Comments:

OPS-II-3 U.S. Navy Capabilities and Employment Considerations
Comments:

OPS-II-4 U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Employment Considerations
Comments:

OPS-II-5 U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities and Employment Considerations
Comments:

OPS-II-6 U.S. Army Capabilities and Employment Considerations
Comments:

OPS-II-7 U.S. Air Force Capabilities and Employment Considerations
Comments:

OPS-II-8 Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Employment Considerations
Comments:

OPS-II-9 Joint and Multinational Warfare Considerations
Comments:

OPS-II-10 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Part 1
Comments:

OPS-II-11 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Part 2
Comments:

OPS-II-12 C4ISR and Information Operations
Comments:

OPS-II-13 Weapons of Mass Destruction Considerations
Comments:

OPS-II-14 The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) Concepts
Comments:

BLOCK III. MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

General Comments:

OPS-III-1 Military Operations Other Than War
Comments:

OPS-III-2 Failed States
Comments:

OPS-III-3 The Interagency Process (Lecture and Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-4 Combating Terrorism
Comments:

OPS-III-5 Homeland Security
Comments:

OPS-III-6 Planning for Post-Conflict Operations
Comments:

OPS-III-7 Foreign Internal Defense
Comments:

OPS-III-8 Peace Operations
Comments:

OPS-III-9 Operation COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN
Comments:

Film Somalia
Comments:

Film MOOTW (General Zinni)
Comments:

General Comments:

OPS-IV-1 Multi-Crisis Planning Exercise (MCPE)
Comments:

The paper form on the pages which follow is provided to assist you in preparing your electronic response to our end of course questions.

We solicit your honest and thoughtful responses to this questionnaire in order to help us make the JMO course better. Please take the time to closely read the questions. Answer each question with the most objective response you can based on your experience in the course. Each section of this questionnaire has somewhat different rating parameters, so please pay close attention so that you do not inadvertently provide misleading data.

Please work through the form sequentially. Your comments will be collated in order to provide key insights to accurate data interpretation, so please take the time to write comments. It is important to get 100 percent participation so that the department gets a clear picture of the student body course assessment. Please submit the questionnaire electronically no later than 1200 on Friday, 7 March 2003. Responses to the questionnaire will not be released to the faculty until grades are posted.

Thank you for your help.

Captain A. J. Ruoti, Jr., U.S. Navy
Chairman,
Joint Military Operations Department

END OF COURSE QUESTIONNAIRE

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA will be used for analysis purposes only.

Seminar Number: _____

Service/Organization:	USN/USCG 1			
	USMC 2			
	USA 3			
	USAF 4			
	Civilian 5			
Component:	Regular 1	Reserve 2		
Previous PME:	Resident 1	Non-Resident 2	Both 3	None 4

Mark the boxes for your previous duty experience:

Joint Duty	Yes	No
Unified CINC Staff	Yes	No
Fleet/Corps/Air Force staff:	Yes	No
Service staff:	Yes	No
Multi-national Operations:	Yes	No

1. The knowledge I gained from the Joint Military Operations Course will be valuable to me in future joint assignments.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
   Comments:_____
   _____
   _____

2. Overall, I learned and benefited from this course.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
   Comments:_____
   _____
   _____

3. I feel prepared to apply what I learned in this course in my future work assignments.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
   Comments:_____
   _____
   _____

4. This course was well-planned and organized.

   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
   Comments:_____
   _____
   _____

5. The pace of this course was appropriate.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

6. Course difficulty was appropriate for my background.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

7. This course was an appropriate mix of lecture and discussion.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

8. The moderator team created an environment where all seminar members were encouraged to participate in discussions and ask questions.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

9. The moderator team respected my opinions.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

10. The moderators were fair and unbiased in the treatment of all students in this course.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

11. Course assignments and readings helped me to learn on my own.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
Comments:_____
_____

For questions 12-22, grade the JMO Course in terms of the degree to which the course enhanced your understanding of the following subject areas:

	Very Little						Very Much
12. Forces Capabilities and Employment Capabilities:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Operational Art Concepts:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. National Military Strategy:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Joint Doctrine:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Multinational Operations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Military Planning Process:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

18.	Service Doctrine:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19.	Naval Warfare	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20.	The Interagency Process:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21.	Military Operations Other Than War:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22.	International Law/ROE:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Comments:_____

_____

For questions 22-34, grade the value of each of the following in helping you to learn in this course.

23.	Seminar discussion:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24.	MCPE:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25.	Class-wide lectures:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26.	Operational Concepts Exam:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27.	Research Paper:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
28.	Discussions outside of class:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29.	Student presentations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30.	Case Studies:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
31.	Moderator team:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
32.	Law Moderator:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
33.	Required readings:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34.	Supplementary readings:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Comments:_____

_____

Rate the JMO Course in the following areas:

		Not Enough						Too Much
35.	Amount of reading:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
36.	Amount of writing:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37.	Amount of class time/week:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38.	Number of tests:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Comments:_____

_____

Rate the overall atmosphere in your seminar:

39.	Boring	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stimulating
40.	Threatening	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Supportive
41.	Few dominate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	All contribute

42. Divisive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Teamwork

Comments:_____

43. Considering study, research and reading outside of the classroom, I devoted about _____ hours per week to the course.

Comments:_____

_____

44. Are there any additions to the JMO course that you can suggest?

_____

_____

45. Are there any deletions from the JMO course that you can suggest?

_____

_____

46. Which topics were most beneficial?

_____

_____

47. What did you like most about the JMO course?

_____

_____

48. What did you like least about the JMO course?

_____

_____

49. Do you have any other comments of suggestions that can help make the course more relevant and timely?

_____

_____

50. Do you have any recommendations regarding the readings for Course Foundations, Block I, Block II, Block III, or Block IV?

_____

_____

51. Do you have any recommendations regarding the content of Course Foundations, Block I, Block II, Block III, or Block IV?

_____

_____

NOVEMBER 2002 CNC&S

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
				1
4	5	6	7	8
11	12	13	14	15
18	19	20	21	22
0830–0930 † CF-1 Course Overview 0945–1145 * CF-2 Introductory Seminar	0830–1000 † CF-3 The American Way of War (Lecture) 1015–1145 * CF-4 Operations Research Paper-Review	0830–1000 † CF-5 The Naval Way of War (Lecture) 1015–1145 * CF-6 Diplomacy and Military Force ELECTIVES BEGIN	0830–1000 * CF-7 National Military Organization 1015–1145 * CF-8 The Strategic Objective ELECTIVES BEGIN	**Student Research**
25	26	27	28	29
0830–1000 * OPS-I-1 Introduction to Operational Art 1015–1145 * OPS-I-2 Operational Art and Doctrine	0830–0945 * OPS-I-3 The Battle of Leyte Gulf-Film 1000–1130 * OPS-I-4 Operational Factors	**Thanksgiving**	**Thanksgiving**	**Thanksgiving**

*Seminar † Spruance Auditorium ♠ Secret NOFORN

DECEMBER 2002 CNC&S

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
2	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
0830–0945 * OPS-I-5 Levels of War 1000–1115 * OPS-I-6 The Theater	0830–1000 * OPS-I-7 Operational Functions 1015–1145 * OPS-I-8 Elements of Operational Warfare	0830–1000 * OPS-I-9 Methods of Combat Force Employment 1015-1145 * OPS-I-10 Operational Warfare at Sea **ELECTIVES**	0830–0930 * OPS-I-11 Principles of War 0945-1145 * OPS-I-12 Operational Planning **ELECTIVES**	0830–1000 * OPS-I-13 Operational Leadership
9	**10**	**11**	**12**	**13**
0830-1630 † * OPS-I-14 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: A Case Study The Strategic Setting † (0830) Falklands Film † (0930) **Paper Topics Due NLT 1630**	0830-1630 * OPS-I-14 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: Preparation **Tutorials**	0830-1145 * OPS-I-14 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: Presentations **Exam Read-ahead Distributed** **Tutorials** **ELECTIVES**	**Student Study** **Tutorials** **ELECTIVES**	0800-1200 * OPS-I-15 Operational Concepts Examination **Tutorials**
16	**17**	**18**	**19**	**20**
Odd Seminars Student Research **Even Seminars** 0830–1000 * OPS-I-16 Use of Force Under International Law 1015–1145 * OPS-I-17 Operational Law and Factor Space*	**Odd Seminars** 0830–1000 * OPS-I-16 Use of Force Under International Law 1015–1145 * OPS-I-17 Operational Law and Factor Space **Even Seminars** Student Research	**Odd Seminars** Student Research **Even Seminars** 0830–1000 * OPS-I-18 Law of Armed Conflict 1015–1145 * OPS-I-19 Rules of Engagement **ELECTIVES**	**Odd Seminars** 0830–1000 * OPS-I-18 Law of Armed Conflict 1015–1145 * OPS-I-19 Rules of Engagement **Even Seminars** Student Research **ELECTIVES**	0830-1000 * OPS-I-20 Operational Law Case Study
23	**24**	**25**	**26**	**27**
Christmas Recess	**Christmas Recess**	**Christmas Recess**	**Christmas Recess**	**Christmas Recess**
30	**31**			
Christmas Recess	**Christmas Recess**			

*Seminar † Spruance Auditorium ♠ Secret NOFORN

JANUARY 2003 CNC&S

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
		1	2	3
	Christmas Recess	**Christmas Recess**	**Christmas Recess**	**Christmas Recess**
6	7	8	9	10
0830–1000 * OPS-II-1 Major Operations in the Littoral 1015–1215 * OPS-II-2 Strategic Mobility **Exams Returned**	0830–1030* OPS-II-3 U.S. Navy Capabilities and Employment Considerations 1045-1145 * OPS-II-4 U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Employment Considerations	0830–1000* OPS-II-5 U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities and Employment Considerations 1015-1145 * OPS-II-6 U.S. Army Capabilities and Employment Considerations **ELECTIVES**	0830–1000* OPS-II-7 U.S. Air Force Capabilities and Employment Considerations 1015-1145 * OPS-II-8 Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Employment Considerations **ELECTIVES**	**Student Research**
13	14	15	16	17
0830–1145 * OPS-II-9 Joint and Multinational Warfare Considerations	0830–1145 * OPS-II-10 Joint Operational Planning and Execution Systems (JOPES) Part I ♠	0830–1145 * OPS-II-11 Joint Operational Planning and Execution Systems (JOPES) Part II ♠ **ELECTIVES**	0830–1145 † * OPS-II-12 C4ISR and Information Operations (Lecture/Seminar) ♠ **ELECTIVES**	**Student Research**
20	21	22	23	24
Martin Luther King, Jr. Birthday	0830–1000 * OPS-II-13 Weapons of Mass Destruction Considerations 1015–1145* OPS II-14 The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) Concepts	0830–1145* OPS II-14 The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) Concepts **ELECTIVES**	0830–1145* OPS II-14 The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) Concepts **ELECTIVES**	0830–1145* OPS II-14 The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) Concepts
27	28	29	30	31
0830–1630* OPS II-14 The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) Concepts	0830–1630* OPS II-14 The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) Concepts	0830–1000 * OPS-III-1 Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 1015-1145 * OPS-III-2 Failed States **ELECTIVES**	0830-1145 †* OPS-III-3 The Interagency Process (Lecture & Seminar) **ELECTIVES**	**Student Research**

*Seminar † Spruance Auditorium ♠ Secret NOFORN

FEBRUARY 2003 CNC&S

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Student Research **OPS Paper Due (1630)**	0830–1145 * OPS-III-4 Combating Terrorism	0830–1145 * OPS-III-5 Homeland Security	0830–1145 * OPS-III-6 Planning for Post-conflict Operations	**Student Research**
		ELECTIVES	**ELECTIVES**	
10	**11**	**12**	**13**	**14**
0830-1145 * OPS-III-7 Foreign Internal Defense Case Study-Preparation	0830–1145 * OPS-III-7 Foreign Internal Defense Case Study-Presentation	0830–1000 * Film - Somalia 1015–1140 * Film - MOOTW 1140-1145* OPS-III-8 Introduction to Peace Operations Case Studies	0830-1145 * OPS-III-8 Peace Operation Case Studies - Preparation	0830–1145 * OPS-III-8 Peace Operation Case Studies - Presentations
		ELECTIVES END	**ELECTIVES END**	
17	**18**	**19**	**20**	**21**
Holiday	0830–1145 * OPS-III-9 Operation COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN	0830–1145 * OPS-III-9 Operation COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN	0830–1145 * OPS-III-9 Operation COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN	0830-1000 Multi-crisis Planning Exercise (MCPE) Intro 1015-1200 MCPE J-2 Training/Combatant Commander IT Training
24	**25**	**26**	**27**	**28**
0830-1015 JTF IT Training 0830-1015 Combatant Commanders Plan **OPS Paper Returned**	0830–1630 MCPE	0830–1630 MCPE	0830–1630 MCPE	0830–1630 MCPE

*Seminar † Spruance Auditorium ♠ Secret NOFORN

MARCH 2003 CNC&S

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
0830–1630 MCPE	0830–1630 MCPE	0830–1230 MCPE	**Student Admin**	0800-1200 CF-9 Joint Maritime Operations Final Examination
10	**11**	**12**	**13**	**14**
Intersessional Conference	**Student Admin**	**Graduation**		
17	**18**	**19**	**20**	**21**
24	**25**	**26**	**27**	**28**
31				